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AN
E S S A Y
ON THE
PHILOSOPHY
OF
CHRISTIANITY.

PART THE FIRST,

CONTAINING
PRELIMINARY DISQUISITIONS
ON
P O W E R,
AND
HUMAN PREFERENCE.

By CALEB PITT.

Power *belongeth* unto God. PSAL. lxii. 11.
Thy people *shall be* willing in the day of thy power. cx. 3.
It is God which worketh in you to will and to do of *his*
good pleasure. PHIL. ii. 13.

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TO THE
FAITHFUL PREACHERS
OF THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST,
OF ALL DENOMINATIONS,
THE FOLLOWING DISQUISITIONS
ON POWER AND HUMAN PREFERENCE,
ARE,
WITH GREAT DEFERENCE,
INSCRIBED,
BY
THEIR AFFECTIONATE WELL-WISHER
AND
HUMBLE SERVANT,
THE AUTHOR.

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INTRODUCTION.

GOD, who at various times and in divers manners spake to the world by patriarchs, prophets, evangelists and apostles, hath also, by a special providence, conveyed down to us the holy scriptures, the writings penned under divine inspiration and superintendency. The hand of God seems equally evident in preserving copies of them through the various declensions and persecutions of the church: and in preserving them from sophistical alterations, to which preservation the order of scribes, under the Mosaic dispensation, and the disputes among Christians under the present, seem to have eminently concurred.

Every man favored with these revelations, I apprehend, has an unquestionable right to endeavour an investigation as he may have opportunity. The process used for such discoveries may be called philosophizing, so, the nature, operation, and influence of these revelations generally

conceived, and as a branch of knowledge, I call the *Philosophy of Christianity*.

Prejudices of education and of superstition, occasion some to be disgusted at whatsoever is called philosophy; and to start at the thought of treating Christianity philosophically. If the disgust of such should prevent their reading this Essay, I can have no direct concern with them. The holy scriptures address mankind as rational beings, and my wish is, with divine concurrence, to lend a hand to the sincere searcher of religious truth. Undoubtedly passion and imagination, as well as understanding, are in their exercise essential to actual and vital godliness; but experienced Christians will assign understanding and a sound theory to take the lead in precedence, since the warmth of affection, and the soarings of fancy cannot be valuable and permanent unless truth is their support. I conceive it demonstrable from the essential perfections of God, that science truly so called, and sound philosophy of every species, do, in the nature of things, perfectly harmonize with all the revelations of God: and am so far from condemning science and rational philosophy, that I am inclined to think, evidence and assent respecting that harmony will progressively increase with the duration of the world, until the knowledge of Christ the glory of the Lord, shall fill the earth, as the waters the place of the seas.

Philosophy

Philosophy may, consistently with the design of this Essay, be distinguished as its objects are either the works of God, or the revelations of God.—This seems the process of human philosophizing, and equally applicable to the philosophy of the universe, and philosophy of Christianity. First, We endeavour from a selection of appearances and experimental discoveries, to trace out some of the rules or laws of the operation and influence of things: then we endeavour by these to discover some of the properties and needful circumstances of the objects thus concurring to efficiency: next we endeavour to discover what are the determinate essentials of the objects concerned: and lastly, we apply our knowledge thus attained to the solution of other difficulties. By this employment we come at a number of established points: but reflecting, that all the works of God, and all the revelations of God, must be analagous and harmonious, we are prompted to push forwards towards systematic knowledge on these subjects.

Now ariseth hypothesis, or a system founded on supposition. That hypothesis, which in our judgment, whilst it consists with all the appearances and experiments made in the universe, is evidently consistent with itself and all other species of evident knowledge, should be esteemed, till we find a better, a good system of philosophy of the works of God. Again, That hypothesis, which

which whilst it consists with all the passages of scripture and the experiments of believers, is evidently consistent with itself, and all other species of human knowledge, must be reckoned a good system, till we find a better, of the philosophy of revealed truth.

Every hypothesis in either of these branches of philosophy, ought ever to be exposed to strict and repeated scrutiny: for we are finite beings, new discoveries may arise which shall dissipate a long received hypothesis, like as a breath, the winged seeds of dandelion. I conceive true critics of every class to be a set of men, "whose business it is to pick holes in the fabric of knowledge wherever it is weak and faulty, and when these places are properly repaired, the whole building becomes more firm and solid than it was formerly." The hypotheses of philosophers respecting the works of God, are treated with freedom, they rise, they are fully examined, they occasionally sink: thus also no hypothesis for explaining the scriptures can be rationally secluded from free investigation.

In church history relations are not unfrequent of the rise, progress, and fall of an hypothesis in religion, notwithstanding the absurd endeavours of men, prompted by carnal policy or other motives to establish and perpetuate uniformity of faith, that is, when stripped of disguise, uniformity of hypothesis. The attempt to establish, perpetuate,
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and render an hypothesis permanent, whether by a pontiff, a general council, or a national government seems to me at best, the offspring of blind zeal and presumption, actually inimical to free discussion, and probably to the progress of religious truth. Certainly every intelligent and sensible protestant must admit, that as every sect of christians is more or less erroneous, to establish a system by civil authority, is virtually to set up an Antichrist.

I grant that national encouragement given to creeds has cherished something approaching to religious truth in the world:—That such furtherance has sometimes had its utility, though at other times it has been an occasional injury to the cause of truth:—And that such collateral assistances have been not only admitted and permitted, but approved by our Maker. Kings were in his wise providence to be nursing fathers, and queens nursing mothers to his Israel. *Isaiah 49, 23.* But this is a distinct thing from the establishment of a system, before censured, and which, I think, the scriptures no where authorize.

As the bee gathers honey from all flowers, so we are warranted to gain knowledge from any writers we can read with safety. But, perhaps, some of my brethren have sat so much at the feet of papists, that they begin to kiss a toe: what I am going to say will not be relished by such. I say, that, in my judgment *it is a question of christian*

tian prudence, and that as such it may be lawfully debated whether it is good, all things considered, that civil governments should *continue* to provide for the support of christian worship, according to the sentiments adopted by the majority.

I think it cannot be disputed, whether it is *lawful* for a civil government to provide for the expences of the popular worship of a country, for "the majority have a right to adopt what mode of worship they please," the question is, its *expediency*. It will be alledged on the one hand that such support provides a more regular ministry throughout a whole country, than would be the result of independent societies; and that in fact such support contributes to render religion popular.—And it will be urged on the other hand, that the late discovery, and general use of the art of printing, renders it dispensible by superseding all its benefits: that it tendeth to carnalize the christian societies, chiefly, as throwing a bait to infidels in respect of a sacred office, and as being the grand source of systematic persecution: and that the example of the progress of religion, under the denominations of quakers, baptists and methodists, in the present century, without national provision, establishes irrefragable evidence that christianity needs no more than civil protection of the rights of human beings, for making its way in the world.

But although it may be debated, whether, all things

things considered, it is best for civil governments to provide for the accommodation of the popular worship ; yet surely, it does not need debate to discover that the popular creed of a country ought to be open to repeated revision, and subject to new editions. Certainly, with the Bible in our hands, we must agree that no christian is authorized to take up carnal weapons to enforce a creed or prescription of worship. Surely a liberal and generous mind will not hold it disputable whether it is right, or even politic, for civil governments to *sanction* creeds by measures respecting dissenters, which violate the natural unalienable rights of mankind.

May the great events now taking place in the world be over-ruled to facilitate the progress of truth and righteousness.—May the great Author of christianity hasten the time when consciences shall be unfettered, and free enquiry in religious matters be protected and encouraged all over the globe ! O blessed Jesus, we anticipate the auspicious day, when our present advances in thy knowledge shall be absorbed, as the morning star is extinguished by the rising sun !

The author of this Essay being at an early age attached to religion, and addicted to study, he laboured for rational evidence, and to harmonize the points he had received. The acknowledged difficulties attending opposing systems were soon remarked : and after much thought on the subject, he

he was led to suspect that the chief discordancies among protestants originated in crude and indeterminate notions of power, and of human preference. At several seasons he committed his thoughts on these themes to writing, and lately has employed himself in arranging and revising the manuscripts. These disquisitions on power and preference are the result. The writer did not rest here, but has sketched a delineation of his ideas of scripture doctrines, as affected by these disquisitions. It was not his intention to have published the disquisitions until he should conceive the application also ready for the public; but was swayed by the opinion of the late Rev. Dr. Samuel Stennett, who advised printing the disquisitions first; and to indicate in a preface that the author published them, because he conceived they were likely to assist the rational investigation of the religion of the Bible; and, in connection with an application to religious subjects, intended to be published at a future time. To this advice he cheerfully conformed, from the consideration, that sending them out alone would give full opportunity for intelligent Christians to make application in their own way, without any thing like bias or coercion. This, candid reader, is a short history of the work.

My first personal acquaintance with that excellent character just mentioned, and whose death we mourn,

mourn, was through submitting my manuscript to his perusal; to which I was induced by a persuasion of his eminent piety, benevolence, moderation, and advances in the philosophy of Christianity. When I was last in his company on the subject of this Essay, he said to this effect, The perusal of your Disquisitions afforded me much pleasure, and a fine entertainment. They contain many new thoughts, at least thoughts new to me, which if published, will probably assist the rational investigation of revealed religion, or be of importance to the improvement of what you call the philosophy of Christianity. The religion of Jesus has nothing to fear from the progress and advances of any species of knowledge.—To throw light on the great debate between the reformed Churches—to manifest the union of natural with revealed religion—and to evince the consistency of the sacred scriptures, are desirable objects. My age and infirmities, and many services, prevent my personal attempts of that nature to the degree I could wish.

Memory does not enable me to do justice to the Doctor's language; I can only say, These thoughts, among many others, some of which would not become me to mention, were expressed in that easy and beautiful style in which he excelled. Doctor Stennett, (late Pastor of the Baptist Church Assembling, in Little Wild-Street, Lincoln's-Inn-Fields) was the preacher in London, who seemed nearest my

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way

way of thinking on religious subjects; and I may add, That I did not perceive any thing in his preaching, during the three years I attended his ministry, that materially jarred with any of my positions.—May his son, who eminently retains his wholesome doctrine, piety, and philanthropy, long live a benefactor of the world.

If I had not apprehended that my way of thinking on power and preference was very different from that of all others, I had read or heard, and had I not conceived, that the communication was likely to prove subservient to the cause of truth, and to conduce to the benefit of mankind; my aspiration to be an author would not have carried me to selecting and retailing the works of others, for gratifying that flame. If I have discovered and exhibited any thing valuable on these subjects which cannot be met with in other books: Let the reader ascribe it to the Divine Being, who is light and love, and who giveth understanding. In a course of diligence and conscious dependence God hath communicated it. I am disposed like the apostle rather to glory in my infirmity that divine power may rest in me. Happy shall I be to enjoy increasing evidence that this result of my humble efforts doth actually concur with the high end of God in his dispensations, and trust I shall again rejoice, if I live to see my own obscurities, inconsistencies and errors amended, and the gospel

pel of free grace more abundantly to have free course, run, and be glorious.

In conveying my conceptions, I have studied plainness of speech, and not a flowery diction. Tropes and figures have a large place in popular harangues, but I think should be used sparingly in philosophical writings; for what sincere searcher of truth can help lamenting their debasement to fill a chasm in knowledge, or to disguise an author's ignorance on a single point of his subject?

In all parts of this Essay I have endeavoured to write clearly and distinctly, or in a perspicuous manner and method. Certainly the author is censurable who does not endeavour to render his meaning obvious and easy to be discovered, notwithstanding he thereby holds up a light, by which the reader may discover his defects; and notwithstanding a mystic obscurity renders some writers almost invulnerable respecting their errors.

E R R A T A.

Page 97, line 11, for *depending*, read *defending*.

—42, — 17, for *application*, read *applications*.

—42, — 27, for *operation*, read *operations*.

—82, — 22, for *in*, read *us*.

—205, — 5, for *wishes*, read *desires*.

—251, — 2, dele *it*.

—246, — 2, after *desire*, read, or at least *aversions*.

—246, — 3, for *desire*, read *emotion*.

—278, — 24, for *notwithstanding*, read *nevertheless*.

A
DISQUISITION
ON
POWER.

SECTION I.

Of a determinate Notion of POWER.

BEING or existence, is the name we give to a simple object of conception, the notion of which is attained by abstraction. The notion of existence seems the only unlimitedly general or universal notion we are capable of forming. It is naturally and obviously essential to every possible object of conception. Logically considered, it is the most universal of all our notions of mode, as applicable to every thought of our minds, respecting either matter or spirit.

If we consider existence as a whole, the first division is into existence actual, and existence

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merely

merely in conception. The former is applicable to all we see, hear, feel, taste, smell or know to exist, independent in any respect on one's own mind, that is, whether we suppose my mind or the mind of some other person to exist, or not, capable of conceiving them. Actual existence is extended also to all mental existence, conceived, without respect to its objects. The latter is applied to all our conceptions which have no objects actually existing; but which are merely imagined, fictitious or fancied beings; that is, what we express by the term possibles.

Another division of our notion of being is, into positive being and negative being. Objects of both the former classes may be positive beings: but the objects of mere conception, alone, can be negative beings. Again, Objects of the class of positives, may be both actual beings and imagined beings: but objects of the negative class, such as all negations and privations, are never more than merely conceived or imagined beings. The primary affections of being are duration and extension—duration and extension are affections equally applied to the negation of beings, as to positive beings. We conceive that were there no positive existence, yet duration and extension must be.

Power, is in its own nature an actual and positive being: and ontologically considered, is an affection of being, next in order of nature to extension

sion and duration, it being essential to all actual being. We are incapable of forming a picturesque conception of power; nor is it a transcript by reflection from our consciousness: but it is, like extension and duration, a simple object of thought, the thought of every one, which can only be singled out by its relations and accompanying objects.

The mind being every day informed by the senses of the alterations of the simple modes it observes in external objects actually existing, and taking notice how one comes to an end and ceases to be, and another begins to exist, which was not before. And concluding from what it has so constantly observed to have been, that the like changes will for the future be made in the same things by like objects and by like ways, considers respecting one thing the possibility of having any of its simple modes changed, and respecting another the actually concurring to that change, and so comes to a notion of that which we call power.

Reflection on what passes in our own minds, also, leads us to the conception of power. The mind reflecting on what it is conscious of within itself, and observing a constant change of its thoughts, sometimes by the impressions of outward objects on the senses, and sometimes through the medium of its determinations or other modified thoughts;

and considering as before, that the like changes will in future be made in the same objects of thought by like objects, by the like ways, considers respecting one thought, the possibility, of having any of its simple objects changed, and respecting another thought, the actually concurring to that change, and hence also comes to the conception of that object which is denominated power.

Power or energy is not only essential to producing and sustaining change : but also to abiding or enduring, in opposition to change. We cannot reflect on the origin, continuation or destruction of being, without admitting the existence of power. We cannot reflect on the origin of our existence without unavoidably admitting the existence of power, adequate power ; nor can we reflect on our daily preservation, without some notion of accompanying power ; neither can we anticipate our advancement in a future state, without this essential co-existent. Indeed the actual existence of power perpetually forceth itself on us : and thus aids our conception of itself, that simple incomprehensible thing we call power.

Power, is that by which change is immediately produced, and by which enduring is sustained in opposition to change. I believe myself incapable of a direct and absolute conception of power, yet
think

think I have a determinate conception of it: as a simple object, like other simple objects, it is incapable of a definition composed of the genus, species and difference, that is, of a strictly logical definition: Yet if we reflect that power is always relative, the reflection, on its relation to change, enables us to determine its notion, or furnishes us ample materials for that purpose.

Some have endeavoured to persuade us, that no difficulty attends the meaning of the word power: but on reading the works of the same Gentlemen, I have found more ambiguity and indeterminedness of meaning affixed to the word, than I could have expected from their learning and acumen. They seem to have no apprehension of ambiguity, when they confound power with property, ability, capacity, might, liberty, dominion, possibility and several other terms, all which admit determinate meanings. I do not think it trifling or needless, seriously to enquire, what is meant by power, for although it is a common word in our language, used every day in conversation, it does not seem used with a determinate signification. If I say, the human mind has the property of perceiving, and that it has the power of perceiving: these expressions will be admitted as synonymous. If I say, fire has ability to melt brass, and that, fire has power to melt brass, these expressions also will be ac-

counted synonymous. And if I say, brass has capacity to be melted by fire, and that brass has power to be melted by fire: Those philosophers do not dispute their equivalence, who admit the notion of passive power. Again, a strong wind, and a powerful wind, are confounded together. Liberty to stretch forth my arm or to forbear it; and power to stretch forth my arm or to refrain it, pass for the same conception. And to delegate power to the King, and to delegate dominion to him, pass for expressions of the same notion. We shall find ere long, at least I venture to assert, that there is more than the shadow of difference between these contrasted expressions.—When I have noticed the adroit use of the word power in three or four, and sometimes five or six different senses in the same chapter or oration, it has reminded me of the stage actor who becomes Hector or Achilles, Cæsar or Cato, Bevil or George Barnwell, as suits the manager's purpose. But what is most amazing, is, that all agree, power is a simple thing: That “it is a thing so much of its own kind, and so simple in its nature, as not to admit of a logical definition.” Let us endeavour to call back this poor prostitute, and espouse her to a single determinate meaning.

1. Power is the primary grand essential to producing of change. There must also be Operation otherwise

otherwise there will be no change, but operation is essentially dependent on power. Power is always first in order of nature, therefore we rightly affirm that power is the primary grand essential to the production of change.

2. The notion of *producing change* leads to power, yet without strict attention to the word *producing*, this is too general; for if we reflect, numerous changes are as fully connected with the absence of power, as others with its presence. Power then is related to *value, excellence, or advancement from non-entity*. The bringing this world from chaos, we ascribe to power; but should it again decay, return to chaos, we should attribute that change to the absence of power in respect of sustaining it.

I grant that people seem generally to hold a notion that every change must depend on ability to produce it. Hence, even in cases of evident decay, perishing and declensions, by a trope, they ascribe the event to some ability and operation.—A tree dies through old age—a man dies by a consumption—another of old age.—We say time killed the tree—old age killed the man, and that the consumption killed this man, and the fever that man. But in either of these cases where shall a philosopher find the object in which he can admit ability, and what the object which operates? The death in either case is the essential

tial consequent of decay of properties in the objects, and consequently decay of power in respect of abiding or enduring.

Power is essentially related to value or excellence, to excellence on the whole, excellence in finity and eternity considered. The separate existence of either power or excellence is impossible. Were there nothing valuable or excellent in existence there would be no power. Were there no power in existence there would be no excellence. The highest *kinds* of excellence we have conception of, I think are *knowledge* and *enjoyment*: Hence power is essentially related to truth and goodness, immutable and immortal truth and goodness. The highest *degree* of every species of excellence we call *perfection*: Power then is essentially related to truth, goodness and perfection.

The rule then is, All changes for the better, or to the advance of real excellence, are the result of power: but all changes for the worse, or declensions from former excellence, are the result of the absence of power. When a scholar advances in learning, we rightly ascribe the improvement to the concurrence of power: but when a lad, unduly indulged by his parents with absence from school, falls back from the advances he had made, I ascribe it to absence of power in respect of tuition. And thus, when
a people

a people conquers another people, if the conquest is founded in unrighteousness, and is on the whole an evil to the human species, I think the change is rightly attributed to the absence of power in respect of defence.

3. Power has always the same respect to a positive cause, as its absence has to what is called a negative cause. View a man walking in the sunshine, I attribute his motion to power: but the motion of his shadow to its absence.

4. Nor does our contemplation of external and internal changes alone guide us to power, for, abiding and enduring in relation to change are equally the result of power. We cannot but admit power in existence to sustain any valuable object, which abides, endures or surmounts opposition. Thus a stone abides, a tree endures, and a diamond retains its polish. Thus also a thought of any valuable species, abides, endures and occupies the mind essentially dependent on power.

But here we must remark, as before, respecting changes, That power is still related to *value, advance, and excellence*: for abiding, enduring and perseverance, in degradation and loss, depends not on power, but its absence. Natural good and moral good, abide, endure, and persevere by power; but natural evil and moral evil, abide, endure, and prevail in the world by the absence of power,

power, in respect of resisting. We conceive permanency to depend on power, but accident, not on power, but its absence. Fortitude and obstinacy are mediate sources of perseverance. We rightly conceive fortitude to depend on power for its existence; but obstinacy, not on power, but its absence. I grant it true, that without power there could be no changes, nor abiding, in opposition to change; because without power, there could be no positive being that could be the subject of change, or which could abide.—What I contend for is, that power is not *immediately* or *directly* requisite to the existence of *every* change, or instance of actual abiding, in respect of opposition.

5. Power, is not existing, abiding, enduring, producing, or sustaining: yet it is that without which no being can in the nature of things exist, abide or endure, produce or sustain: For existence, immutability, production and mutability, essentially involve power to exist, power to abide and endure, power to produce and power to sustain. There is no power where there is no actual change, or actual abiding in opposition to change. The actual existence of power can be alone truly infered from actual change, or actual enduring, in opposition to change. Where there is no actual abiding or enduring, and on the other hand, no actual change, there is no power in that respect. As power and change, or power and abiding,

ing, are co-existent, although, in order of nature, power is before both; the former propositions are truly demonstrable.

6. Power has been, in my opinion, treated very absurdly by some philosophers, and inconsistently with their own and the foregoing account of it, when one class of them distinguish it into active and passive, and another class into intellectual and active. If the nature of things be considered, their division is not a distribution of a genus into its species, an universal whole into its kinds: but it is rather the division of an integral whole into its parts. Now if my readers think as I do, they will conceive of power, respecting the production of change, and respecting abiding and enduring, in opposition to change, as a simple object of conception, like immensity and duration, a unit, an integer, an undistinguishable whole, in which case, if my representation be just, the distinguishing power into its kinds, is as absurd, as dividing an animal into head, trunk and extremities, and then calling and accounting the head an animal, the trunk an animal, and the extreme parts also animals.

In my opinion, the reason of this inconsistent and absurd treatment of power, is this, Philosophers have confounded their conception of power with that of property.—Property is any mode or quality of being essential to the existence of power

or energy; but not power and energy itself. Property is more remotely conceived, a mode essential to casual influence, and as most objects have more modes than one which are essential to the existence of casual influence, therefore, most objects have a plurality of property, that is, have properties.

Properties are of such importance in relation to power, that it is proper to familiarize their conception as we go forward.

7. A property is a mode or quality in a being, which is related to a quality or mode in some other being: But this description is too general, we must add, that it is immediately essential to the existence of power, in whatsoever respect power existeth.

A property cannot exist without a subject to which it belongs; for property is a mode; and all modes essentially require a subject to their existence. That a property may exist without any being or subject to which that property may be attributed, is an absurdity.

It is a quality which may be varied not only in degree but also in kind; and we distinguish both the kind and degree by their conduciveness to the existence of power, and by the object of the power. Thus the property of moving, and the property of thinking, are different kinds of properties: But the property of supporting one hundred weight,
and

and the property of supporting two hundred, are different degrees of the same kind.

We cannot conclude the want of a certain property from its not being exercised. Nor from the exercise of a less degree of a property, can we conclude that there is no greater degree in the subject. Thus, though a man on a certain occasion said nothing, we cannot conclude from that fact, that he had not the property of speech; nor from a man's supporting ten pounds weight, can we conclude that he had not the property of supporting twenty.

There are some qualities that have contraries, others that have not; properties are qualities of the latter kind. There may be weakness or privation of properties, but not contraries to them.

As there are some things of which we have a direct, and others of which we have a relative conception, properties belong to the latter class. Of some things we know what they are in themselves; our conceptions of such things we call *direct*. Of other things, we know not what they are in themselves, but only in their attributes and certain relations to other things; of these our conception is only *relative*. Relative attributes of that kind which is immediately essential to the existence of power, are properties. All the primary qualities of body, figure, extension, solidity, hardness, fluidity, and the like, are objects of direct conception; but the various properties

of bodies, such as that in the sun, respecting the warmth of the earth, that in fire, respecting the burning of wood, and that in the magnet, respecting iron; and on the other hand, the property of the earth in respect of the property of the sun, that of the wood in respect of that in the fire, and that of iron in respect of that of the magnet; these are relative conceptions.

All our knowledge of properties seems dependent on experiments, our own experiments or those of other people. Till gold was exposed to the fire, the property of fire to melt gold, and the property in gold to be melted by fire, were unknown.

Properties are active and passive. This is the most obvious and important distinction of properties. The property of the fire in relation to melting gold is an active property: but the property of gold in relation to the fire is a passive property. Probably the distinction of nouns by the Greeks and Latins into masculine and feminine beyond the extension of actual gender, originated from the obvious distinction of things as being subjects more remarkably of active properties, or more remarkably of passive properties.

Properties are rightly distinguished into active and passive, for they owe their essence to the relation existing between active and passive.

Active properties let us call abilities, and passive properties we will call capacities. Let it be noticed,

noticed, that I purpose to use the term ability to express active property, and the term capacity to express passive property, in the farther prosecution of this Essay.

8. What has been called active power in one subject and what has been called passive power in another, are with great propriety called active property and passive property; but are improperly called power, for they are not power. It is a prostitution of the name to call either of them power: for no notion of power would through eternity be conveyed by them, unless the two subjects are brought in contact according to the laws of circumstances, and actual operation and influence take place and exist. Thus the sun has been said to have a power to bleach wax: but this is no other than active property. Wax has also been said to possess a power of being bleached by the sun, but this also is no other than passive property. And farther, Power doth never exist but with its proper circumstances. Let the wax be placed in a suitable situation for the sun's rays, and let the clouds permit the sun to shine on it at the proper season of the year, and for a proper time, then will power and consequent change exist. Properties are essential to power, but are not power, and the meaning of the words should not be confounded.—If there were any ground for distinguishing power into active and passive, there would be also for the addition of circum-

stantial power. Active power, passive power, and circumstantial power, have equal claim, if any claim, to toleration. I conceive, that if there can be any propriety in thus using them, it must arise from the plea, that these expressions are synecdoches. Were people in general aware that the expressions are tropical, their use might be admitted : but as I have no reason to suppose, that philosophers have conceived them to be tropical, or wished them to be thus accepted by their readers, I beg leave to assert, and endeavour to expose, their absurdity. In my opinion, the division is similar to dividing an individual into parts, and then calling each part an individual of the same species as the individual divided. As if one should divide a house into floors, walls, and roof, and then affirm, that the floors are a house, the walls are a house, and the roof is a house.

Active property or ability, is a quality of some subject. Ability may be various not only in degree, but also in kind. Thus ability to fly, and ability to reason, are different kinds of ability : but ability to draw an empty carriage, and ability to draw a loaded carriage, are different degrees of the same kind of ability.

Ability is one thing, the actual exertion or exercise of ability is another thing. There can be no exertion or exercise without ability, but there may be ability that is not exerted. Thus a
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man may have the ability of speech when he is silent; he may have ability to rise and walk, although he sits still.

We may also remark concerning active property, as before, concerning property in general, that, we cannot infer the want of ability, in any respect, from its not being exerted, nor from the exertion of a less degree of ability, can we infer that there is no greater degree in the subject. Thus, though the house-dog was silent when the thieves broke in, we cannot conclude from that fact, he had not ability to bark; nor from a horse carrying one hundred weight, can we conclude that he had not ability to carry two hundred.

9. Through confounding power with ability, some of these remarks on ability have been inadvertently applied to power. Writers and speakers have told us of dormant power as distinct from power in exercise: also of power in possession and power in exertion. But in my opinion there is no power where there is no operation: for power entirely relates to agency, if I may safely use that word, respecting the effecting or else opposing some change. Efficiency is a co-existent and essential consequent of the existence of power respecting a valuable change, although in order of nature it gives precedence to power.

10. Again, From the same erroneous conception, or confusion of notions, power has been supposed to admit degrees of comparison. Thus

respecting intelligent beings, it has been said, that, disposition to an action is imperfect power, or the lowest degree of it. That, next to this is mere ability to perform, that is with difficulty and care. And lastly, a strong habit, constituting ability to perform the same with ease and certainty. But I conceive the first to exhibit no power at all. The second, with the addition of actual operation, I judge to convey the notion of power. And the third also, but not to convey an idea of greater power than the former; since though there might be a surplussage of active property, yet there was no greater passive property: for the event or performance in both cases is the same.—“The schools say, Whatsoever power the agent has to act, yet the action can be received by the patient no farther than the power of the patient reaches.” Exchange the term power in the first part of the sentence for ability, and in the latter part for capacity, then will the note be just: but as it stands, is inconsistent, for the power will ever be as the properties of the agent and patient are related, and as the actual operation and event are, and no farther. How inconsistent then to say, that a gallon may pour its liquor into a pint bottle, but the bottle can receive but a pint, and if the neck be narrow it can receive liquor but slowly, how fast soever the larger vessel may pour it! That a teacher may teach a child all the rules of reading in a day, but a child cannot learn them
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in a month Who does not see that the excess of ability in the gallon and teacher, does not enlarge the power, which is limited by the pint and the learner, and the actual event produced?

The power is always limited by the weaker part of the proposition that implies it. If I affirm that the sun in the last summer concurred to the formation, growth, and ripening of a particular daisy, in a certain field: the exuberance of the sun's ability in respect of vegetation avails nothing in this instance, for power was limited by the capacity of the daisy in relation to the sun, in respect of perfecting that particular flower.

If power is always limited by that ability or that capacity in every case, that is weakest, then is power, a uniform thing which does not admit degrees of comparison.

11. Ability is not power, although essential to the existence of power. Try ability by the idea of producing change. I have rubbed what appeared gold on the touch-stone, but on pouring aquafortis, the assay has evaporated in smoke. Production of change is the touch-stone of power. Ability, we will add the ability of a person, refer it to production of change: but this ability and an able person may continue for ever, without producing change, if there is not also relative capacity, and concurring circumstances. Therefore neither ability, nor an able person, is power. Let us take ability of action, or of an acting person

son, for instance, ability of thinking, thinking under any modification, inclination at large if you please, bring this to the notion of producing change : but without capacity, related capacity, in some object of thought, and concurring circumstances, no power exists, no change takes place. Conceive the ability of a body in motion. A saw in motion has ability to separate fundry bodies ; but, let it move ever so violently and incessantly, without a body of suitable texture, and in concurrent circumstances, no change takes place, no power in respect of dividing a body exists : it may move to eternity and saw air without producing the relative change, consequently its ability is not power.

Ability has evidently a contrary, for ability is active property, and capacity is passive property, and active and passive are contraries. Inability is defect of ability, but not its contrary.

12. Capacity, or passive property, like ability, is a quality of some subject. It may be various not only in degree but also in kind. Thus capacity for the passion of love and capacity for an amputation are different kinds of capacity : but capacity to receive one pound of meat, and capacity to receive two pounds, are different degrees of the same kind of capacity.

Capacity is one thing, the actual occupation of it another thing. There can be no reception of ability without capacity for that reception, nor of
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the consequent of ability without capacity. But there may be capacity unoccupied. Thus a man may have capacity for learning who is untaught; and a pint vessel capacity to contain wine although it be empty; and a wild horse docility, though no man ever attempted breaking it in.

We may also remark concerning capacity, that, we cannot infer the want of capacity in any respect from its not being exercised, nor from the exercise of a less degree of capacity can we infer that there is no greater degree in the subject. Thus though steel is unpolished, we cannot conclude that it has not capacity to be polished, nor from a quart bottle as containing but a pint of liquor, can we conclude that it had not capacity to contain more.

Perhaps no one can help observing how eminently and essentially *shape* concurs to both ability and capacity in innumerable instances. Thus the shape of a knife to an *ability* for cutting; and thus the shape of Rupert's drops or hand grenades to *capacity*, for the remarkable event of flying to powder, on the small end being broken off.—*Composition* also in numerous cases concurs to ability and capacity. Respecting ability, recollect the freezing mixture and gunpowder. And respecting capacity, I may mention copper and silver, each of which are harder to melt separately than gold, yet when used to alloy gold, the composition will melt easier than gold itself.

Capacity,

Capacity, or passive property, has been dignified by the appellation *passive power* by Mr. Locke, but its claim to the name has been disputed by a respectable Writer. Bring capacity however, I mean capacity for sustaining change, to the idea of producing change, and no person will question whether existing capacity in body, in mind, in thinking, or in motion, can produce change, or whether change will exist without the addition of relative ability and the suitable circumstances of time, place, and position.—Neither will the addition of *inadequate* ability and *inadequate* circumstances be sufficient. Suppose a saw made of wood, it would have ability, when in motion, to cut a softer body, butter for instance, has a relative capacity, let the saw be in motion, and the butter be in concurring circumstances, power will exist, the lump will be divided. Suppose the same saw used in the most advantageous circumstances for dividing a piece of iron, for want of ability in the saw relative to the hardness of the iron, no power, operation, or change would exist. Thus also where ability meets relative capacity but with insufficient time, an inadequate place, or other circumstance, the power and change will also be proportionate. And if no time be admitted and no place allotted, it will matter nothing, the exact agreement of ability in one thing to capacity in another. Power and change will not exist.

13. Circumstance has been described a particularity, which, though not essential to any action, yet doth some way affect it. Circumstances do undoubtedly affect every action, but I must add, that they are essential to the existence of the action. Every kind of circumstance, I grant, is not essential to any action; but I will contend that time and place are circumstances unlimitedly essential to action and operation, whether their subjects be material or spiritual beings, for without time and place the subjects themselves can have no existence, but are non-entities, and have nothing to do with operation or power. Circumstances may be favorable or unfavorable, suitable or unsuitable, respecting any proposed event. Suitable circumstances compose identically what we call opportunity. Circumstances are infinitely diversified and infinitely extended, for space is infinite, and the same identical circumstances can never return.

Some have supposed favorable circumstances, concurring circumstances, or opportunity, to be causal, the whole of what is causal, and consequently to be power, or at least to involve the notion of power. But what are arrangements of circumstances either of body, or of mind, of motion, or of thinking, when brought to the idea of producing change? The truth is, that without the addition of ability and related capacity in the objects thus circumstanced, there can
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be no operation or change, and consequently no power.

I said *suitable* circumstances are essential to power. We ask, Suitable to what? To the consequent operation. True, but we must not rest here, for if power is essentially related to excellence, (Positions 2, 3, 4.) and is restricted to valuable changes and to valuable abiding and enduring, then must the circumstances essential to power be *suitable* to *valuable* operation.—A curious and useful work of art may be crushed by a millstone,—We may conceive ability in the millstone, capacity in the mechanism and circumstances, suitable to the operation of bruizing and influence of being crushed to atoms: but as the change was a bad change, the circumstances wanted the suitableness essential to power, and the change is rightly ascribed to the absence of power in respect of averting the blow.—One man murders another man,—Here also we conceive ability and capacity but no suitable circumstances to a valuable change, for the change was not good but evil.—The event is rightly ascribed not to power but to its absence respecting prevention of the murder.

I conceive that all finite beings, unless secured by a perpetual series of divine immediate interpositions, are, through the limitations of their properties and consequent circumstances, necessarily exposed to consequences of the absence of power
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in certain respects, and thus to changes and abiding which essentially depend, not on power, but on its absence in respect of prevention.

We have considered properties as essential to power, but could not say that every junction of ability and a related capacity, essentially involved power; so neither, with the addition of circumstances rendering them adequate to actual abiding, enduring or change, can we affirm there is power: because power is essentially related to value and excellence; but the abiding, enduring or change respected, may not be valuable or excellent. Some of these thoughts will again present themselves, when we pay attention, to what are called negative causes.

14. The essentials to the existence of power evidently are ability, capacity related to that ability, and suitable circumstances to valuable operation.

I grant it difficult to reach a notion of power, and thus it is also of substance, yet we know both to exist, can distinguish them, but cannot comprehend them. The nearest approach we can make to matter or body, seems to be extension and solidity. Conceive of a geometrical point, no length, breadth, or thickness, or absolutely without extension, and we are certain this cannot be matter, or even substance of any kind. Suppose, or conceive some extension, for instance a cubic foot, but absolutely without any thing

which makes the conceived extension differ from mere nothing, and we rationally deny this also to be substance. But admit the conceived extension any contents, whether conceivable or not, it will be distinguished from mere nothing, and we see no inconsistency in affirming its existence independent in some sense on another finite being, and accounting it substance and the subject of particular modes or manners of being.—Thus also respecting power, the nearest approach we can make towards it, seems to be ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances. For myself I confess, I have no conception of power but what I recognize by this affirmation, Power co-exists with, consists in, results from, or is somehow essentially connected with, or signified by active property, and relative passive property in suitable circumstances, and being the direct immediate source of *valuable* operation.

Whether ability, relative capacity and opportunity compose power, or are merely essential co-existents with power, is immaterial to my purpose, so it be admitted that the connection establishes an immutable law or rule, arising from the essentials and properties of things: which I think, on the discovery, no reasonable man can ever doubt.

Ability is indispensibly essential to power, but detached from capacity and suitable circumstances, does not imply power respecting any operation

tion or proposition. The sun has ability to melt or dissolve snow, but without a capacity in the snow to be melted by it, there would not exist power and operation. Nor are both ability and capacity adequate without opportunity, for clouds may obstruct the rays of the sun, the snow may be placed on the Alps, or other high mountain, or may through the circumstance of winter and a frost remain unmelted by the shining sun in our own climate: or the sun itself may be so circumstanced towards snow in its declination that its vertical rays will be insufficient to dissolve it.

Capacity is indispensibly essential to power, but as detached from ability and opportunity does not convey the notion of power. It is well known that aquafortis has ability to dissolve silver, and silver a capacity to be dissolved by aquafortis. Will it not be granted that silver possessed this capacity before the valuable invention or discovery of the menstruum we call aquafortis? Yet what had this capacity, in those circumstances to do with power in respect of dissolution?

Lastly, Suitable circumstances are indispensibly essential to power, but as detached from ability and capacity, adequate ability and adequate capacity, do not convey the notion of power. The circumstances of nearness or distance, attitude or position, time or place, avail nothing respecting objects destitute of ability and related capacity to the existence of power. What avails that a par-

don is obtained, and the prison doors set open, when it is discovered the prisoner is dead? Can power exist respecting his liberation?

That power essentially co-exists with active property, related passive property, and suitable circumstances, in respect of a valuable object, I account a first principle of knowledge. I think every one must admit it who understands the terms: and I do not see that any arguments from a foreign source can increase its evidence. So the notions of ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances, are familiar, assent seems unavoidable. Active property, related passive property and suitable circumstances, in respect of a valuable object, do as invariably lead us to power as extension and solidity, or extension and actually existing thinking, do lead us to substance.

Perhaps some one may object, that in his conception, ability depends for its very existence on capacity and opportunity. That without the two latter there cannot be ability. To such I would reply, My friend, you have let slip the distinction between ability and power, and in your objection, do use ability as synonymous with power, and confound their true notions. I think this objection requires no farther reply.

I somewhere hinted that power is essential to ability, capacity, and opportunity: but let it be noted, that this is power merely respecting the *existence* of ability, relative capacity and opportunity, and not in respect of an answer to the questions,

tions, Ability for what? Capacity for what? Opportunity for what? By the proposition, power is essential to ability. I mean that the existence of ability itself implies ability, capacity and opportunity. Thus the ability of food to support animal life, supposes ability somewhere to communicate a nutritive quality. Capacity in the matter of food to receive it, with suitable circumstances. By the sentence, power is essential to capacity, I mean that capacity depends for existence on ability, capacity and opportunity. Capacity in an animal to be sustained in life by food, depends on ability in some other object, capacity in its own substance with suitable circumstances. It is one thing for an object to depend on power for its existence; and a very different one should we suppose it to be, or in itself to constitute, power to abide, endure, or to produce change.

15. Again, I remark, that although ability, capacity, and opportunity co-exist with power or are essential to power, yet an invariable proportion of each is not requisite to its existence in all cases, and sometimes not even in the same respect.—A man may possess a greater ability for swimming, so that with the least capable water and least favorable circumstances he can swim. Power exists in respect of his swimming.—Salt water may be so dense and thus have so great capacity, that a man shall swim in it who has not ability adequate to swim in fresh water.—Thus also the calm-

ness of the water may be a favorable circumstance, which shall concur to a man's swimming, although he possesses little ability, and the water is defective in capacity: whereas in agitated water, his swimming, or power respecting swimming would not exist.—Thus also as the tyro-mechanic improves in ability, he executes his work with former perfection, although with worse tools, worse materials, and more unfavorable circumstances, than in his first efforts. When but tyros in any mechanic art, a conjunction of the most favorable circumstances were requisite to our good performance: but advanced in ability, we seem to master it even in very unfavorable circumstances.—A mere dunce may read when the book is excellently printed, or of superior capacity: and with every favorable circumstance of light and composure. And thus also with the most advantageous circumstances of instruction, a lad, although deficient in genius, and on materials also defective, may learn an art.—Ability in fire is requisite to melt metals, and capacity is requisite in metals to being melted. It is well known to those who melt metals, that some metals melt with a less degree of heat than others, thus tin than lead, and brass than copper. This depends on the different proportions of active and passive relative properties. Thus tin with greater capacity in itself and lesser ability in the fire becomes melted: whilst lead with lesser capacity for
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being melted, requires a greater ability in the fire for the same purpose. Thus also lead requires more favorable circumstances for melting than tin, a vessel of tin will melt if used for baking in an oven, but lead will endure its usual heat.—These differing degrees of proportion respect comparisons with what they formerly were, or what they now are respecting some other persons or things: but do not at all touch the exact relation requisite in each particular instance between ability, capacity, and opportunity to the existence of power.

16. I think properties as essential to power will also take another consideration without violence to their conception: We will distinguish their general conception into *adequate* and *inadequate*. These terms immediately lead us to think of an *end*, to which they are adequate or inadequate. This end may either be our conception of *power*, or else some actual consequent *efficiency*, because both are fully connected and always co-existent.

When there is no defect of *ability* in relation to supposed capacity and suitable circumstances, essential to the existence of power and efficiency in any respect.—I denominate the ability *adequate*: but if there is a defect of ability in relation to the supposed capacity and circumstances essential to power and efficiency, either or both, considered as their end—the ability is *inadequate*,

The adequacy of ability may consist in its
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suitable nature as a *simple* active property, or as a *composition* of active properties of different kinds, or as a *collection* of the same kind.—The property of aquafortis in respect of the dissolving silver, is an instance of the first,—The property of a composition of aquafortis and sal armonic in respect of dissolving gold is an instance of the second,—And the ability arising from the proportions of a certain number of ounces in respect of raising the scale, is an instance of the last.—Thus also, the ability to see in respect of actual sight—The ability arising from a conjunction of what is called *natural* ability with *moral* ability in respect of the end, *discharge* of duty—And, the ability resulting from the collected abilities of a team of horses in respect of drawing a load.

From attention to what has been said of the adequacy of ability in respect of the ends power and efficiency, it is evident, that the inadequacy of inadequate ability may consist in defect of kind, defect of composition, or defect of collection, or of all these.

Capacity also, like ability may be considered in its nature or aggregate as adequate or inadequate. Here also we have respect to an end, either power, or its consequent efficiency related to which, adequate ability and circumstances are supposed.

The adequacy of capacity in respect of its end, whether power or efficiency may consist either
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in a single passive property—a composition of passive properties—or in a collection of passive properties. Thus, to give an instance of the first, Silver has an adequate passive property to dissolution by aquafortis, and to power in that respect. To give an instance of the second, Man as combining the passive properties of body and mind in his nature has adequate capacity to be instructed, or to power in respect of learning. And to instance the last, Thus a certain number of candles by their collected passive properties have adequate capacity in respect of the end, enlightening a room to a certain degree, and to power in that respect.

It is evident, if this be a true representation, that the inadequacy of inadequate capacity must consist in defect of kind, composition, or collection, or of all.

Circumstances may be also considered as adequate or inadequate, for, we can conceive adequate ability and related capacity where there is not adequate circumstances to the existence of power and efficiency. Adequate circumstances I have expressed by the terms, suitable circumstances.

No single circumstance is adequate to the existence of power or efficiency conceived as an end, because without both time and place in every instance there can be no power or efficiency. Adequate circumstances ever consist in a combination

nation or arrangement of circumstances, and circumstances may be inadequate in respect of kind and composition.

17. Probably, the objects of power are rightly distinguished into abiding, enduring, and changes. Power considered as essential to, and co-existent with, abiding, enduring, producing, and sustaining, may easily be illustrated from facts, which occur every day.—Instances of abiding readily present themselves. Our dwellings abide. Furniture abides where we place it. Day and night still continue. And the heavenly bodies which were of old continue or abide at the present time. A cowslip in the field with ability in the soil, capacity in itself, and its root in the earth, abides in its vigor and beauty: let it be plucked up or torn off, suitable circumstances no longer exist, power respecting abiding is no more, it withers, dries, or rots on the ground.

Objects which abide, may be distinguished into such as are generated, and such as are made. Things which are generated, mature and decline. Things made may be improved, and then gradually or more rapidly decay. Both these kinds of objects are liable to be prematurely destroyed. The excellence of machines in their construction admit the following remarks. Those are the best that consist (1.) of the most valuable materials. (2.) that consist of the most excellent properties, (3.) of the greatest number of valuable properties.

ties. (4.) That are calculated in their parts for the greatest durability. (5.) And that are calculated so that all their parts shall be equally durable, and when they decline equally decline together.

Abiding is here taken in a popular sense, for strictly and philosophically judging, perhaps there is no such thing as absolutely abiding among created things, since even the air tends to oppose the place of bodies, and if opposition to place only, is admitted, the object which abides strictly endures. And again as no body is perfectly free from subjection to the operation of other bodies its whole continuance, even that of a diamond is a state of enduring.

Enduring respects more violent opposition, and includes the various degrees of just supporting, surmounting, and triumphing over, all which depend on adequate power. Thus gold endures the corrosive quality of aquafortis: a diamond the ability of both it and fire. Thus a child endures chastisement, a man affliction or an amputation. A house endures the wind, rain and lightening, and a ship the swelling billows.

Power in respect of abiding and enduring seems the result of ability to surmount opposition —Capacity in opposition to be surmounted— Time, place, and other suitable circumstances. But in respect of evil objects their abiding and enduring depends on deficiency of ability in the opposer

opposer—deficiency of relative capacity in the abider or endurer, and the want of suitable circumstances ; and consequently absence of power. Abiding and enduring of an evil kind depends on defects or restrainings of power in respect of change : but changes which are evil depend on defect or restrainings of power in respect of abiding and enduring.

The changes which happen within our cognizance are either in matter or in mind. They may therefore according to their subject be called material or mental changes. Changes in matter are sensible or insensible, conceivable or inconceivable. Changes in mind are objects of consciousness, or of a kind incapable of it.

I have before said that positive or valuable changes ever imply ability to produce and capacity to sustain. The chymical laboratory affords the most ample illustration of the changes of matter. Yet the world at large is not deficient in an obvious exhibition of changes. Our countenances are insensibly, but perpetually changing : the place of our habitable globe perpetually altering, and the sensible and conceivable qualities of the air ever variable. Changes in our animal frame, changes in objects of sense and changes in our sensations and internal feelings, numerous beyond our memory or cognizance. Wherever or in whatever we observe valuable changes, the mind rationally recurs to ability to produce, capacity
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to sustain, and suitable circumstances, and thus arrives at power.

Power is essentially requisite to all valuable changes of matter, and in many cases can be traced to ability, related capacity and suitable circumstances. The sun by active property enlightens the planets which move round it. The earth and its companion planets by passive property enjoy its illuminations. Our moon and the satellites, have capacity to be enlightened from the sun and also from, in a secondary way, the superior they revolve around : and have ability also in a feebler measure to enlighten the planet in their turn. Fire we say boils water, or has ability to boil water. Water has capacity to sustain boiling. Boiling and the several degrees of heat are new existences. These have opportunity of existing when the water is exposed to the fire, and also after its removal from the fire, but in a decaying state, till it quite ceases. Air has ability to cool boiling water, and boiling water has capacity to be cooled : in suitable circumstances, that is being removed from the fire, coolness, the new mode will exist. Water has ability to extinguish fire. Fire a capacity to be extinguished by it, add suitable circumstances, in this case an application of an adequate quantity of the water, power exists, the fire is extinguished, and in the operation loses its essence.

Declines from, or decays of excellence, are

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rightly conceived one class of changes. All declines from excellence arise from what is called a negative cause, which we shall by and by attend. They are ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary declines from excellence sometimes arise from a failure of active and passive properties, and of suitable circumstances: more usually from a failure of two of these whilst the other remains: and still more frequently from a failure of one of these in respect of adequacy. Contemplate a man in a consumption; he eats as much as formerly, and perhaps of food more salubrious, and has as great or greater advantages in respect of circumstances, yet he loses his flesh and falls off by steps towards death. Here the active property of food is equal to what it was formerly: the circumstances of receiving it into the stomach, exemptions from fatigue, and a country retreat are in their nature valuable circumstances, but the defect is in relative passive property in the man. Suppose such a man in unfavorable circumstances, for instance, confined to a dungeon and defrauded of his allowance, then we shall see that want of passive property and unfavorable circumstances both concur to the decline, and that the decline will be more rapid. Suppose to these be added unwholesome food, then we may attribute the decline to defect in active properties, passive properties and circumstances, and the decline will be more rapid still. Again, suppose
a healthy

a healthy man starving to death between stone walls. Here is no defect in the man's capacity, nor in the ability of wholesome food, but merely in the circumstances. Suppose another to decline through feeding on unwholesome food, the ability is defective, but his capacity and suitable circumstances in respect to the food are admitted.

The degree of these declines may be reduced in speculation to the following rules. Let a degree of defect be represented by a , whether of ability, capacity, or circumstances. Then will a degree of defect of ability only, in an assigned case of decline be a . If two degrees of defect of ability it will be $a\ 2$. If one degree of defect in ability and one degree in capacity, then the expressions will also be $a\ 2$. If there be one degree of defect in ability, one in capacity, and one in circumstances, the expression will be $3\ a$. And so in all variations of the degrees of defect in either or all. Then let the degrees of decline be marked by z . And in every case the degrees of defect will correspond with the degree of decline. Thus a and z , $2\ a$ and $2\ z$, $3\ a$ and $3\ z$, $4\ a$ and $4\ z$, &c.

To aid our conceptions also of the measure in which declines are kept back by application of mediums, such as props to a house and medicine to a declining man. Let the degree of value in the medium be subtracted from the degrees of defects: then if the degrees of excellence in the

application exactly agrees with the degrees of defects, the disease is stationary and decline stopped. If the case of decline is $2a$, then by the medium the defects will be reduced to a , and the decline will be z and not $2z$.

Extraordinary declines from excellence are such as result from opposition; or in other words, from ability, capacity and opportunity, but which ability, capacity and opportunity, do not mark power, but its limitations in respect of preventing their existence and the consequent decline. These will be more attended when we come to treat of operation and of negative causes.

We may remark, that some abilities having concurred to power respecting either abiding, enduring or change, they gradually or immediately lose their own existence. Thus a house abides or endures, but by degrees its ability in respect of resisting change becomes extinct, it falls to ruins. The house in proportion as it decays loses its abilities, till at last the fabric tumbles.—Woad and other dying materials have ability to tinge and impart their ability to a suitable liquid, but do themselves immediately lose that ability.—The dye possesses ability to dye wool, linen, &c. but having concurred to changing the colour of a just quantity of these subjects, it retains no farther ability of that kind.

Again, some capacities having concurred to power respecting abiding, enduring or change, gradually or immediately are themselves extinct.

Thus

Thus the house decaying as it decays loses its capacity.—A town besieged abides and endures. Capacity in the besiegers to be resisted concurs to power in that respect: but by re-inforcement, after reinforcement, this capacity in the besiegers gradually subsides and finally is gone. This was remarkably exemplified in the siege of Jerusalem by the Romans.—Thus also silver reduced to a calx by aquafortis has no longer capacity in respect of the ability of aquafortis. A culprit has capacity to be tried by a court, but when in consequence condemned and executed, capacity for trial, condemnation and execution no longer exists.

We may remark also, that ability in one thing and capacity in another is generally obvious, yet, that, sometimes ability in one thing is combined in the same thing with some capacity which like the ability has a related object in the other thing. Calamin has ability and copper capacity in regard to its becoming brass: but if we reflect that after the operation the brass will weigh more than the copper did, though not so much as both the copper and calamin did, we rationally conceive a lesser capacity also in the calamin, and ability in the copper in respect of it. The primary essentials of matter in all cases remain, extension and solidity are somewhere existing.

Were it needful to give instances in this place for illustration of abiding, enduring, and changes

of mind: I might say respecting the first, Thus a man continues, as we say, in the same mind: Respecting the second, that, Thus a man under affliction possesses calmness without murmuring, or a martyr retains his faith and fortitude though at the stake. And respecting changes, that sight of an alms moves a beggar to your door, and a signal puts an army in motion.

Before we pass on to say something of operation, influence and efficiency, it may be observed, that, our knowledge that one thing actually existing possesseth an assigned active property, and another an assigned passive property can rise no higher than the greatest probability, since it depends on observations made on experiments, wherein we have ever found that like changes have ever attended like application, consequently as we cannot make an infinite number of trials, we cannot be infinitely certain that a future experiment may not fail our expectation.

We may also observe, that if all the active properties of matter, according to the hypothesis of a modern philosopher, may be truly resolved into attractions and repulsions, we must admit a related passive property in the attracted to the attracting, and a related passive property in the repulsed to the repulsing, or no operations, influence, and efficiency can exist.

We now proceed to discuss some consequents of power which co-exist with it, that we may at
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once obtain a more extended view of power, and elucidate these objects. With this double end, a more comprehensive conception of power, and enlarged acquaintance with these objects; let us immediately give some attention to operation, influence, and efficiency.

SECTION II.

Of Operation, Influence, and Efficiency.

IN all cases of the existence of ability, a related capacity to that ability, and suitable circumstances, I hope it is sufficiently evident, that power is constituted, or co-exists with that junction. For myself I judge it no less evident that where-foever there is power, there is valuable operation, influence, and efficiency. As ability, capacity and opportunity, are in order of nature prior to power, although co-existent with it: so, power itself is in order of nature prior to operation, the first of the articles now before us.

We have much earlier in life a notion of action than a notion of operation at large. Motion, the action of body catches the eye of an infant, and soon becomes familiar to his conception. As intellect advances, the child reflects on his own thoughts,

thoughts which seem the acts of his mind. Both these kinds of action become now familiar to him. By degrees he conceives and forms notions of motion and thinking, under various modifications or affections. Thus in both cases the notion of action is generalized. The mind proceeds to remark signs of action under various modifications, and hence by analogy, we extend a notion of action wheresoever we perceive the marks or signs, whether we have any conception of the action or not. To this notion so much abstracted and generalized, we affix the name operation. That is not first which is mental but that which is material. And that it is not next in succession which is abstract, but that which is the object of consciousness or sensation: respecting the progression of knowledge.

Our conception of action may be distinguished into absolute and relative. To walk, to dance, to fly, without any farther respect seem instances of absolute action, the action is supposed to terminate in the actor, and is expressed by intransitive verbs: But action is also considered as relative, and the term used relatively, or in relation to an object acted on, and to an actual influence. Absolute action is what we call *mere exercise*. The exercise of soldiers is one thing, but a military action or the operation of an army, is another thing. Action as relative I conceive to be a species of operation: for operation may be distinguished

tinguished into such as we have ideal conception of, and such as we can obtain no other than a notional conception of, and then, action is that species of operation of which we may have ideal conception.

Operation, or working, I conceive to be always relative, and to be the immediate result of power, or its absence, and the medium of influence.

Operation is not power, but is the immediate result of power: It owes its existence immediately to power, and is attributed to the object that has active property. Thus we say the ability of an artist, and the operation of an artist. The ability of aquafortis, and the operation of aquafortis. The ability of rhubarb, and the operation of rhubarb. Every operation requires an operator, this may be a person, or a thing, and is always that person or thing, that possesseth active property, that is ability, in respect of power and the operation. In common language we say, he operates, she works, and it operates.

Every operation requires also a subject to be operated on, this also may be a person or mere thing.

In whatever respect there is power, in that respect there is also operation. If, as in some cases, the power is evident, but we cannot reach a conception of the operation: Power is an indubitable mark or sign of the existence of operation: And we rationally infer the existence of an occult operation.

operation. Thus a fire adequate in degree has ability to melt silver, and silver capacity to be melted by it.—Add the suitable circumstances of its being placed in the fire and continuing there sufficient time, it is evident power exists respecting its becoming melted.—I am inadequate to a conception of the operation of the fire, but fully infer its existence from the existence of power in that respect.

Again, wheresoever there is operation there is influence also. When the operation is inconceivable: but the existence of the influence is evident: The existence of influence is another indubitable mark or sign of the existence of operation, and we rightly infer the existence of unknown operation. Thus if in all cases needles, or other small steel bodies, leap towards a magnet, the influence is evident, and we truly infer an occult operation of the magnet.

Such is our unavoidable ignorance of the essentials and properties of the insensible particles of matter, that we can obtain no direct conception of either operation or influence in respect of *abiding*, mere abiding. We may talk of the impenetrability of particles, and of their cohesion, but we seem totally out of our depth. Such also is our inevitable ignorance of the essentials and properties which go to constituting mind that here also we are totally unable to trace either operation or influence as conducing to the *abiding* of our minds.

minds. In either case we know that abiding involves power in that respect: and that in proportion as abiding is evident so also is power in respect of it.

Arriving at *enduring*, we a little emerge from darkness respecting operation. Conceive a bridge erected over a large river, London bridge if you please. The water opposes its weight and consequent firm bearing, according to the laws of hydrostatics, but still it endures. Water also opposes its compactness by penetrating the stones which are more or less vulnerable, but still the bridge endures. The running of the water also opposes its retaining its situation, and in case of a tempest, with great violence, but still it endures.—What is its conceivable operation? Cutting or dividing the water and current.

We seem to have but little idea of the actual operation, strictly conceived, even in material subjects, but denote it by the terms defending and resisting. The properties on which such operation depends seem more obvious, such as impenetrability, hardness, toughness, shape, colour, union, composition, &c. &c.

Mental enduring, no doubt essentially depends on operation as well as power in that respect; but our ignorance of the nature of modified thought, in respect of thought, under other modifications, leaves us quite destitute of any direct notion of the operation which conduces to enduring,

during, whilst its existence cannot be disputed.— Abraham endured as looking for a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God. Moses endured as seeing him who is invisible—and as having respect to the recompence of the reward. Heb. 11.

Perhaps all operation which is the direct result of power, in respect to mental enduring may be appositely referred to knowledge, affection and preference; or more particularly conceived, to faith, love, Godly fear, hope, joy, confidence, resolution, fortitude, vigilance, prayer, and endeavour as its operating objects.

Frequently abiding and enduring is effected through sensible mediums, and as the mediums usually involve changes the operations may be usually known. Thus a town endures a siege by fortifying and returning the fire of the enemy.

Changes compose the large field of operation. Here we should not know where to begin or when to stop, if we were to attempt an enumeration. Changes are either changes in matter or changes in mind. Operation as essential to changes in matter, may be distinguished according as the operator is either an inanimate, a vegetable, an animal, or a person. Hence operation of the sun, of the wind, or of Jalap. Operation of a plant, a shrub, or a grove. Operation of a lion, or a lamb. Operation of a surgeon, an orator, or a mechanic, &c. &c. Operation in respect to changes

changes in matter, may again be distinguished according to the nature of the operation where it is manifest to observation. Thus chopping, sawing, planing, hammering, scraping, engraving, grinding, polishing, burnishing, bending, straiting, boring, filing, drilling, turning, ploughing, sowing, harrowing, &c. &c. &c. without end. Operations of this class, may also be distinguished according to the subject operated on. Thus operation on stones, on metals, on wood, on kine, on horses, on men, on the head, on the feet, on the eyes, on the hands, &c. All these operations which respect matter, seem referable to force, all seem to centre in the word force.

So evident is it to mankind at large, that there is operation in cases wherein they can attain no direct conception of it, that they have affixed names to various occult operations. Cohering, attracting, repelling, electrifying, reflecting, refracting, are instances.

Changes in mind also are numerous, especially respecting its subjects of thought, and perhaps no one will doubt whether operation as well as power, is not essentially and immediately requisite to the existence of valuable mental changes. By reflection we may attain conceptions of many of these changes or actions of mind, that is, thinking under various modifications on numerous subjects.

We have through reflection some conception
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of several mental operations on the subjects we think of, such as distinguishing, dividing, uniting, comparing, collecting, combining, multiplying, magnifying, abstracting, arranging, &c.

Here also mankind seem well aware, that there are operations certainly existing, which reflection cannot reach, yet to which operations they have given names. Thus inciting, exciting, and inducing.

Operation may be distinguished into good and bad. Good operation is the essential immediate result of power, but bad operation is the consequent of the limits or restrainings of power in respect of prevention. Good operation is valuable, but bad operation is worse than merely of no value. Between good and bad there is a dividing line, so also between good and bad operation. The more the object advances from the line on this hand, the greater its excellence; the farther it declines from the line on the other hand the greater the defect. And as this dividing line has no dimension of thickness, it follows that the existence of indifferent operation, that is, operation neither good nor evil, is excluded from fact. Yet we may rationally conceive of a mixture of operations in respect of good and evil, and if we take an equal measure of both from the said dividing line and combine them, the combination taken as a whole, as one part balances the other, may be conceived and called indifferent operation,

operation. Where there is no operation there is no power: but we must not say where there is operation there is power, for ability, capacity, and opportunity adequate to evil operation, occur every day.

Of Influence.

As power is in order of nature prior to operation, although co-existent with it; so also, operation is in order of nature prior to influence, although co-existent with it; and there is no operation, where there is not co-existing influence.

Influence is not operation, but is the immediate result of operation: It is ascribed to the object that operates, but affirmed of the subject operated on; or subject of passive property. Thus vegetables are influenced by the operation of the sun, and human bodies by the operation of physic. Influence, in other words, owes its existence immediately to operation: but is predicated of the object, which is possessed of capacity in respect of the operation. Thus we may say gold has capacity of being melted by fire, and that gold is influenced by the operation of fire.

Some influences obvious to observation, on subjects which correspond with fore-mentioned operations respecting matter, are, being divided, being lessened, being rounded, being squared, coloured or brightened, being joined, being planed,

being carved, or engraved, ground or polished, being attracted, repelled, or electrified.

Influences also obvious on reflection corresponding with operations of minds on the subjects of our thoughts, are, being defined, being divided, being united, being compared, being collected, being multiplied, being magnified, abstracted, arranged, &c.

I know but of three kinds of influence, the subject whereof is mind, that may be objects of reflection, namely being incited, being excited, and being induced. When I assent to truth, I am incited to assent—when I love, I am excited to love—And when I determine, I am induced to determine, according to the meaning I affix to these terms.

One object incites, and inciting is operating: another object is incited, and to be incited is to be influenced.—One object excites, and exciting is operating. Another object is excited, and to be excited is to be influenced.—One object induces, and inducing is operating: another object is induced, and to be induced is to be influenced. And in either case the new existence leads us to the conception of efficiency, for it is the effect. Generalize these conceptions and we have incitation, excitation, and inducement.

Operation and influence which regard matter, when considered most abstractly, seem resolvable into force, they center in our conception of force.

One object forces, and forcing is operating : another object is forced, and to be forced is to be influenced.

Force is not power, but operation and influence among bodies : either as opposing or producing change. Force is distinguished into *vis inertia*, and *vis impressa*. These Latin words having been used by philosophers, I use *vis inertia*, to express that essential principle implanted in all matter, whereby it resists any change endeavoured to be made in its state. It is that principle, or force, by which bodies persist in their motions or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted. *Vis impressa* is operation and influence on any body, to change its state, or it is that force by which the state of matter is changed.

Of more particular kinds of force, we may instance, impulse ; Impulse is the force attending one body that strikes or impels another : Or, it is the force with which one body impels or strikes another. This force reflected, is called repulse. —Attraction is the force whereby bodies tend towards one another. Repulsion is the force whereby bodies tend to remove from one another. —Electricity is the force by which some bodies when being heated by friction in a certain degree, do attract or repel distant bodies, and frequently emit sparks or streams of light.—Elasticity or springiness, is elastic force, or it is that

force by which bodies restore themselves to their former figure, after any external pressure. These seem all to come under the *vis impressa* idea.

One object impels, and to impel is to operate : another object is impelled, and to be impelled is to be influenced. One object attracts, and to attract is to operate : another object is attracted, and to be attracted is to be influenced. One object electrifies, to electrify is to operate : another object is electrified, and to be electrified is to be influenced, &c.

Cohesion and durability come under the idea of *vis inertia* : Cohesion is that force by which the particles of the same body, adhere together as if they were but one. Durability, unlimitable durability, can only be truly applied to the Deity, who is immutable : but limited durability exists in various degrees of comparison among creatures, and according to the degree of the durability or permanency, the force requisite to abiding, or enduring, is estimated.

Perhaps we are equally remote from an absolute notion of mental operation and influence, as from an absolute notion of force. That some thoughts under one modification, are attended with operation and influence to produce thought under another modification, I think we must assent to, if we admit the existence of power in the same respect. Permit me to add a word or

two respecting an operation and influence, we call compulsion.

Compulsion, is a name we apply to force, as confined to material and cogitative beings, considered as more or less abridging their liberty of acting, or refraining, accordingly as inclined. The operation essential to this influence, we express by the verb, to compel. Compulsion is wrongly applied when used to express inducement: but it is rightly applied to force, which restrains liberty for either acting or refraining. Thus when a man is dragged by a horse, his foot fastening in the stirrup, the force is compulsion; And thus also when a man is dragged or carried to prison, it is rightly applied.—Compulsion, as forcing to involuntary exercise or motion, as in these instances, takes also the name constraint. When the hindering, or stopping of any action, is contrary to inclination, as when a man is chained to the floor, the compulsion takes the name restraint. The word necessity, in common life, is used to express compulsion.

Of Efficiency.

Our general conception of Efficiency owes its existence to that of valuable influence, for the effect is the definite valuable influence.—In every case of valuable operation and influence in that respect, the object of which is change, we are naturally led to conceive a *new existence*—that
existence

existence to be an effect—and hence to admit efficiency. In every case of operation and influence the object of which is abiding or enduring, we are led to conceive *continued existence*; continued existence is the effect, and efficiency in that respect cannot be denied.—Efficiency is the result of the operation and influence of fire on gold, for its being melted is the definite influence or effect. Efficiency is the result of the operation and influence of a prop in respect of a tottering house, for its abiding and enduring is the definite influence or effect.—Those who are fond of tropes may conceive efficiency the flower, or ripe fruit of power, operation, and influence.

Operation and influence may exist, which is not immediately dependent on power, but efficiency cannot. True efficiency, or efficiency philosophically conceived, is like power essentially connected with value and excellence, its object must be what is good on the whole, good eternity considered, and good in the estimate of the infinite mind, that is of God. There is bad operation and bad influence, but, in my judgment, there cannot be bad efficiency; for however striking such operation and brilliant such influence, the essentials of the influence include mischief and loss on the whole and in the unerring estimate of the Divine Being.

Notwithstanding we can thus distinguish in conception, power, valuable operation, influence,
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and efficiency, yet they are essentially connected, so that their separate existence is impossible. There is no power where such operation is not the consequent—No power and operation where influence is not the result, and no power, operation, and influence, which does not involve, or is not accompanied with efficiency. Efficiency is the essential consequent of power and valuable operation.

Efficiency depends immediately on influence for its existence, remotely on operation, more remotely on power, and still more remotely on ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances, yet they all co-exist as to order of time.

If any reader should find it difficult to reconcile the order of nature in these cases with co-existence as to time, let him examine a pocket watch. He may therein contemplate respecting the spring, the barrel, the chain, wheel after wheel, and the verge, power, operation, influence, and the effect motion in each individually: Yet must, however his intelligence may totter, admit that all co-exist the same instant, not one wheel or one tooth moves before all the others begin to move; yet the spring forceth the barrel, the barrel the chain, the chain the first wheel, that the second, &c. till the last wheel forceth the balance. The same is also exhibited in a chain of many links drawn by the first link.

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By the notion of power we are directed to operation—by operation to influence—and by influence to efficiency; for the new or continued existence, that is to say, the definite influence, in any given instance, is the effect.

We call, for facility of speech, the person or thing to which we ascribe ability, and which actually operates respecting an effect, an efficient. Thus we say, an archer is the efficient in respect of bending his bow; and thus we say, that some desire was efficient to his endeavour so to do. In merely material causes, we also call it the agent. Also, for facility of expression, we ascribe efficiency to ability and operation.

An efficient is the person or thing, which possesses active property, and which operates. Efficients are either primary or common. The primary efficient is one, that is God, and his efficiency is absolutely independent. The common efficients, by courtesy taking that name, are creatures, and the efficiency of any or every creature depends on numerous other creatures, and primarily and ultimately on God.

We are now naturally led to the doctrine of cause and effect, which will be the subject of the next section.

SECTION

SECTION III.

Of Causes and Effects.

I Use the word cause to express the source or principle, or that which produces, or which is the ground of the reason of an effect. Any kind of spring, or source of valuable existence whatsoever, I account a cause. Generally speaking, a cause is that which makes a thing to be.

According to Mr. Locke, we get the notion of cause, and also of effect, to which it is related and stands opposed, from our observations of the vicissitudes of things, while we perceive some qualities or substances begin to exist, and that they receive their existence from the due applications and operations of other beings. That which produces is the cause, and that which is produced, is the effect.

Active property, related passive property and suitable circumstances are essential to power. Power is essential to valuable operation; operation to influence, and influence to efficiency: But all these together with their subjects, taken as an aggregate or whole, are essential to the existence of a cause—constitute a cause, or co-exist with a cause.

Causes

Causes are truly distinguished into primary and secondary. The first is a cause, itself uncaused ; that is, it can be in no sense the effect of a preceding cause, but is an eternal immutable cause. God only is this primary, eternal, all-involving, all-comprehending cause. The second is a cause itself caused by a preceding, and ultimately by the first cause. Secondary causes are dependent on foregoing, and were their effects. Active property, passive property, and due application with operation and influence, in concrete with their essentially requisite subjects, seem the constituents of these causes, which we now more particularly consider.

Cause, like power, has been in my opinion, treated very absurdly by ontologists. They distinguish what they call causes, into material and formal, efficient and final, whilst they acknowledge, that in many instances, all are needful to one effect, and notwithstanding their definition of a cause is inapplicable to either of them considered singly or detached from the rest. I am inclined to think that Aristotle, or whoever first discovered the distinction of material, formal, efficient, and final in respect of causes, never conceived them to make so many sorts of causes. I rather ascribe this confusion to his more erroneous editors and expositors.

Effect is ever acknowledged to stand in opposition to cause : now if all these are essential to
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the production of the effect, which is always the case where an intelligent being is the agent, then either of them singly cannot be a cause, because out of conjunction with the others, it produces no effect. Again, A cause is any source or spring of existence: but either of these detached from some, or all, the others, is not a source or spring of existence, and consequently is but part of the cause, in every case of actual conjunction, and actual existence of cause, and should be thus denominated. To say, the material part of a cause, the formal part of a cause, the efficient and final parts of a cause; are quite consistent expressions. Strictly and properly speaking there can be no cause, which is not adequate to its effect. An inadequate cause is no cause, and a contradiction. A cause, according to every good definition, must be conceived, if conceived consistently, a whole, an integral whole, consequently these distinctions can only regard the parts of a cause, for a cause is the whole of what in actual existence, produces a real change, or which sustains in opposition to change. All things in concurrence which are essential to the existence of an effect, is the cause and not each of the essentials in a detached state—Indeed, neither of them can possibly exist in a detached state. A subject is essential to the existence of a mode: but no subject can exist, where there is no existence of mode, and no mode can exist, where there is no

existence of a subject. An effect is essential to the existence of its own cause, but is not its cause. The effect is not the cause of its cause, yet nevertheless, the existence of the effect, is essential to the existence of its cause: for there can be no relation till both the subjects related do exist. Thus there cannot be a husband, whilst there is not a wife in existence. A cause is undoubtedly in order of nature, before its effect, but I contend, that cause and its related effect strictly conceived, are coexistent as to time, in every case and instance of their existence, or the existence of either.

That every valuable change in actual being, is the consequent of an actual cause; and that valuable abiding or enduring, as opposed to change, is the consequent of an actual cause; I account a first principle of intelligence: or a point assented to by every reasonable being who understands the terms.

What is called a partial cause, is by its epithet confessed to be no cause, the total cause alone is a cause: This also is self-evident, and such paradoxical language should be rejected by philosophers.

All things in concurrence which are essential to the existence of an effect is the cause: This also is self-evident to all persons who know what a cause and effect is.

There cannot exist the part of a cause in a certain

tain respect, when a cause does not exist in the same respect. No one can doubt this axiom.

That a cause cannot exist to which there is no existing related effect, at the same instant: and that an effect cannot exist to which there is no related cause existing at the same time; I account fully demonstrable, since the denial of either is to assert, that relation may exist, and not exist, at the same time, and in the same respect: or that cause and effect are, and are not, invariably related; the impossibility of which is self-evident.

If the foregoing representation is just, we shall, in that case, find no place for distinguishing any class of causes by the epithet free, and talking of them as acting or operating discretionally and occasionally; since they could not be, before their operation and efficiency.

This axiom, that every effect has an adequate cause, does not imply that I, or another many has faculties to discover in all instances of causal existence, or in any instance, the whole cause. Such limitation attends our knowledge, through ignorance of the insensible structure of matter, and the more inconceivable structure of our minds, that it is not amazing, if we should not be able to say in any instance, what is the particular induction in actual existence, which constitutes a specified cause, notwithstanding in the general, I hope I have rightly supposed it to consist in power, operation and influence, in con-

crete with the requisite subjects. Our knowledge of these objects, is however just and valuable in proportion as it agrees with them as actually existing. In matters of mere speculation, and mathematics, where the nominal essence, as in the mind is the real essence, ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances, with operation, influence and efficiency are in conception what they are in actual existence, that is, if they actually exist at all, for it may be doubted, whether an infinitely true line, circle or square, ever existed otherwise than as the object of a determinate conception. The active property of our notion of six, and passive property of our notion of fifty, in the suitable circumstances of being present, and in contact in our minds, are ever attended with operation and influence to a change of idea: and to the effect fifty-six in conception. The angles of a triangle and two right angles brought together in conception, produce by operation and influence, the idea of equality.

As various simples may go to a compound, and many small sums to an aggregate, which yet admits of being again divided with different proportions and additional advantages to a present purpose; so, a cause seems to admit of similar treatment. Now if we reflect, that ability, capacity and opportunity, necessarily must have matter or mind, for its subject, and that every effect within our cognizance, is in the modification of either
matter

matter or mind, I think we are naturally led to divide a cause into subject, power, operation and influence.

If I deviate in my use of words in this case from their more common meaning, may I not hope to be forgiven, as I do it under an apprehension of following more strictly the nature of things?

The parts of a cause then may *first* be four in number, and, we will call them the subject part, the power part, the operation part, and the influence part, respecting the relative effect.

First, the subject part. There are two subjects essential to every cause: the one the subject of active property, the other of passive property. Though popularly speaking, through the poverty of language, they may be frequently called one, as when a man or his mind is considered the subject of both cause and effect: yet speaking with precision, there are two opposed objects of conception, the one the subject of active property, the other of passive property in order to the existence of cause and effect.

These subjects may be either matter or mind; hence causes may be distinguished according to their subjects into *material* causes and *mental* causes. Material causes then are all those second causes which have for their subjects matter or body. Mental causes are all those, the subjects of which are mind and thoughts.—The subject part of a material cause is the matter or body possessed

of active property, which actually operates, and also the matter or body possessed of passive property whereon the agent operated, or the material of which the thing is made or produced.—The subject part of a mental cause is some thought or thoughts possessed of active property, which actually operates; and some thought or thoughts possessed of passive property on which the former operated, or which becomes the subject of influence.

Secondly, Power comes next in order to consideration as essential to a cause. Power, we have considered coexistent with, or the immediate result of ability, capacity, and opportunity. Now ability, capacity, and opportunity, are essential to the existence of a cause, whether material or mental.

In a material cause, ability in the agent, capacity in the patient, and opportunity to both.

In a mental cause, ability in thought under one modification; capacity in thought under another modification; and opportunity to both. Or ability in a sensation, perception, conception, or notion; capacity in the mind and its thinking; with opportunity to both.

Some have considered what I call suitable circumstances, opportunity and occasion, as itself a cause. This I conceive to be inconsistent; they have farther added, it is that, which removes obstructions. But they seem to forget that removing

ing obstructions, must have a cause consisting of all that is requisite to a cause. And that opportunity is itself the partial cause, in that case, of opportunity.

I grant, however, in regard of the effect, that when an intelligent being is remotely considered as concurring to the existence of opportunity or occasion, that although he be not the agent yet he truly suffers, admits or permits all efficiency which is consequent of opportunity.

Some on the other hand may tell me that time, place, position, junction, &c. are but circumstances of events that come to pass, and not essential to the causes of these events, or of being as they are. As I am persuaded such language must arise from an inadequate notion of a cause, I must beg leave to recommend a reviewal of the subject, and to remind them that suitable circumstances which compose opportunity and occasion, are essential to the existence of power, and consequently of every cause. Turn your thoughts to Alexander, Cæsar, or Cromwell, admit for the present their conquests were laudable. Without suitable circumstances, power would not have existed, their ambitious aims would not have been gratified, or the revolutions which attended their endeavours effected.—Had Charles the Twelfth, of Sweden, been in the circumstances of Alexander, no doubt such were his ambition and courage,

rage; that he would like him have conquered the known parts of the world.

I am not disposed to resolve all second causes into what some will call occasional or instrumental ones; yet permit me to declare, that it is my fixed judgment, that all efficiency strictly conceived, together with whatever is essential to it, depends, not only originally, but constantly, on the vital essence or spirit of God.

Thirdly, The operation part. Operation has been already attended to, and some known operations noticed, such as cutting, scraping, building, distilling, brewing, purging, &c. respecting matter, and comparing, abstracting, generalizing, judging, respecting mind. It was observed, that numerous operations respecting both matter and mind, do evidently exist of which we have no direct conception, and to some of which we have given no name.

Fourthly, The influence part. Influence also has been attended to. The influence part of a cause, is the modes of the new; or the continued existence, that is to say, abstractly conceived, the effect.

The influence part of a material cause is the change in modes resulting from the operation of matter on matter: And in case of abiding and enduring, it is the continuation of former modes in opposition to exchange. In other words, the influence part of a material cause is the sensible
corporal

corporal effect.—The influence part of a mental cause respects the new ideas or modifications arising in the object of contemplation, or the continuation of the former assemblage in cases of abiding and enduring. Or otherwise expressed, It is that which determinates the sensation, conception, idea, notion, or affection, as an effect, to be this or that, and distinguishes it from every thing else.

So much for the first division of a cause, but,

Secondly, A cause admits of a division into two parts, namely, the *active* part, and the *passive* part. This division is of great utility as being strictly natural, and much conducive to facility of speech.

The active part of a cause includes relative ability in some object with the addition of actual operation and actual efficiency.

The passive part of a cause, is the subject, its capacity, and the actual influence it sustains.

I before said, that material causes are those which respect matter. I now add, That a material cause is that, which produces a sensible corporal effect, and that which produces its effect by a material virtue. I said, that mental causes are those which respect mind; I now add, that a mental cause is that which produces a real effect in mind, or it is that which affects understanding, affection, or determination of mind.

As two subjects of properties are essential to every

every cause, and one may be material and the other mental, we may consistently add *mixed*, as a third kind of causes: Mixed causes, are causes to which both matter and mind are essential. These are of two classes. *First*, Those which respect bodily sensation; and *secondly*, Those which regard the communication of motion by endeavour.

Of the first class, The subject part is some material objects, more particularly, an organ of sensation; and an object of sense, in respect of active property: And also the mind, in respect of passive property.—The mind of a man, the subject of sensation and passion, through an organized body, on the organs of sensation of which the mind depends for the origin of thinking itself.—The power part implies ability in external objects, the bodily organs of sense, the nerves and the instincts of the body.—It also implies capacity in the mind to which also we rightly add opportunity, without which no power in this respect can exist.—Of the operation part I can form no idea, but some have called it impressing.—To the influence part we apply the terms seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and feeling, and in general perceiving.

Of the second class of mixed causes, or those which respect communication of motion, or rest by endeavour of mind. The subject part is the mind and its thinking: and also the body, more particularly

particularly the nerves and some member of it.

—The power part involves ability in mind under the modification of endeavour—capacity in the body—and suitable circumstances.—The operation part I do not recollect has any name, nor can I form an idea of it.—The influence part is actual motion, cessation, or rest.

An effect is the new existence. Or it is that which is produced, done, or obtained. It has been, in my opinion, rightly held an axiom, That every cause contains its effect, or that there is nothing in the effect, which was not in the cause. This axiom seems fully exemplified in the former divisions of a cause, for the influence part, considered as an actual existence, is the effect.

The new existence, or continued existence, which we call effect, may be, popularly speaking, either a mode or a substance. When the operation and influence is not reciprocal, of, and on the subjects of a cause, the effect is conceived a mere mode;—Thus whiteness of wax, in consequence of the operation of the sun. But when the operation and influence are reciprocal, we popularly conceive, and call the effect a new substance,—Thus in making or causing brass, the calamin operates on the copper, and the copper on the calamin, the copper is influenced and so is the calamin,—Brass, which is the effect, is a new substance, or more strictly, a substance under a new modification;—Thus also respecting propagation

pagation of the species, the fœtus is conceived and called a new substance.

I observed respecting power, that when carried back to its source and attributed to the eternal and infinite God, we have no place for the distinction of ability, capacity and suitable circumstances as essential to divine power. So also we may remark concerning cause, common or second causes, of which we have been treating. When these are carried back to the primary all-comprehending, all-involving cause, and contemplated in the divine nature all the foregoing divisions and distinctions of parts and species, we rightly conceive to lose their existence, being resolved into the fulness and independence of the divine nature and efficiency.

What is called negative causes will be considered in the fifth Section.

SECTION IV.

Of Necessity.

THE word necessity, necessary, &c. is much used in popular language, as synonymous with need, needful, indigent. Thus when we have talked of the necessities, conveniencies, and superfluities of life, or of our necessity. And this
feems

seems generally the meaning of the words as used in our translation of the holy scriptures. This is not the sense in which I use it. To avoid ambiguity, to express that conception, I use the word need, needful, and other synonyms.—Again, the word necessity, is often used to express the opposite to liberty; and synonymous with unavoidableness. Thus it seems used in 1 Cor. ix. 16. 2 Cor. ix. 7. But as the words constraint and restraint, do more specially express this conception, I avail myself of them, and in this case also avoid an ambiguous use of the word necessity.—I use the word necessity, so far as I can judge, in what has been accounted its philosophical sense.

Necessity, philosophical necessity, in my apprehension, is that in the nature of objects actually existing which is the reason of certainty (the certainty of knowledge to any intelligent being) of their existence, or the existence of some other object. Or, necessity is an affection of existence, which belongs to objects, the denial of the existence of which, implies a contradiction. *Must be—cannot but be—it is impossible but that it should be—or, it is impossible it should be otherwise, all essentials, properties, and circumstances taken into the account, are the proper expressions of necessity.*

I always mean by necessity, that by which whatsoever comes to pass cannot but come to

pass, all considerations taken into the account; and can come to pass in no other way or manner than it does. Now what is this when reduced to its greatest simplicity, but the *power*, or *absence of power*, on which its existence depended? I refer it to the consideration of the reader, being satisfied for myself, that it is always power or its absence we call philosophical necessity. On power, or defect of power, every object of finite existence, depends for existence. This first principle of intelligence cannot be shaken. To affirm that neither of these, as perceived, was the ground of certainty respecting some actually known and affirmed existence, is to affirm the contradiction that the existence was necessary and not necessary in the same respect.

If we have here a just representation, then the same thing to which we have given the name power, conceived in a different respect takes the name necessity: but power is not alone called necessity, for the absence of power also takes that name. I think all will admit that necessity must be viewed differently, when applied to the existence of light, from what it is when applied to darkness. It certainly differs respecting actual being and nonentity, perfection and defect, notwithstanding it is rightly conceived in either case, as that affection of existence which as perceived, is the reason or ground of certainty. Let

us then distinguish necessity into direct and indirect.

Direct necessity is power, with a certain affection arising in the mind from a consideration of power, consisting in or coexisting with the absolute nature and depending relative properties and circumstances of things to constitute their own existence, or to produce the existence of other things. Let direct necessity be kept perfectly distinct from certainty, I am persuaded it conveys to our conception no other object than power. Direct necessity respects the existence of things, positive beings, subjects and modes, essentials and properties. If power is direct necessity, then so certain as we are that all positive finite beings are causal in their existence, so certain we are also that they are necessary: for power is primarily essential to every proper cause.

Indirect necessity is negation or absence of power. And its objects are negations, privations, defects, sinkings of value, declensions from excellence, &c.

Indirect necessity, may receive some light from the doctrine of negative causes, or causes improperly so called. Both indirect necessity and a negative cause, agree in this respect, that they have no actual external being; but are mere conceptions of our minds: Whereas direct or proper necessity, and direct or proper causes, may have

actual being external to our conception, yea, would have actual existence respecting matter, if no human mind existed to have cognizance of them. Perhaps also, the negative quantities in algebra, conceived less than nothing may aid our conception of indirect necessity.

Things which certainly have been, are, or will be, but exist by a negative cause, and those that exist by a positive or proper cause, are equally necessary in their existence: although the former exist by indirect, and the latter by direct necessity. Necessity, I think is applicable to every thing which hath existed, doth exist, or will in futurity exist; whether substance, or mode, action, or passion, positive being, or negation. In what respect soever I find power, I also find necessity in the same respect: also where I discover the absence of power, and any consequent or consequents of that absence, I equally find necessity respecting the consequent object or objects. Wherever there is evident existence either positive or negative, such existence depends on power or its absence. Wherever there is evident existence either positive or negative, there is also necessity, the existence is necessary either with direct or indirect necessity. I think no propositions are more certain truths than these, rightly conceived.

Although many objects are conceived to exist by mere indirect necessity: Yet respecting the
same

same objects, we are the subjects of direct necessity in regard to the existence of their notions in our minds. Their ideas, such as they are, are powerfully present in our minds. Indeed indirect necessity and direct necessity as perceived, are equally a ground of knowledge, and of other mental existence.

Certainty, is the result of perceived evidence. Evidence has ability in matters of understanding, the mind has relative capacity, and in suitable circumstances, the ripe fruit certainly is produced and exists. Or thus, Perceived evidence, is an indubitable sign of power. Truths and facts perceived, or remembered, have ability, the mind capacity, and in suitable circumstances, operation and influence proceed, certainty is enjoyed or exists. Let it not be forgotten, that objects existing by indirect necessity, or the absence of power, when conceived by the mind, that conception has direct necessary existence.—Instances however are not wanting respecting mind any more than respecting matter of indirect necessity, since every want, defect of excellence, non-existence or privation of thought or in thinking is indirectly necessary. Yet the notion even of these when it exists in the mind, exists by direct necessity: cannot exist without power respecting its existence. So that our actual knowledge, ever valuable, is always strictly and directly necessary.

Necessity respecting the assent of our minds, is

not our certainty of truth and fact: but it is that, in the nature of things which is essential to our certainty of it. It is that wherein, as perceived, lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms it. And what is that but power? Truth is necessary. Facts are necessary. Intuitive knowledge, or its absence, is also necessary. Thus that John is not Thomas at the same time and in respect of a distinguishing name. Two and two make four. The part is less than the whole, and the whole greater than a part.

Waving the dispute whether, first principles of truth and intuitive truths, are the same thing. I may observe, that first principles are self-evident truths, or propositions, which can receive no additional evidence from considerations foreign to them. Now all these first principles I account necessary, and to co-exist with power in every mind which understands and thinks of them.

Some of these first principles, of great moment to sound philosophy, according to my estimation, may be thus arranged.

1. "The existence of every thing of which I am conscious."
2. "The thoughts of which I am conscious, are the thoughts of a being; which I call *myself*, *my mind*, *my person*."
3. "Those things did really happen which I distinctly remember."
4. "Our personal identity and continued existence,

tence, as far back as we remember any thing distinctly."

5. "Those things do really exist which we distinctly perceive by our senses," and have actual properties relative to the bodily organs of sensation.

6. Every thing that actually existeth has essentials, that is to say, what is essential to its constitution, and which renders it distinct from every thing else.—How far we can discover these essentials has nothing to do with this proposition.

7. We are the subjects of abilities, that is to say, active properties.

8. We are the subjects of capacities, that is to say, passive properties.

9. Every man, and limited being, is in some circumstances.

10. Operation and influence, good and bad, are essentially dependant on the properties and circumstances of things, cases of miracles excepted.

11. Every valuable change in the created works of God, results from the relative, active, and passive properties and circumstances of things; or from Divine interposition.

12. All declines or changes from excellence result from the absence or restrainings of power in respect of preventing them.

13. All valuable abiding or enduring in the created works of God, as opposed to change, results

sults from the relative, active and passive properties and circumstances of things; cases of divine interposition excepted.

In other words, Enduring or perseverance in any degree of excellence, ordinarily depends on the properties and circumstances of things, and in extraordinary cases on interposition of the Deity.

14. We have some degree of dominion over our actions both of body and of mind.

15. We are in a state of unlimited subjection and dependance on another being, or on other beings.

16. Those properties of our constitution which are mediums, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious.

17. "Another first principle relating to existence is, That there is life and intelligence in our fellow men with whom we converse."

18. "Another first principle I take to be, That certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind."

19. "Another first principle appears to me to be, That there is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion."

20. "There are many events dependant upon the will of man, in which there is a self-evident probability,

probability, greater or less, according to circumstances."

21. In the phenomena of nature, similar consequences of ability, relative capacity, and opportunity, will in futurity take place, to former consequences of similar ability, relative capacity, and opportunity.

All these appear to me, self-evident truths, and as thought on by me, to be, necessary knowledge, actually existing in my mind.

Demonstrable knowledge is also necessary. Thus that A. is equal to B. for C. is the measure of both. D. is not equal to E. for F. is the measure of D. but does not agree to E.

Knowledge also on the evidence of report or history, which takes the name belief, is necessary. When we believe, we cannot help believing. I believe, and cannot but believe, that there is a city in America called Philadelphia. I necessarily believe that ancient Babylon doth not exist at present.

Existence, mental existence, is applicable to every degree of assent to a proposition. And every thing actually existing is necessary, therefore every existence of actual assent is necessary, cannot but be as it is, and cannot be, all circumstances considered, any otherwise. It is impossible, nature and circumstance considered, that it should be otherwise. Thus necessity is applicable to knowledge, faith, and opinion in us, for these

these are conceived, rightly conceived, to exist in our minds. And all actual existence is necessary, that is, involves power, or its absence, to be: And cannot be detached from coexistence with power, or its absence, in that respect. Necessity of operation or action, comes under the same definition as necessity of the existence of things, because we as justly conceive operation and action to be things actually existing as we do any other modes, or even substances. This remark applies to mental operation and action as well as material, for thinking, under any modification, is justly conceived to be a thing existing; and necessity regards at all times the real existence of things. Conceptions are real and actual existences in the mind, and as such must in every case be as they are, natures and circumstances taken into the account, and cannot be otherwise.

The word essential, is also expressive of necessity. This is essential to that, may be rendered, this is necessary to that, or this is effective to that. But as the essences of material things are to in little more than merely nominal essences, and the essences of imaginary things are quite arbitrary, perhaps the term essential may be consistently restrained to mental matters, and thus is applicable to what goes to make the idea of a thing what it is, or its definition to be true. Timber is essential to a ship. Tallow or wax is essential to candles. Workmanship is essential to a clock. Evidence

dence is essential to knowledge. Premises are essential to an inference. In all these cases, essential may be exchanged for necessary, and the notion continued the same, with only a shade of difference, as immediately regarding the essence of things, whereas necessity has immediate respect to existence.

Indispensible, requisite, or as we sometimes say, essentially requisite, are also used respecting our thoughts, as synonymous with necessary.

We have an adverbial expression of necessity, but this can be with equal effect expressed by the adverbs from power. We may say necessarily this, efficiently and effectively that. Thus, the conclusion of a syllogism is necessarily contained in, or flows from the premises, may be expressed, the conclusion of a syllogism effectively and efficiently is contained in, or flows from, the premises. The latter may not be so usual in speech : but do they not equally manifest that the existence of the conclusion results from the power coexistent with the premises, as rightly understood, and that where this is not the case, though there be the appearance of a syllogism, yet in reality it is but a sophism ?

Were it proper to anticipate a subject, which belongs to the future application, I might here remark, that necessity, proper direct necessity, is rightly judged a primary attribute of God. His existence and all other known or unknown attributes,

butes, his necessity excepted, as well as his operations must be necessary, for the smallest deviation in this respect must destroy in our conception the infinitude of divine excellency. That necessity cannot be superior to God as some have erroneously conceived, is fully evident from the consideration, that, apart from eternal, actual, substantial existence, necessity would be a non-entity, eternally a non-existence; and this actual eternal being is God: consequently were there no God, necessity would be no more than an abstract notion of our minds.

Let us now proceed to survey fundry objects, some of which are akin to power, and all of which have been more or less confounded with it.

SECTION V.

Of Things akin to Power, and other Objects which have been confounded with Power.

FIRST, LIBERTY. Liberty is a species of opportunity. It consists in opportunity for concurrence to certain conduct and its opposite, or certain conduct and its negation as the inclination of the subject of liberty shall be. Liberty thus differs from opportunity in general, as single and plural: since

since liberty ever involves opportunity for two objects, but with this peculiarity, that one of them only can be embraced. If this representation is just, liberty consists in opportunity for acting or operating. Thus a ball at the north side of a room, twenty feet square, has liberty to roll twenty feet to the south, but is deprived of liberty for rolling twenty feet to the north. The aperture of the door gives liberty for the furniture and other objects to pass. The window gives liberty to the rays of light to enter by day, and to emerge from a candle by night. Removing a dyke, gives liberty for the water to rush through. The looseness and flexibility of apparel, gives liberty or freedom for the motion of the limbs.— Thus also ignorance of the event gives liberty for an ox to be influenced by its leader or driver to go to the place of slaughter. Thus the silence of the holy scriptures respecting the final event of any future determinate individual of mankind, gives liberty or freedom for the operation of their commands, intreaties and expostulations on the mind. And, thus probably, some existing ignorance of futurity, gives liberty for even the angel Gabriel, to be influenced by the divine command.—The cage bounds the liberty of a bird, and a prison the liberty of a man.

There is an hypothesis that has of late much prevailed in the world, which has been called by the ambiguous name of the free-will system.

H

This

This hypothesis many learned men are very tenacious of, and I think so bewildered in, that by force of habits arising from tracks of thought consonant with their hypothesis, they persuade themselves, and endeavour to persuade others, into a belief, that, what to the more unprejudiced are viewed as prejudices of infancy, of childhood, or savages, are actually first principles of common sense and knowledge. One great end of the publication of this Essay is exposure of that hypothesis to examination, and to show, that it unlimitedly fails of answering those ends which its adherents suppose it to answer, yet which inspire them with courage and confidence in its promulgation and defence. These philosophers say, Liberty is power—that in a moral agent, it is power over the determinations of his own will. As the discussion of human liberty naturally belongs to the disquisition on human preference,

Suffice it to say at present, that, in my best judgment, there is no just conception of liberty diverse from its being, in all cases whatsoever, a species of opportunity : and that opportunity is not power.

Secondly, POSSIBILITY. Possibility expresses our conception of power under some condition. Thus your watch will go on condition you wind it up, or power will then exist respecting its going.

Possibility, possible, and possibly, have always
immediate

immediate respect to our Speculation or speculative knowledge; for though we sometimes say a thing is possible or impossible in the nature of things; we always mean, according to our *conception* of the nature of things; that is to say, our conception of the essentials and properties of this, that, and the other thing. Possible, always requires for its existence some mind in the estimation of which an assigned event is possible. Were there no actually existing mind, there would be no such thing as possibility existing in the universe.

The object of possibility or possible, is always some event, which event is conceived as past, present, or future, or else in the absolute, without regard to time. Thus it is possible, Adam was six feet high. It is possible my friend in America is asleep. It is possible that water will freeze next Christmas-day in London. And it is possible the moon is inhabited.

When there appears no evidence for or against the existence of an event, we account it, and say it is possible, or merely possible. All things which do not involve absurdity, we admit possible to exist, because God can mediate or immediately effect it, or has dominion adequate to effect it.

When there appears evidence for an event, we admit it either probable or certain. In this case we consider possibility involved in probability and certainty, yet do not conceive it merely

possible. What is certain is probable : but what is probable may not be certain. What is probable is possible ; but what is possible may not be probable. A greater degree of assent also involves a lesser : but a lesser degree of assent does not involve a greater.

It might have been—it may be—it can be, are the common expressions of possibility.

Events, which are neither certain nor probable, must be conceived either possible or impossible. Events, uncertain and improbable in view of the party, are the objects of mere possibility and impossibility. In this respect possible or mere possibility cannot be applied to God, for all events are to him certain, and there is no such thing as merely possible or even probable unto God.

Possibility seems to have been sometimes confounded with dominion. Thus we have said, It is possible for a man to cleave wood : or this, and that, is impossible for a man to do : but that all things are possible unto God. That it was possible unto God to have made our bodies triangular : and possible unto him to create a thousand worlds he has not created and will never create. This representation does not disagree with the original of the word, for Etymologists say, Possible is of *possibilis* Latin, of *possum*, to be able to effect. There should not however be an undue attachment to the original meaning of words, for as discoveries are carried forward in philosophy,

fophy, new terms must be invented, 'or old ones applied in a various sense, both which may sometimes be done consonant with wisdom and prudence. The cases above are clearly referable to dominion, which we are next to attend. Strictly speaking there is no such thing as possible, merely possible in the estimate of God. Whatever God does not incline to, it is in his view, strictly impossible he should incline to, at an assigned time. Every thing which existeth in his works of creation, at a given time, could never be viewed as merely possible by the Deity. And whatever does not exist at a given time, was always known to be impossible by the Deity. There is no such thing as merely possible or merely probable as a modification in the knowledge of God. Mere possibilities and mere probabilities, belong to the knowledge of limited intelligences. We rightly say, It is possible a mountain of gold exists, or will some time exist : Or that a river of oil may be. These ideas we can actually unite without inconsistency. We know that God can do any thing which does not involve absurdity, or in other words, that his dominion is unbounded, and that nothing but the volition and fiat of the Almighty is wanting, to the existence of power, operation, influence, and efficiency, in respect of the actual existence of such an event.—But there is evident absurdity in the supposition, that an event in the conception of the deity is viewed

by the deity in respect of its actual existence as merely possible. The absurdity is evident not only by refering the case to the proposition, whatsoever is, is, and cannot be otherwise, but also as referred to direct necessity, that is power in respect of the actually existing essentials and properties of things.

Again, Possibility and possible, seem to have been confounded with power. To conceive that possibility is power, is very erroneous and absurd. I have said, that possibility expresses our conception of power suspended on some condition. The truth is, that without actual existence of two things, one of which has ability, and the other a related capacity, and in suitable circumstances, there cannot be power in an assigned respect. There may be two things really existing, one of which has ability, and another a related capacity, add to them suitable circumstances, then power would exist: but if these circumstances are absent, there is no power in an assigned respect existing, and consequent operation, influence, and efficiency cannot exist. We can only say, efficiency was, is, or will be possible, supposing the suitable circumstances shall exist, do exist, or had existed.—Possibility respects our conception of the real existence of things so related, that in suitable circumstances, power, operation, influence, and efficiency would be the consequent: but irrespective of whether these

suitable

suitable circumstances exist or not. Or else it respects the real existence of the circumstances, without respect to whether the things circumstanced, have relative ability and capacity, or not: In the former case, a sound horse can, that is, his natural strength and capacity of the road, render it possible for him to travel forty miles per day. But here is no respect to the necessary circumstances of his master's inclination, and actually taking the horse out of the stable, saddling, or putting it in harness, &c. Without which no power and efficiency can exist in that respect. This knife will cut ivory, or its constitution and sharpness related to the hardness of the ivory is such as renders it possible that it should cut ivory: But here is no respect to the inclination of man and his hand to employ it, without which power and efficiency in this respect cannot exist. In the latter case, It is possible to learn Latin of Mr. ——— a good master, and who is disposed to teach it, but here is no respect to the ability of the learner, who may be without acumen and memory related to the difficulties and burthen of that language. Consequently power and efficiency in that respect cannot exist. This view of possibility seems nearest akin to our view of power, but is, I apprehend, evidently diverse from it, and diverse from our conception of it, as I have endeavoured to show.

Possibility

Possibility is applicable to past, present, and future mental existence, and to mental existence, irrespective of either : both respecting our own minds, and the minds of other persons. It is equally applicable to the conceived existence of events which have for their subject, *matter*, and those which have for their subject, *mind*. Respecting my own mind, It is possible that I voluntarily did a certain thing, for instance, climbed up on a table, or voluntarily said a certain thing ; when I was two years old : but which I have not the least remembrance of :—It is possible, that I now retain some erroneous judgments, or that in some points I am mistaken :—It is possible, that in futurity I may see some of my present mistakes, and voluntarily acknowledge my blunders :—I hold it possible, that my dubious propositions are true.—For instances of mental existence which I esteem, but possible respecting other persons take the following. I fix on a determinate object. I conceive it possible that he once loved a person, he has evidently at present no love unto :—In my view it is possible, that he now loves a certain female :—And I hold it possible, that he may live to hate the person he now ardently loves :—And of events with indefinite time, I conceive it possible, that he is of a good natural temper.

Power is essential to the existence of our assent to every mental proposition we assent to, whether the assent be opinion, belief, or knowledge. It follows

follows that certainty is the highest elevation from mere possibility. Of intuitive propositions and first principles we say their negation is impossible. But descending only to demonstrative points, we admit possibility of mistaking, and improve that sentiment by adding up large accounts more than once, and by re-attending the proof of momentous matters.

Thirdly, DOMINION, or Sovereignty. We have considered power as coexistent with, or the essential result of ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances: But we have frequent occasion for expressing them separately. Thus we say, my ability, my capacity, and by courtesy, my circumstances. Thus also, the ability of this thing, the capacity of that thing, and the circumstances of the other thing.

We also frequently take them in couples, thus, ability with suitable circumstances, and capacity with suitable circumstances. To the former, namely, ability and suitable circumstances, conceived without respect to present operation, we have assigned if I mistake not, the name Dominion, and say by courtesy, my dominion, your dominion, and the dominion of this, and of that. To the latter, namely, capacity and suitable circumstances, we give the denomination, subjection. And humble ourselves to say my subjection, our subjection; and that this is subject to that.

Dominion and subjection are relative terms.

They

They lead our thoughts to two beings, or objects, of conception, one of which is in a state of dominion respecting the other, whilst the other is in a state of subjection in respect of that which has dominion. Dominion, expresses the advantage one being has for influencing another. Subjection, denotes passiveness to the being that has dominion.

In all instances of actual operation we ascribe dominion, to the object which has active property, over the object which has related passive property.

We ascribe dominion to our minds over all actions and forbearings respecting which we conceive ourselves at liberty.

We also ascribe dominion to ourselves over all objects exposed to the consequences of our actually forbearing or acting, for which we are at liberty.

The joining abilities of several persons or things makes an aggregate of ability and with the addition of a junction of suitable circumstances, an aggregate of dominion.—The joining capacities also make an aggregate of capacity, and with the addition of joined opportunities an aggregate of subjection. The government of united states is an instance of the former; and the people at large under any government are an instance of the latter.

Dominion seems to make a more near approach to power than either ability, capacity, or suitable circumstances

circumstances alone: But it is not power: For if we reflect, power does not immediately depend for its existence on power: But both dominion and subjection depend for their very existence immediately on power. Even the dominion of God immediately depends on ever-existing power. Again, Without subjection in existence, there can be no actually existing dominion. Were there no subjects, no creatures, the dominion of God could not exist. Yet in that case his eternal power or necessity would exist.

Dominion is either immediate or mediate. Thus our minds influence our bodies immediately; but influence other objects mediately, or through their medium.

Dominion is greater or less, according to the degree of advantage, one being has for influencing another. Thus our minds have greater advantage for influencing our hands than for influencing our bowels.

Dominion common, or dominion among us, is but a subjected dominion, it being derived from God, and held only according to his pleasure. The dominion of God is infinite in every possible respect, but the dominion among creatures, however exalted, is finite or limited.

Fourthly, AUTHORITY, seems to have been confounded with power. Authority is a conception essentially related to that of author. Both author and authority, in origin and existence involve

involve power, but are not themselves power. Authority I take to be, primarily, dominion, or sovereignty, in respect of suasive government, necessarily resulting from being the Creator or author of the governed; consequently belongs to God only, and is distinct from his power.

But we are more conversant with subordinate authority, such as that of parents in respect of children, masters in respect of servants, and civil government of nations. Power seems to have been confounded with civil government or the policy of a state when it has been called, "an orderly power constituted for the public good:" and as used by our translators of the epistle to the Romans, 13th chapter, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers: For there is no power but of God: The powers that be, are ordained of God." But for reasons before named, a civil government is not power; to which I add, That power respects an actual change, or actual enduring, in opposition to change, and not a mere junction of active property, and opportunity, by courtesy called ours, to which immediate operation is not essential. Again, Power cannot literally be attributed to a creature, a man, or set of men, since neither, nor all of them involve in their nature active and passive related property with opportunity respecting any particular change, or enduring, as opposed to change. But civil authority may be ascribed to a man, or set of men.

men. Authority then is not power, but a species of dominion.

The very notion of a community involves the conception of mingling or joining cares and adventures, hopes and fears, in a word, interests for the attainment of a greater good, and avoiding more evil than could be rationally expected by detached individuals. The joining abilities makes a weight of ability, and conjunction of suitable circumstances compose a larger field of opportunity: whether the ruling and depending, that is, the executive part is equally vested in all, delegated to a certain description, or to a single individual. I conceive that the majority of a people have right in equity to appoint their governors; and that, so far as the appointment is valuable, it is delegation of authority by the Deity through these instruments.—Human power, in my judgment, strictly speaking, is human nonsense. Power belongeth unto God, and not to men, nor to any other dependent being. We may talk of human properties, abilities, and capacities, with consistency: but cannot without error and inconsistency ascribe power to man. Power, unbounded power is the attribute of God. From him as a fountain, the stream of power flows among the various orders of creatures in ample channels. Now if disposed to carry on the allegory, it is easy to conceive various reservoirs, larger or smaller stationed on the stream of power

appoin'ed by the Creator and Preserver of the world. Such I suppose good sovereigns and senators, judges and magistrates, for all these in their highest attributes, can be rationally no more, at most, than reservoirs on the channel of power, issuing from the all-involving, all-comprehending fountain.

Fifthly, MIGHT, STRENGTH, VIGOUR, or POTENCY. This is not power, yet has been frequently confounded with it. Strength is evidently a mode of active property or ability. And it is usually predicated of the subject of properties, the parts of that subject and of the properties themselves. Thus we say a mighty man, a man of strong intellects, and a man of strong passions, a strong arm, a strong perception, strength of memory, and strength of reason, strength of body and strength of mind.

Might or strength, like ability itself, always relates to some object. We ask, Ability for what? Strength, for what? As active properties always relate to either abiding, enduring, or changes; so does strength. A house built on a rock, of strong materials and on a strong construction, abides, and endures the rain and tempest. A strong wind may eminently occur to wafting a ship on the ocean, or to grinding much corn in the mill, which are changes in matter. By muscular strength a porter supports a load, and a pugilist knocks down his antagonist. Might, is as requisite

sive for bearing the fatigues of the campaign, as for subduing the enemy. Strength, is as indispensable respecting a porter who bears a burden, as respecting a pugilist, who knocks down his antagonist. And might is equally requisite in respect of reasoning, and strength, in respect of judging.—As ability does not require, like power, that its object should be good in order to its actual existence, so neither does strength. Strength is as indispensable to incorrigibleness as to fortitude—to thrust the dagger of the assassin as to lift up the brother who falls; and is as really predicable of apostate spirits, as of the holy angels who excel in might.

Strength is opposed to weakness, yet not as its contrary, for wherever active property exists it exists with some degree of strength, but these terms are used comparatively. Thus we say a strong horse, that is, strong when compared with another less strong, which we call weak.

The strength of creatures is derived and dependent, but the strength of God is underived and independent. The strength of finite beings is finite or limited strength: But the strength of the Deity infinite and unlimited; God is almighty, omnipotent, or infinite in strength.

We may also remark, that strength is not inapplicable to the subject of passive property, for without some degree of strength no passive property can exist: but strength does not go to the

passive property itself. The perfection of relative passive property is better expressed by great and small. Thus wax and plaster of Paris have a great or excellent passive property relative to taking an impression from a seal; clay has a lesser capacity; and sand a smaller capacity in the same respect.

This notion is sometimes expressed by the adjective powerful. Thus a powerful king, a powerful west wind, and a powerful resolution, have been used as synonymous with a mighty king, a strong wind, and a strong resolution, which latter expressions are much preferable.

Sixthly, The modifications of mere vegetative life are sometimes called powers. Thus we have heard of the powers of rosemary, of sage, and of wormwood. Also their consequent, growth, nourishment, formation, &c. Modifications likewise of mere animal life, as eating, drinking, swallowing, digesting, sleeping, waking, moving, are sometimes called powers. But neither of these are called by that name with greater propriety than the properties would be of merely inanimate things, such as dry timber, diamonds, and metals.

The modifications of mind, or rather, mental abilities for thinking under various modifications, have been called powers. And in general, the intellectual and active powers of man. Thus we have been used to say, the understanding, the will, and the affections, are powers of mind. But
the

the ability of the mind to understand, to will, or to be impassioned, is not power. These properties, and all consequent modifications of thinking, cannot be called powers in any other sense, or with greater propriety, than the various instruments in mechanics are called powers, known by the names, the lever, pulley, wheel, screw, wedge, and inclined plane. Both classes may concur to the existence of power in a certain respect, but are not themselves power. These mediums in mechanics, without the actual existence are no more than abstract conceptions, and with actual existence without passive property in some other object to be lifted, driven, drawn, &c. and in suitable circumstances, do not constitute, or convey to us the notion of power. And thus respecting the mind, were there no bodily organs of sense, or no external or internal sensible objects, the essential property in mind would avail nothing in respect of perception, for power in respect of perception could not exist, and consequently neither could operation, influence, or efficiency in respect of perception. Were there no sensation and no consciousness, there could be no notion of human thought or thinking, for all our notions of this class are obtained by reflections on our consciousness of thought, under the several modifications.

I have heard also of the name habitual power, and the power of habit. This in all instances

that have occurred within my notice, I think should be called habitual facility, habitual ability, and habitual strength. Habit is a facility, or aptitude, acquired by repetition of action. Facility may exist, which does not depend on a repetition of acts. Thus, The apostles by an effusion of the Holy Spirit, spake numerous languages with facility, which is usually attained by repetition of efforts: But this facility was not a habit, or habitual. To talk of infused habits is indefensible. As we have no conception of action but thinking and motion, we consequently have no notion of habit respecting any other objects. We experiment the ease and aptitude of running through a train of thoughts, which we have started and several times repeated. Thus also we observe, or experiment, with what facility a musician plays a flute without reflection on the motion of his fingers, through a repetition of action, at first not less difficult than the former.

Habit is not power, yet eminently concurs to its existence in numerous instances and species of efficiency. By habit of hand I write. Habit of hand is essential to the *ability* of writing. Ability in me, capacity in what I write with, and in what I write on, with time, place, and other suitable circumstances, are essential to power in respect of writing.—Ability increases by habit, for sustaining a burden. The man in the fable, who daily lifted his calf, is said to have done it by habitual strength,

strength, and strength acquired by exercise, with as great ease when it became an ox, as the first morning. We conceive capacity in the burden, ability in the man, with suitable circumstances to be essential to power in respect of bearing a burden.

Seventhly, TENDENCY, or DISPOSITION TO AN END. This in its common acceptation seems an abstract conception akin to that of Power. Tendency is ascribed to either detached active property, detached passive property, or detached opportunity, in a certain respect. Ability in an object has tendency, capacity, has tendency and suitable circumstances have also tendency respecting proposed operation and influence. Thus a good oration tendeth to persuade,—An irritable constitution tendeth to be affected,—and the circumstances of attention and reflection, have tendency to advance our knowledge.

Tendency is a mode essentially related unto subject and end. There is no tendency without a subject that tends, and there is no tendency where there is no end to that tendency. Appetite in an animal may be conceived a subject of tendency, and the ends to which it tends are preservation of the individual and propagation of the species.

The end of a tendency is a distinct conception from the end proposed of any effort of an intelligent being. The end of a tendency is immutable,
but

but the end proposed by a finite intelligent being may be accomplished or defeated. The end of a tendency may be the same object which is the end of an intelligent being, or it may be diverse: Thus in the former case, the end of industry, and the end of an industrious man, may be wealth: in the latter case, the end proposed by Haman in erecting a gallows fifty cubits high, was the death of Mordecai, but the end of the tendency was Haman being hung on it himself, which he never proposed as an end.

A just notion of tendency is of importance to a just notion of power, which is the subject of this Essay; For I conceive that ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances are essential to the existence of power; but that as power is essentially related to value and excellence, these may exist in one respect without the existence of power; and perception of their tendency alone distinguishes them, as connected or not connected with power. Ability, capacity, and circumstances, which tend to valuable influence, do unlimitedly involve power; but ability, capacity, and circumstances which have tendency to evil influence, do not involve power, but unlimitedly mark its absence, respecting prevention of their operation and influence.

There is also a conception of tendency which is no otherwise related to that of power than as its opposite; for tendency is also conceived, connected

ned with the absence of power. Thus flesh tends to putrefaction, beer and wine to become acid in consequence of the absence of power to preserve them.

Eighthly, NEGATIVE CAUSES. Negative

Causes are, strictly speaking, no causes at all.

What is most strictly called a negative cause consists, if I may so term it, in the negation of

power, operation, and influence: and its effect is

some negation in consequence of that negation of

power, operation, and influence. Some seem to

ascribe power to negative causes. The absence

of the sun is said to produce darkness. Ignorance

and error to have baleful productions. Perhaps

this language will be apologized for, as rhetorical

tropes: or as a ground of our conception of ne-

gative causes being what it is, yet as applied to the

nature of things in actual existence, I conceive it

irrational and absurd. There is, truly under-

stood, no notion of power conveyed by either of

the forementioned expressions; for according to

the degree of negation, so is the removal from

power; and consequently from causal influence.

In respect of the proposition, the sun's absence

causeth darkness, we may remark, that the abi-

lity is in the sun, and in suitable circumstances it

enlightens objects which have capacity to be en-

lightened: When its beams are obstructed in any

way, defect, want of light takes place, or ensues

respecting the said objects. Suppose the sun to-

tally

tally withdrawn, power is in that respect gone with it, and is in respect of former enlightened objects, a nonentity, what we call darkness remains. Darkness, however remote from power, yet seems essential to our conception of space, such as it is, without actual existence, or a void in the nature of things, mere nihility respecting substance.—As to the other instance, knowledge founded on truth or fact, coexists in its possession with power in that respect. But suppose the subject of this knowledge to exchange a part thereof for what is unsound, or not founded on truth and fact, then his knowledge being partial, or judgment erroneous: Will not the essential power retire in proportionate degree? Suppose another person totally ignorant of all the truths the former had knowledge of. Doth his ignorance convey any notion of existing power in that respect? Doth it not give the full notion of want, defect, non-entity, and consequent non-existence of power? Energy certainly coexists with truth and knowledge. Error, or partial truth, is accompanied with deficiency of energy: and absolute ignorance excludes all energy in respect of the knowledge to which it is opposed.

Some philosophers seem to conceive that every being, once raised to any degree of excellence, requires an equal operation on it to reduce it to its former state, to that which raised it to that degree of excellence. They seem to owe this
opinion

opinion to unwarrantably applying the laws of motion to all cases of decline. It is granted, that a body put in motion requires an equal operation to stop it, to that which imparted it; but I cannot by that law account for all declines from excellence. I conceive that all *generated* things, for instance, are raised by power and operation to a state of perfection greater or less, after which they decline in proportion to the gradual or more sudden withdrawment of power and operation in respect of sustaining them. "The creature was made subject to vanity." In the scale of value and excellence in kind, a clod of earth gives precedence to a vegetable, and a vegetable to an animal. Power raises a vegetable or animal from an inanimate state to maturity, power sustains it in maturity, and its absence occasions its decline to inanimacy again. As are the restrainings of power, so is the existence of negative causes. A man dies through old age, I think we rationally attribute it to the restrainings of conserving power—a negative cause which involves the absence of power, operation, and influence in that respect.

The restrainings of power in all cases of decline are as the limitation of abilities, capacities, and circumstances are. Every one who reflects, must know that our knowledge is limited, that our memory is limited, that our appetites are limited, that our passions are limited: And of our bodies, that our strength is limited, as well as every faculty

culty of body; at a certain period we all decline and gradually perish in old age, when accidental sickness or external calamity do not shorten our years: And that consequently we are in numerous respects exposed to the result of negative causes.

A negative cause is a cause (if it may be so called) to which the absence of power is essential. Negative causes are of two classes. *First*, Such as exclude power, ability, operation, and influence. And *secondly*, Such as merely exclude power, but not ability, operation, nor a positive consequent. The first class takes in all necessary antecedents of negative consequents, as decays, declines, such as withering, rotting, perishing, dissolution. This class we have already attended, and I hope it is evident to the reader that every change does not immediately depend on power, nor even on ability to produce it. The second class takes in all those necessary antecedents which have positive consequences of a bad nature. This class we now attend.

The absence of power is always essential to a negative cause, but not always the absence of operation and influence, for these depend for existence on ability, related capacity, and circumstances suitable to operation and influence: but not always on ability, capacity, and circumstances suitable to *valuable* operation and influence, with which alone we considered power essentially connected: And thus a negative cause
may

may have a positive consequent. We read of the working or operating of Satan, and of the workers of iniquity, and of evil works, which certainly depend essentially on the restrainings of power in respect of their prevention.

This kind of negative causes, though they exclude power, yet do not exclude active and passive property. A highwayman snaps his pistol which wounds his prey. Here we conceive ability in his mind, capacity in his hand—ability in his hand, capacity in the pistol—ability in the pistol, capacity in the powder—ability in the powder, capacity in the ball—ability in the ball, capacity in the sufferer. Nor does this class of negative causes exclude circumstances adequate to the baneful operation and influence. The poor gentleman is actually wounded.

Baneful operation and baneful influence are not excluded these causes.—A man dies through a pestilence in prime of life. I think we rightly attribute this death to a negative cause, notwithstanding the active property and active operation of baneful vapour, the passive property of the man, and the actual influence he sustains, for power was absent in respect of abiding and enduring.—A watch is by accident in salt water, which penetrates the cases and quite destroys its works in respect of their end. I think this change must not be ascribed to power, but to its absence respecting securing the water from the steel parts,

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notwithstanding

notwithstanding we must admit the active property, operation, and influence of the salt water. No advance of excellence is effected, not even a continuance of excellence effected: but instead thereof, a falling back equal degrees from the preceding state to those positive degrees which raised the watch from crude matter to its perfection. A failure in circumstances occasioned the absence of power in respect of its preservation.—A lady sitting by the fire, an unperceived flame takes her clothes and she is burnt to death. The event is evil, we rationally look for the negation of power on which it depended, and find defect in the linen dress in respect of resisting fire, and defect in the lady in respect of watchfulness, the consequent absence of power in respect of preventing the fatal accident. Yet we rationally admit ability in the flame, capacity in the linen—ability in the burning clothes, and capacity in the person: Operation of the fire, and the influence of being burnt.—The decay of a beam occasions the house to fall—the roof falling in kills a man.—The rottenness of the beam we do not ascribe to power, but to the absence of power in respect of preserving it sound. The cause then of killing the man is a negative cause, yet we conceive ability in the falling stone, capacity in the man, opportunity for their contact, operation of the stone, and influence on the man. —Thus also, ordinarily, lust generates war—war
famine—

famine—and famine pestilence: at every step is a negative cause, that includes bad operation and influence.

If power is essentially related to excellence, then every effect of this class of negative causes is of the nature we call evil, and every kind of evil must necessarily be the effect of a negative cause. Hence, respecting every known evil event, we rationally enquire for the essential absence of power. Yet of numerous events that take place, such is our unavoidable ignorance that we are frequently unable to judge whether they are on the whole evil or good, hence cannot decide whether they owe their existence to a positive, or else to a negative cause: but we may remark that these cases are, for the greater part, respecting objects concerning which the investigation is of small, or of no importance.

Power, being something of which we can form no sensible or spiritual idea; and can conceive of no otherwise then as certainly existing, determinate objects and circumstances admitted; and requiring labour, much labour of mind, to make it the subject of meditation; we need not wonder that mankind have confounded it with kindred notions in the past instances; nor even that they have confounded its notion with others which are but its shadow, in this, and the following instances.

Ninthly, FORTUNE, CHANCE, and CONTIN-

GENCE, have been by the superstitious in all ages regarded as names of a kind of power, and even idols have been erected to Fortune, which I do not wonder at, considering the circumstances of the heathen world: but am astonished that a modern philosopher should tell us, which is a fact, however ridiculous, that "Power and necessity are opposites."

Contingence is a conception opposed to that of necessity. Some suppose such a thing actually to exist: they think there are objects which may or may not exist notwithstanding all essentials, properties, and circumstances of things are taken into the account.

If direct necessity is power: Power cannot have for its object a positive being and its negation, or its contrary, at the same time and in the same respect. To affirm it would be to affirm absurdity, therefore contingence is excluded from all positive existence.—Again, If indirect necessity is negation of power, then that negation cannot have for its object some negation and its related positive, or contrary negation, at the same time and in the same respect; therefore contingence is also absolutely removed from all negative existence. Again, If necessity is that in the nature of objects actually existing, which is the ground of certainty respecting their own existence, or the existence of some other thing; then I may argue from the infinite knowledge of God

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to the impossibility of contingency. If all things are known to God, then all actual abiding, enduring, and changes are truly necessary—if they depend on a positive cause are directly necessary—if on a negative cause, are indirectly necessary: But God is infinite in knowledge: therefore the said objects are necessary; and if necessary they cannot be contingent.

If necessity is fully involved in the idea of eternal past existence of substance, it follows, that there is no eternal past existence of substance, or else that contingency, as opposed to necessity, can exist no where, except as a chimera in the mind of a man, I mean, cannot actually exist at all. That there is actual existence of substance I think every man is intuitively certain; and that every man may demonstrate that substantial existence has been from eternity, I consequently conclude, there can be no such thing as contingency actually existing: And that fortune, luck, and chance, conceived as opposing necessity, are the trinity of the fool, who says in his heart there is no God.

Since all finite existences depend on power to effect, and power to prevent; and since power is in my judgment, direct necessity, it follows, that in my judgment, there is no such thing conceivable as a substance or mode, whose future existence is, in its own nature, contingent. Neither has there ever been, nor is there now, existence

of an event which I can ascribe to contingency. The phrases, *contingent in the nature of things*; and *contingent in its own nature*, I reprobate as an abuse of speech, a name to a non-entity, an eternal non-existence.

The doctrine of contingent existence seems to me the greatest violation of intelligence that ever insulted common sense.

Though I cannot admit, for a moment, the idea of contingency respecting the existence of matter or of mind, a thought, or modification of a thought; yet I can conceive that finite intelligent beings are often *uncertain* of what will exist at some proposed time in the world, or in any assigned mind. If any by contingency, mean *uncertain to them*, I then grant, that in this sense, actions of mind and motions of matter, may be in their existence contingent. I sometimes wish to persuade myself, that writers and speakers of penetration, never use it in any other sense. Uncertainty or contingency, thus used, is but a shade different, if I may so express it, from possibility. I may say it is possible an island may arise out of the atlantic ocean, so large as England: or I may express nearly the same conception by adding, the existence or non-existence of such an event in futurity is uncertain to me. Whether next Christmas-day shall be fine or cloudy is to me uncertain, and either is possible. What side upward the die shall fall, and what ticket shall be drawn

drawn from the wheel, are also uncertain to finite intelligences. I could tolerate the substitution of contingent for uncertain in these instances, for words are arbitrary signs, and so the meaning is obvious we cannot lawfully complain.

Be this as it may respecting contingency, it seems fully evident that *chance* is sometimes used as synonymous with uncertainty, or at least as "a term by which we express our *ignorance* of the cause of any thing, for when we say any thing comes *by chance*, we do not mean, that it had no other cause, but only that we do *not know* the true cause which produced it, or interposed in such a manner as to make that fall out which was not expected."—"We attribute some events to chance, because we know only the remote cause which must produce some one event of a number; but know not the more immediate cause which determines a particular event of that number in preference to the others."—Near akin to chance, according to this conception of it, is *accident*: which we use to express something that comes to pass in the course of things, not owing to our design, and unforeseen by us.

Chance is also used rationally to express the degrees of probability or improbability of uncertain existence, and is considered greater or less according to the number of chances by which it may happen or fail. We may also call chance the measure of uncertainty, and conceive it sometimes

times to enlarge, at other times to lessen; as when we say, it is a greater chance if it doth happen, than if it doth not. At other times we seem to suppose chance to be an invariable expression of a degree of uncertainty. Thus it is five chances to one that the die falls less than six, and an equal chance, or a chance of one to one, that a piece of coin falls head.—“The doctrine of chances has furnished a field of demonstrative reasoning of great extent, although the events about which this reasoning is employed, be not certain but probable. In the mathematical reasonings about chances, the conclusion demonstrated, is not, that such an event shall happen, but that the probability of its happening bears such a ratio to the possibility of its failing; and this conclusion is necessary upon the suppositions on which it is grounded.”

From the representation of contingency and chance, I think it is evident, that contingency has nothing to do with power, so far from it that it seems in its conception removed much farther from it than the mere negation or non-existence of power; and that chance in its best acceptation cannot otherwise be related to power than as it may respect an approach towards the existence of a degree of evidence respecting an uncertain event.

SECTION VI.

Objections and Replies.

I DO not know that any person will raise such objections to my thoughts on power as I am going to state : but as I can conceive of none more likely to be raised by prejudiced people, who cannot pay due attention to any thing which jars with their former habits of thinking ; I shall propose them and reply.

First Objection. An objector states thus, I have hitherto judged power to be a *quality*, and consistent therewith also considered the subject of this quality to be a *cause*, and that this is the true notion of cause : consequently if I have been right you are wrong. Suffer me to endeavour a reply.

That power may exist without the existence of substantial being is admitted to be a wrong conception, yet I do not judge power to be a quality. I judge power, considered as a subject of ontology, to be an affection of being, and therein to agree with duration and immensity, cause and effect : but cannot admit power, or either of the others, to be a quality of being. All qualities are affections of being, but all affections of being are

are not qualities. Power is not, in my apprehension, a quality of any individual being, not of God himself, notwithstanding, he is the only being to whom, with philosophical precision, power can be attributed.

Any quality, and every quality of any and every individual being involves dependence on power in respect of its existence, enduring, and continuance : But those qualities, or any of them, are not the power on which they essentially depend. Any and every quality we intuitively judge to depend for existence, abiding, and enduring, on power, and with equal evidence, judge they cannot be the thing which their existence, abiding, and enduring essentially involve, as an object of dependence. Every attribute of the blessed God, power excepted, involves power respecting existence, enduring, and continuance : but these other attributes are not his power.

Again, Every good quality *immediately* depends on power for its existence : but power does not immediately depend on power, but on ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances, and but *remotely* on the power on which the ability, capacity, and suitable circumstances depend.

Again, Examine a quality in respect of producing a valuable change. A quality may abide and endure ; but although it abide and endure to eternity, it produces no valuable change. Operation and influence are essential to a valuable change.

change. No quality is essentially connected with immediate operation: but power is essentially connected with immediate operation: therefore no quality is power. Power is essentially connected with actual influence; but no quality is essentially connected with actual influence, therefore no quality is power.

The objector seems to owe this opinion to his confounding power with active property, which is a quality. I grant that he has undoubted right to call active property, power, if he pleases; but if he gives it the attributes of power, his notion is but a chimera, and its promulgation confusing to other people: he may also call the subject of active property a cause; but if he gives it the attributes of cause, I think him highly censurable.

This notion of power seems that of children and savages, but, I think, is not the general notion of those who are much exercised in thinking. We contemplate immensity or infinite space, and know that it actually exists. We contemplate infinite duration and know that it exists, that eternity past has been, and that eternity to come must be. We reflect on this knowledge in us, and enquire for the reasons of it, and know that it does not depend on immensity nor eternity, but on a third object which we call operation. On starting the thought, we know that the origin, and the enduring, of every actually existing valuable,

valuable, but finite, thing essentially depends on operation of some other thing, or of the thing itself ; and can demonstrate that the operation of a being cannot be essential to its own origin, although it may be to its enduring. Pursuing it further, we ask, What is the reason of operation ? And we find this operation is the essential result of a fourth thing, which, found or not found, we agree to call power. We look about and enquire for power in the object that operates, and find active property. Some I find rest here, and consider active property and power to be the same thing. The more discerning who rest here, have invented various substitutes, like the cycles and epicycles of Ptolemy, to help their hypothesis, such as contingency and allodial liberty, which their inferiors readily lay hold of. Some other philosophers do not rest here, but pursue the enquiry, and find, that in order to the operation of the subject of active property, there must be a related passive property in some other being on which it operates, or that no operation will ever take place. If the enquirer rests here, he will conceive of power, whatever it be, as co-existing with active property and related passive property, or perhaps, go into the erroneous notion of active and passive power. But if the discovery is pursued, we find that suitable circumstances of the two subjects of properties must also exist before operation can exist. Arrived

rived at this point, turning every way, I find, for myself, I can go no further as to the reason of operation, and am fully convinced, that power, though I cannot see, or hear, or form an idea of it, coexists with active property, a related passive property and suitable circumstances of their subjects: or in other words, ability, capacity, and opportunity.

I have said the more to this point, because a respectable, a very respectable writer now living, has avowed this opinion, that power is a quality, but which I conceive to be an opinion remote from truth and reason.

Second Objection. An objector is of opinion, that matter cannot be the subject of active property, or, that active property can only have mind for its subject.—That if we survey changes in matter, they seem dependent only on a transfer of passion, and have nothing to do with activity. One moving body by moving another, loses so much of its motion as is imparted to that other. But that, in respect of mind, we find by experience, that barely by a thought we can move some parts of our bodies which were before at rest.—That in fine, he cannot find any place for causes among merely material things, and that in his opinion, causes can only be mental or exist in mind only.

In reply to such an objector, I grant to him, that all motions require a mover, which must

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primarily

primarily or originally be mind. This mind is the supreme being. I grant also, that all causes must centre in him, who is the eternal source, or admitter, of all modifications and changes of existence: But I wish it to be noticed, that I have not treated of the first cause, but of second or common causes, causes which are within our daily cognizance.

Now respecting our bodies and minds, so far is it from evident, that changes in matter primarily originate in mind, that the reverse seems actually the fact: for were there no motion in matter we have no degree of evidence that there could be thought in human minds. I grant, that children and savages, if shewn the time measurer, called a watch, would be apt to admit there is some little demon within that keeps it going: But this is another case in which I must dissent from the judgment of some philosophers, since I cannot admit this judgment of children and of savages to be a first principle of knowledge: But do account it a mere prejudice of infancy, and of the ignorant.—Perhaps the original stamina of intellectual life might be imparted to a pebble: But as by its constitution it has no organ of sense, it could not be a conscious being. Give it some known organ of sense: Yet if it had no internal motion, and was affected by no external motion, I cannot think, recurring to the known laws of the senses, that sensation or perception could exist.
And

And if there is no perception there can be no consciousness : If there is no consciousness, there can be no reflection, nor abstraction : In a word, no knowledge, no thought at all.

As to his notion, that changes in matter do depend on a mere transfer of passion. I observe, that in my opinion, the objector confounds in conception, not only his notion of power with that of property and dominion, but also with velocity, and so is led into further mistakes. Velocity is the name, by which I call the ability of motion, or of a moving body : Or it is the active property of a body in motion. The ball which by motion obeys the stroke of a billiard stick, may lose a part or the whole of its velocity, by meeting with a ball of suitable weight lying in its way, to which it imparts it : but it cannot lose any degree of its dominion, circumstances considered ; for the aggregate of dominion or active property and opportunity, must be estimated not merely by its velocity, but by every other circumstance. If with a certain velocity we suppose a ball so circumstanced, that it would run ten feet and not liable in its direction to be intercepted by another ball : We may then say it has dominion sufficient to run ten feet. But if it is so circumstanced, that it shall meet another ball at three feet distance, the velocity as before, we now estimate its dominion according to what length it can roll, and what power would attend its action on

the other ball, from their relative sizes, and the manner of their hitting, whether the consequence in fact, is, communication of motion to the other ball, the rest of both balls, or a recoil of itself, according to the known laws of impulse. Ability of a moving body, or velocity, is a mode of a mode, at least depends for its existence on the existence of another mode, consequently, velocity can exist no longer than its primary mode motion. Operation and influence, are dependent on velocity, yet there may be velocity when there is no power, operation, influence, and efficiency, in regard of communicating motion to another subject.

Probably the objector would do well to reflect, that he has no more a direct conception of the primary operation of mind on the body, than he has of the operation, impulse, attraction, gravitation, or elasticity on matter, respecting motion or rest. In all these cases, the idea is but an idea of abstraction. Thought, is not essential to the beginning of motion of bodies, within our notice, under the laws of motion established by the divine mind. For does not gravitation begin as well as continue the motion of a body whose support is removed? Does not elasticity begin and continue the motion of a watch? Does not a magnet concur by attraction to the motion of particles of steel, which placed within the sphere of its dominion, fly towards it? The evident concurrence

concurrence of mind, to the beginning or continuing motion in cases, in which we find by experience, that barely by a thought of our minds, we move the parts of our bodies which were before at rest, appears to me to afford no nearer approach to a direct conception of power, operation, influence, and efficiency, in their essence, than gravity when it produces motion. A ball rolls down my desk and falls to the ground: begins to roll on the inclined plane by a force dependent on gravity, and falls also by the same principle. In both cases, the mind seems utterly incompetent to a direct conception of the intervening operation and influence. Perhaps our ignorance of the insensible particles and qualities of body, occasions our entire ignorance of the operation and influence, to which matter, in these cases, essentially concurs.

Third Objection. Suppose another objector should doubt on the other hand, the existence of mental causes, and be inclined to dispute mental efficiency. Suppose he should tell us that reasons have no weight as incitives, but what we please to give them. That we are deceived when we imagine, that some objects as conceived are essential to the existence of passion: that motives are but counsellors; and that rewards and punishments, commands, intreaties, expostulations, and other instruments of government, have neither

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ability,

ability, operation, nor influence, when presented to the mind, and conceived by it.

In reply, permit me to declare, that in my opinion, ability and operation in mental matters, that is, the efficient part of a mental cause, as really exists and may be as fully proved, as the existence of ability and operation in matter, constituting the efficient part of a physical cause.

By the medium observation, we have, I mean all have, a notion, yea cannot exclude the notion of ability and operation, when a signal puts an army in motion. The same thing is evident, when sight of alms moves a beggar to our doors. In all similar cases, we observe, that the effects produced in men by objects presented to their perception, are as constant, uniform, and certain, as the motion of a watch on winding up the spring.—But by observation on others, we cannot trace power through any intermediate stages of human intellect, or perceive any thing of its operation, till it again makes its appearance, by the man's external motion, of some sort or other: The passions and purpose, often appear involuntary in the countenance.—There is certainly no man who has lived any time in the world, but is by his observations practically convinced, has attained conviction on thousands of experiments, and every day acts on such conviction, that commands, invitations, promises, and threatenings, have ability, and consequently
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in suitable circumstances have influence: nay, in some cases, is next to certain, when well acquainted with the party, or his circumstances, of what will be the effect of mental causes, previous to their existence and influence on an individual. Even in general cases, no man doubts but merchandize will be sold when the full price is offered. Alms will be accepted by the soliciting necessitous. A loan will be accepted in certain circumstances. *Ruth* iii. 18, "The man will not be in rest, until he has finished the thing this day."

Although common sense, in my apprehension, must infallibly secure an assent in those unprejudiced by zeal for a system, yet I readily grant that many seem as ignorant of what passes in the mind of the party, between his perception of the object and his shewing visible signs, as another is, of the operation of a coffee mill, from its receiving the coffee to its discharging it in powder. Or as another person is, of the maintaining force of a watch, as imparting motion to all the wheels. But as in these cases all readily admit, that the intelligent know in the first instance, whether the effect is produced by scraping, cutting, filing, or bruising, and in the latter instance, can trace operation and influence, from wheel to wheel, till its last effect: Why should it be difficult to suppose, that those exercised in reflection on what passes in their

their minds, may trace influence, if not operation, through several modifications of thinking?

Although by observation alone, we can have no conception of the various states of another person's modified thinking, or thoughts, between his evident perceiving, and consequent acting or forbearing: yet as taught by a large induction of experimental reflections, we conceive, and that even habitually, of ability in thought under one modification, and its operation, in and on the mind in respect of thought, under another modification: And thus giving birth to a new ability and consequent operation, until action or refraining claims our observation:—So that to gain any conception of what passes in the interim, we must reflect on what we feel within ourselves in similar situations: for from all experiments made, we find no reason but to conclude, that as in water and in the glass, face answers to face, so doth the heart of man to man. Prov. xxvii. 19.

Much knowledge of mind may be gained by many reflections. I say, without hesitation, that an unlettered ploughman, who is accustomed to reflection on what he is conscious of, knows more of causal efficiency, respecting changes in his own mind, than one person in an hundred does, of the various agency and efficiency of a complicated machine for any one purpose: such, for instance, as the stocking loom; tapestry and carpet looms; water engine or steam engine. I do not say,

say, he is able to talk pertinently of mental operations.

If the objector should further alledge, that mental mediums, such as rewards, punishments, offers, &c. do not always succeed, the effect desired is not always produced.—Granted, but thus it is also even in mechanical matters. Witness the many experiments yearly, but unsuccessfully made, and why, but because there was not a happy conjunction of unknown properties, with such properties as were known? I doubt not but the ploughman, just referred to, was able to discover more of what prevented, when his addresses to a neighbouring nymph were not accepted, and in many other mental cases, than one person in a thousand can of the cause of his watch stopping.

In my apprehension, mental causes are causes in as proper a sense as any causes whatsoever, they have as real an operation, and are as truly the ground and reason of an event coming to pass. I have said so much on this subject, because many men seem to forget, or affect to forget, that there is any other operation or influence in the world, but under the laws of matter, which they seem to apprehend they can universally form conceptions of.

I would remind objectors, that the laws of thinking, are in a great measure known, and actually applied to practice. Do not writers of novels

vels and plays owe their ability to please, to that knowledge? And thus also, orators of every class who are skilled in persuasion?

Does not the gamester owe the perfection of his dexterity at cards, drafts, and some other games, to knowledge of the consequences of ability, capacity, and of changing circumstances on the thoughts of his opponent?

And respecting evil operation, Does the politician plan and execute his manœuvres for raising insurrections in an opposing country without assuming knowledge of the laws of mental efficiency?

Let these observations suffice for the present, a more particular attention to these points, belongs to the second subject of this Essay, which we presently enter on. Suffer me in this place to add—There are laws or rules of the operations of the mind; there also laws of the operations which exist in the material system; and as the latter are the ultimate conclusions, which the human faculties can sometimes reach in the philosophy of bodies, so the former are frequently the ultimate conclusions we can reach in the philosophy of minds.

“ In the operations of the mind, as well as in those of bodies, we must often be satisfied with knowing, that certain things are connected, and invariably follow one another, without being able to discover the chain that goes between them.”

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Such connections, as discovered, furnish us so many rules or laws of operation and influence: "and when we say, that one thing produces another by a law of nature, this signifies no more, but that one thing which we call in popular language *the cause*, is constantly and invariably followed by another, which we call *the effect*; and that we know not how they are connected."

Conclusion.

To conclude. Let me observe, that although I were to grant that we have not intuitive, or even demonstrative evidence of the actual existence of external things, and must content ourselves with merely probable evidence: Yet existence, actual existence supposed and admitted for sake of argument, when our conceptions of its objects are generalized, we then reason with demonstrative evidence, concerning the abstract conceptions.

Thus granting the actual existence of power, and that ability, capacity, and opportunity are essential to its existence: We generalize power, ability, capacity, and opportunity, and having them consequently in abstract conception, we demonstrate from intuitive principles, as concerning other metaphysical subjects, various truths concerning them. For instance, that if a conjunction of the three are essential to power, the conjunction of only two of them will be inadequate

quate to power: Or again, that the existence of only one, will be inadequate to power in any case whatsoever. And thus also, that if ability, capacity, and opportunity, are essential to power, that which does not coexist with these, or immediately depend on these, or immediately result from these, cannot be power.

These demonstrations are of importance to our argument, when we find mere ability, mere capacity, or mere opportunity held up as power.—Also when might or strength, which is a mode of ability, is asserted to be power.—Also, when dominion, which is a conjunction of ability and opportunity is said to be power.—Likewise, when the properties, qualities, or attributes of any being, are called its powers, or their aggregate asserted to be power, and the power of their subject.—Likewise, when power is confounded with negative causes, or mere opportunity.—Also, when it is confounded with possibility,—And also, when power is confounded with liberty.

A

DISQUISITION

ON

HUMAN PREFERENCE.

SECTION I.

Of Human Preference in general.

OF all the numerous modifications of human thought, I know of none so important as that we call preference, which is the subject of this disquisition. On preference, as a centre, all our virtues and vices, graces and depravity, seem suspended, and subordinately, our happiness and misery, in time and in eternity. If thinking under the modification of preferring be so important, surely its study must be equally interesting; which will further appear, if we reflect, that without clear conceptions of preference, we cannot attain clear conceptions of virtue or vice, praise or blame, reward or punishment; since the property of preference is essential to the existence and constitution of a moral agent. Thus the investi-

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gation of preference, is as interesting as to men of a philosophical taste, it will be entertaining. To assist the meditation of searchers in this branch of mental knowledge, is one end of the Author, in publishing the result of his enquiries on this subject; who will find such contemplations comparatively easy, as its object is ever at hand, and experiments within their dominion.

As essential as a clear understanding of the language of an author is to a true perception of the ideas he intended to convey; so essential to the character of an intelligent writer, is a strict conformity of his expressions to the great end of being understood. Every man of reflection must have observed that our notions, distinct notions, far exceed our names, distinct names, affixed to them; yet that, of those comparatively few names, several in common use, are in many instances, affixed to one thing with perhaps not a shade of difference; and that from various sources, synonymous names have abounded. The candid will suffer and excuse my distinguishing the meaning of some of these, for accommodating with names, several things, which we may find blended and confounded together. Were no names to be assigned to what may appear in some respects new objects of thought, our discourses concerning them through repeated definitions, would be full of circumlocutions, and a burdensome

some consequent, where clearness and brevity are aimed at.

We may just notice, that the word *prefer*, sometimes means advancing or promoting, and in law, a bringing in, speaking of a bill of indictment : but without regard to either of these meanings, I use it in this Essay in a philosophical sense, for an action of the mind, or rather, for thinking, which seems the action of the mind, but under a particular modification.

In common language, the word *preference* seems used promiscuously with willing, wishing, chusing, accepting, refusing, consenting, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, determining, inclining, or being averse to, being pleased or displeased with, &c. with indeterminate shades of difference. I purpose in the progress of the work to distinguish and affix determinate distinct meanings to some of these words : yet let it be observed here, that, a reflection on what passes in the mind when we prefer, intend, will, chuse, &c. according to popular language, will confusedly convey the object I would communicate by the term *preferring*, or thinking under that modification ; or by preference as a thought thus modified ; or in the abstract, as a property of soul.

Thinking seems to be the primary mode of the human mind, whilst it is also rightly conceived a property essential to the existence of power in many respects. From its analogy to action of

body, it seems not improperly called the action of the soul. Perceptions, conceptions, sensations, and notions, may be called the materials, on which thinking is employed, from its analogy to that on which the action of body terminates. Or perhaps, with greater propriety, the objects of perception, conception, and notion, with sensations which from their nature have no object, may take that appellation. Thinking, then, is the term by which we express our most general conception of the action of the soul; which action, I conceive no one will doubt is incessant, at least, in a waking man, although with various degrees of intention or remissness, as it takes the names, or we express it by, study, reverie, ecstasy, dreaming, &c.

It is impossible to direct any person into a notion of thought, or to bring it to the view of his mind, unless he has previously received it by reflection on what passes in his mind, and unless he recollects the reflection.

Thinking, and *thought*, which is the name we give every individual act of thinking, take various names according to their more remarkable modifications; I say more remarkable, because their modifications are more numerous, than language has ability to express, or even reflection to grasp. We immediately attend that circumstance of thinking which occasions our calling it preferring,

ing, and that modified thought, we call a preference.

When the mind, on any kind of evidence, supposeth that one of two objects reflected on or conceived, represents a greater enjoyment than the other, or a nearer approach to either enjoyment or good, than the other: an affection of mind immediately follows, which is exactly adjusted to their supposed superiority or inferiority one to the other. Power, operation, and influence undoubtedly attend the existence of emotion; but for facility of speech we will express them by the term influence. Now a thought on the two in contrast, under the influence of this adjustment of affection, is what I call a preference, and thinking as employed on them, and under the influence of this affection, takes the name of preferring. So that preferring is that action of the mind which necessarily follows a perception or apprehension, that of two objects of conception, one is a greater enjoyment, a greater good, or a nearer relation to enjoyment or good, than the other, and which is attended by the affection which the apprehension occasioned. The mind perceives it, apprehends it, compares it in relation to good, judges of it, falls under its impression, and then prefers it. However quick the mind may be in its action, yet this seems the order of nature, and also of time. On the minds comparing its objects of thought, in relation to satis-

faction and good, as is the judgment, so will be the affection, and as is the emotion, so will be the preference.

We pretend not to convey the ideas of preferring and of preference, to any one who hath not previously received them by reflection on what hath passed in his own mind: but endeavour, by surrounding circumstances, to single out and expose to view, that particular modified thought, or species of modified thinking, to which we affix these names. This is similar to the conduct of a person, who apprehending that I had in idea the several colours of the rainbow, or the several colours of the sun's rays in the order in which they appear, when refracted and distributed by a prism, and that I had knowledge of the names connected with some of them, would endeavour to acquaint me with what particular colour some particular name is connected; suppose, for instance, green, he would probably tell me it was not the red, orange, or yellow, nor the blue, indigo, or violet purple, but the remaining colour of the seven, and farther, that it was the colour which took the middle place in the distribution of rays.

A preference is not a perception of a superior quality in one object to that in another; nor is it the cool or sanguine affection which is essential to a preference; neither is it the voluntary expressions we may use with a view to inform others of
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our preference : but it is a necessary act immediately following a perception of superiority of nature relative to our taste, and preceding any consequential voluntary expressions of it. That instant the superior and inferior nature of two objects are perceived, the emotions of mind are exactly adjusted to their different degrees of pleasing or displeasing property. Now the first thought of the two in contrast which existeth under the influence of emotion is a preference. —I multiply descriptions, because I apprehend the meaning of a writer is much more likely to be mistaken in mental matters, than on other subjects. Two ideas are compared in relation to goodness, as the superiority and disparity are seen the affections will be adjusted, then the thought of the object, or idea most loved, or least hated, takes the epithet preferred, and thinking under the influence of affection thus circumstanced is preferring. Comparison of things according to their ability to please or displease, is the hand which lifts the veil from two objects, which are adapted to attracting us by their beauty, thereby admitting their respective operation on the spectator, who, struck with the superior attraction of one, is ravished with pleasing emotions, under the influence of which, every thought on the two in contrast will involve a preference of one to the other.

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Although an attempt to divide a simple notion would be absurd, yet any definition or description may be taken to pieces, or the circumstantial modes laid open, for the easy examination of what it consisteth. This process seems requisite in treating our subject, chiefly, through the common obscurity arising from the indeterminate meaning of terms.

The first thing remarkable in our description of preference is, that it is a thought under a certain modification : and that preferring is thinking in certain circumstances.

I apprehend, the custom of calling the properties of mind or thoughts under sundry modifications, faculties, and attributing personal expressions or language of agency to them, notwithstanding originally used tropically, hath much clouded and impeded the rational acquaintance of many well meaning persons with these subjects. Who but considers, that actions belong only to substances and not to modes, will readily agree that there is impropriety in such phrases as these. The understanding governs, or dictateth to the will. The will hath capacity to receive the action of the understanding and to obey its mandates. Dictation and obedience being properly and literally attributed only to agents capable of voluntary action, are not properly and literally ascribable to understanding, which is thinking under a particular mode, and to volition, which is

is a thought under a certain mode, and both dependent for existence on thought and thinking, which I think we rightly conceive modes of the human mind. Mr. Locke was sensible of the danger attending the use of such language, and in some measure attempted a reformation. Let the authority of so great a man, or rather a conviction of its importance apologize for my excluding such modes of expression from the subjects of this Essay. Such personifications may certainly be dispensed with by philosophy, however indispensable from the pleasing allegories of Mr. Bunyan and Mr. Keach, or the style of a poet. Certainly the style of a poet, or declaimer, is improper for a philosopher, or one who endeavours to exhibit the nature and reason of things. Respecting action of mind, I think we can strictly go no further than the discovery of laws of operation and influence.

It seems generally agreed, that we are incapable of an idea of the human mind, considered as a substantial being: And that we cannot attain to conception of any of its modes, but by reflection on what we are conscious of. Thinking is a simple, and the most general, mode of mind, which strikes us on reflection. We are constrained, as it were, to observe that it runs through and is the subject, if I may be allowed the expression, of all other modes of mind within our cognizance. What is reflection itself, but thinking,

ing, as taking that appellation when employed on the action of our minds, which we are conscious of? And what is a reflection, but a thought on the action of our minds?—To familiarize such reflections, and habituate us to conversing with thinking and thoughts under their numerous modifications, it will not be amiss, before we proceed, to attend a few of the more remarkable of them, under terms familiar in conversation.

For thinking, as actually accompanying, and annexed to any impression on the bodily senses, we borrow a name from the senses, and correspondent with their diversity, call it seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling: and a thought under this modification, we express by the verbs, see, hear, taste, smell, feel. Thus,

Respecting smelling, when the mind is conscious of a sensation which existeth through the medium of the organ called the nose, and is a consequent of that property in an object, whether a known material being, or some effluvia proceeding from it, which is called smell: Thinking takes the name smelling—and a single thought is denominated a smell.

When the mind is conscious of a sensation, which existeth by means of the organ of taste or palate, and a consequent of the application of some sapid body, or matter with the property, we call its taste: Thinking takes the name tasting, and a single thought, a taste.

Hearing,

Hearing, is thinking, when the mind is conscious of a sensation which existeth through the medium of the ear, and consequent of the property of some sonorous body, or the undulations of elastic air, which we call sound.—A single thought under this modification we express by the verb to *hear*.

Touching, also, is thinking. When the mind is conscious of any sensation through the medium of the fingers, or other part of the body being in contact with some other body, and the consequent of the heat, cold, hardness, softness, roughness, smoothness, or other quality, thinking takes this name and *feeling*.—A single thought is touch, or is expressed by the verb to *feel*.

Lastly, When sensation is present through the medium of the eye, and of light, and which is the consequent of what in material things we call a sight, a view, or prospect: Thinking takes the name *seeing*.—And a single thought is expressed by the verb to *see*.

When we think of a present object, thinking takes the name *perceiving*, and a single thought is called a *perception*.

When we think of an absent object, thinking is called *conceiving*, and a single thought a *conception*.

When objects are conceived which owe their existence to efforts of mind in differently combining its simple conceptions: *Thinking*, takes the
name

name imagining, and a single thought is an imagination.

When an idea recurs to the mind through its object or archetype being again present : Thinking, in this circumstance, takes the name *recognizing* ; but I do not recollect any name for a thought under this modification.

When an idea recurs to the mind without a presentation of its archetype : Thinking is called *remembering*, and a thought under this modification, a remembrance. The ability requisite to do this, is called *memory*.

When perceptions or conceptions are taken express notice of, and as it were registered in the memory : Thinking takes the name *attending* ; and the series of thought, we call *attention*.

When the mind seeks a conception, and it is brought again to view, thinking thus circumstanced is *recollecting*, and the thought a *recollection*.

When an idea is long in the mind under consideration : Thinking thus circumstanced is called *contemplating* ; and a series of thoughts a *contemplation* or *meditation*.

When the mind, considering some particular objects of thought as they are in the mind, separates them as far as possible from all real existences, and the circumstances of substantial existence, such as time, place, and position, thus making them general notions. Thinking as thus employed,

employed, we call *abstracting* or *generalizing*, and the employ itself *abstraction*.

Thinking, when the mind perceives the difference of one object from another, or from others, is called *discerning*. The thought may be expressed by the verb to discern: and the ability to do this is *discernment*.

When the mind brings two objects or two conceptions in contact or together, in order to perceive how far they agree: Thinking is called *comparing*; the thought may be expressed by the verb to compare: And the expression of this employment is *comparison*.

Thinking, when the result of the operation of evidence respecting a proposition, takes the appellation *assenting* or *dissenting*, and a thought under this modification is called an *assent* or *dissent*.

When the agreement or disagreement between two ideas is found by comparing them with a third idea which agreed to one of them: Thinking thus employed is called *reasoning*: The third idea is called a *reason*.

When the mind makes mental propositions of the ideas which it perceives to agree or to disagree: Thinking is called *judging*, and a thought a *judgment*.

When we are conscious of our sensations and feelings as detached from the objects which caused

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them :

them : Thinking takes the name *feeling*, and a single thought is called a *sensation*.

Thinking, when we are conscious of the sensation that we call pleasure, is *enjoying*, and a thought thus modified is *enjoyment*.

Thinking, when we are conscious of the sensation that we call pain, takes the name *suffering*, and the thought a *pain*.

Thinking, when the soul is under an affection or passion, takes a name according to that particular passion, thus loving, hating, admiring, hoping, fearing, desiring, &c. And the thought, or series of thoughts, are expressed by the verbs, to love, to hate, to admire, to hope, to fear, &c.

But I must forbear giving further examples in this place, as thinking, under its various modifications, slightly surveyed, would make a volume ; and the foregoing may serve as a specimen of modified thinking and thoughts, and also of the Author's way of thinking on mental subjects.

Thoughts, under this view of them, assimilate the vowels in orthography, whilst the various modifications are similar to the consonants. As consonants owe their very existence to vowels, so also do these states or modifications, owe their existence to thoughts and thinking.

We may remark concerning all these expressions of thinking, that the general or abstract notion of each modification of thought is expressed by

by the same term, as a single thought or series of thoughts of each modification.

I think it of great use in order to clear views of mental matters, whenever we attend the names which common sense, for common utility hath affixed to the actions of our minds, to recollect, that, they are not distributively, a name of any distinct act of mind diverse from thought, but only an expression signifying thinking, or a thought under a particular modification arising from properties and circumstances.

Preferring then agrees with all these, in having for its genus our general conception of thinking. Let us now,

Secondly, Attend that supposition or apprehension of mind, which seems essential to preferring and a preference. For I have said that preferring is that modified thinking, and a preference that modified thought, which necessarily follows a perception, apprehension, or supposition, that of two objects, one is a greater enjoyment or good than the other ; I added, and which is attended by the emotion that the apprehension occasioned.

It were well for humanity, in common apprehension, if clear perception, or understanding, always attended our preference : But we are finite creatures, and daily facts prove that our preferences do not always consist with a true understanding of things in their own nature. There

must be some sort of understanding of the objects in conception, or there can be no preference: But the excitement of affection, and consequently the existence of preference, is not confined to that clear and evident understanding, which we call knowledge, or to the comparatively few objects of intuition and demonstration. Both the affection and preference are frequently influenced by the most confused and inevident understanding of the objects perceived, therefore, the general action of the soul, that is, thinking, is under such mortifying circumstances, rather called apprehending or supposing, than understanding and knowing. The preference ever is as the apprehension and affection. And as is the apprehension and affection, respecting two objects, so is the preference of one to the other.

It is not my business here to enquire, how far this melancholy state of human preference is owing to original apostacy, the suggestion of evil spirits, or to the necessary imperfection of a creature. Suffice it to say, that all these, in my apprehension, are in the sacred scriptures represented as occasions of the wrong preferences of the human race.

If any one should chuse to say, that the preference follows understanding and affection, to be consistent, he must use the word understanding in a vague sense, so as not to exclude the smallest degree of knowledge, and to take in mere apprehension,

prehension, or the nearest approach to utter ignorance. For our apprehended knowledge of things is sometimes very different from what they are in their own nature, which a reflection on past discovered mistakes abundantly evince; and it is our apprehended understanding of the things presented, strictly speaking, that essentially concurs to both emotion and preference.

Let us, *lastly*, attend for a moment the affection, passion, or emotion, which we said was essential to preferring and to a preference.

Affections or passions, are commotions excited in us in consequence of our perception or conception of some suitable object. Good or agreeable, evil or disagreeable, in relation to present satisfaction, are the pivots or hinges, on which all the passions turn. The affection attending a preference, may be a passion or passions of any kind; for who that reflects on the operation of his mind, can avoid remarking, that he has preferred under the influence of admiration and of contempt, love and hatred, hope and fear, desire and aversion, which as cardinal passions do eminently influence our preferences.

It may here be proper to distinguish emotions into cool and sanguine: for a great number of our preferences are attended with so cool an affection, that we have not noticed its existence: But many other of our preferences, are attended with a conscious animal commotion, which like a

torrent, has a tendency to sweep all before it.— This division of passions naturally leads to a division of preferences into primary and habitual. The primary being generally influenced by a sanguine affection: similar cases or occasions frequently occurring, the degree of animal commotion gradually subsides, and a habit of preferring is gradually formed, and in consequence a hundred preferences exist without any perceptible commotion.

Some have inadvertently conceived, that preference may exist by mere judgment without affection. Now, that judgment is a medium between the perception of objects, and preferring one to the other, I have fully granted, but let whoever makes experiments or observations, notice, that no judging which does not respect pain or pleasure, good or evil, and which is not in consequence accompanied with corresponding emotion, ever affects or influences the preference. A thousand judgments respecting things totally unrelated to our pleasure or good, pain or evil, can affect nothing respecting preference, approbation, or disapprobation.

As from what we every day experiment in ourselves, we find, that the modification of our thinking, is perpetually changing, and that no particular thought, by perpetual continuance, attracts and secures the attention of our minds without intermission: But that the regard of the
mind

mind is ever in degree and continuance, proportionate to its present apprehended importance: We demonstratively conclude from the nature of a preference, which is a species of thought, that no determinate preference is always present in our minds; that is, that although our minds are, at least while we are awake, always thinking, yet, the species of thinking is not always that of preferring: And when preferring, does not always respect the same objects.

A preference then is a special kind of thought, which occasionally takes existence in our minds, for which existence it dependeth on the previous existence of other kinds of thought, and remotely on the natural quality of the mind, and operation of extraneous objects on it.

But we may remark, that preferring is a kind of mental action, very frequent in its exercise, since objects of thought are perpetually offering, few of which are without ability in respect of exciting some emotion, through their pleasing or displeasing quality, or incapable of a comparison in this respect with each other, which every one's experience does sufficiently evince.

It may be debated whether the perception of superiority and inferiority in respect of goodness, precedes, in order of time, as well as *nature*, the adjustment of passion, the latter of which is indisputable: And whether the apprehension and emotion, precedes in order of time, as it does in the order

order of nature, the act of preference: But since a precedency of nature will, I think, be admitted by all persons, which is sufficient to my purpose, I shall wave such debate, and should immediately proceed to a distribution of preferences according to their nature and circumstances; but that some edification may arise from an enquiry into the reason of the great difference in respect of preference of the same, or different persons in similar circumstances, which will be the subject of the next Section.

SECTION II.

Of the Diversity of Preferences.

IF we reflect on the numerous beings which surround us, and engage our attention, can we help observing their unlimited variety? The illiterate as well as the learned, have, in all ages for convenience classed the remarkable parts of the creation under particular names. Thus in the Mosaic account of creation, the Lord is represented as bringing the animal part of his works to Adam to see what he would call them; and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof, Gen. 2, 19, 20: Yet after all this arranging into genus and species, and naming the kinds of natural objects, we cannot help

help remarking an almost infinite variety in the individuals of the lowest species of inanimates, vegetables, and animals, both in their inherent modifications, and circumstantial relations among themselves.

Among our own species, how determinate and evident the likeness of man to man, both in composition, and dependence on other objects, yet how much more striking the endless variety of distinguishing modes belonging to any individual, consisting in size, figure, composition, complexion, and voice. The distinguishing points in the features of an individual face, a modest limner will admit are too numerous to be perfectly expressed by his pencil, or even conceived by his mind. May we not reason from analogy, and admit it probable, that if God hath thus glorified his perfections in the parts of his works conspicuous to us, he hath in as eminent a degree, in those more hidden from our notice? Does not the late improvement of telescopes and microscopes sufficiently justify and enforce this way of reasoning, since thousands of shining orbs have been, within these few years discovered in immensity, quite unknown to the ancients; and thousands of animated animalcules, which were never objects of the conception of man, all of which agree in some points of unity, yet are subjects of the greatest variety?

If we turn our thought inward, and extensively
contemplate

contemplate consciousness, what fields of diversity, diverging from unity, present themselves to conception? and if we recur to memory we find a storehouse or magazine indeed of diversity centering in unity.—But to come more strictly to our subject, such is the evidence arising from reflection and observation, that, I need tell no man, that the preferences of men as actually existing are very different both in degree, and in respect of their objects; nor that human preferences, and consequent pursuits, differ in man from man, as much as their features: yea and even the preferences of the same man, at different times, in similar circumstances.

I am aware, that such is the eternal unchangeable nature of things, that it is impossible any two men should ever be really in precisely the same circumstances, for the circumstances of time and place precisely the same, can never be affirmed of any two objects: nor can the consciousness of two men unite, so as to render them strictly or literally speaking, but one intelligent being. But though the circumstances of men almost infinitely vary, yet mankind for convenience and other valuable purposes have, perhaps in all ages, arranged and classed some of the more remarkable circumstances of individuals, and in some cases with the addition of names. Thus we say of one man, that he is in affliction, of another that he is
in

in adversity, of a third that he is in circumstances of prosperity.

Our enquiry respects the sources of the diversity of preferences in similar circumstances : We are therefore led to remark, that the constitution both of body and mind of different persons do also almost unlimitedly vary. The more remarkable properties of mind and body have been noticed and names assigned to them. Hence the phrases a sound mind, a strong memory, great parts, a disordered mind, an unhealthy body, a hale constitution. We can only talk of preference under limitation proportioned to our limited abilities. I think we may affirm in general respecting our enquiry, that a difference in the constitution of mind and body prevents the uniformity of preferences where circumstances are conceived to be alike or similar : and also that a different preference may arise from a difference both in constitution and circumstances. Constitution in this case seems but another word for nature. by which I mean the essentials and properties of the object.

Apprehension or understanding, and affection or passion, I have supposed, essential to the existence of preference. But it is obvious, that the ability to apprehend or understand, differs in mankind. Some have strength of perception, but are weak of judgment, others are strong in judgment, but cannot with facility deduce inferences, whilst some others have amazing ability for reasoning,
but

but seem deficient respecting conceiving and judging. These abilities in some cases are native, and in others accompanied with the erudition of schools. The active and passive properties of some, for instance children, are not arrived to maturity, those of some other persons are in their prime, and of some others in a declining state.

The knowledge of some people seems fettered with prejudices and errors, whilst that of some others seems in a great measure emancipated from them.—Nor are the properties of the body less various, or liable to fewer disorders, as experience and observation abundantly evince. And perhaps the state of the body or its constitution does more affect the intellect than we are sometimes disposed to admit. The difference of the properties of one man from those of another do certainly more or less affect the preference, or occasion a diversity although in similar circumstances.

Secondly, observations on those we are conversant with abundantly prove that the affections or passions vary in different men, some having a greater aptitude to one passion, and others to another passion. Where a passion has been remarkably predominant epithets have been applied expressive of that reigning passion. Thus an envious man, a malicious man, a loving disposition, &c. As one passion is predominant in one person, and another in another person, so there is diversity

ity in the aptitude of people to being impassioned. Hence we say a warm man—a man of feelings—a cool turn, &c. Now as preferences ever are as the affection or passion is, or as preference ever accompanies the heart, it follows that diversity in the constitutional passion will occasion diversity in the respective preferences.

If we will enquire deeper for the diversity of preferences arising from constitution, we must enquire for the source of the difference of the passions in men. Now, this I take to be,

Thirdly, Mental taste. We find ourselves the subjects of sensations;—agreeable, disagreeable, and indifferent sensations. The number and variety of our sensations and feelings is prodigious, since they accompany our perceptions, conceptions, appetites, passions, and sentiments, differing in kind, and in an endless variety of degrees. “Every thing we call pleasure, happiness, or enjoyment, on the one hand: and on the other, every thing we call misery, pain, or uneasiness, is sensation, or feeling: For no man can for the present be more happy or more miserable, than he feels himself to be. He cannot be deceived with regard to the enjoyment or suffering of the present moment.” Enjoyment and suffering, together with good and evil, which concur to their existence, seem the centres from which all our passions vibrate. The sensation of enjoyment leads us to look for a something internal capacitating

for that enjoyment; some gust, relish, or taste, the gratification of which is enjoyment. This quality capacitating for sensation, and consequently for enjoying and suffering, has in allusion to the taste of the palate, been called taste, we will call it the mental taste or internal taste. Now if this mental or internal taste be variable in different constitutions and in similar circumstances; so also will the affections or passions be, and consequently the preference: But that this is actually the case, experiments on every hand, and reflection on what passes in our minds abundantly proves: The consequent therefore follows.

The mental taste, like the taste of the palate, relishes some things, and is disgusted with others; with regard to many is indifferent or dubious, and is considerably influenced by habit, by associations, and by opinion. "The force of custom, of fancy, and of casual associations, is very great both upon the external and internal taste. An Eskimaux can regale himself with a draught of whale oil, and a Canadian can feast upon a dog. A Kamschatkadale lives upon putrid fish, and is sometimes reduced to eat the bark of trees. The taste of rum, or of green tea, is at first as nauseous as that of ipecacuanha to some persons, who may be brought by use to relish what they once found so disagreeable." When we see such varieties in the taste of the palate produced by custom and associations,

sociations, and some perhaps by constitution, we may be the less surprized, that the same causes should produce like varieties in the mental taste.

Were our affections always raised correspondent to the real goodness of objects in their actual nature, and not merely correspondent to the apprehended goodness of things, our affections would be undoubtedly uniform and true to the laws of excellence in their own nature : but this would not only essentially require a perfection of apprehension and understanding, but also a uniformity and perfection of mental taste or relish of the mind, and in fine, an absolutely perfect being.

—Mankind are limited beings. The mental taste of one man seems peculiarly to one species of pleasing objects : That of another to a different species of enjoyment. And even the mental taste of the same man differs respecting objects of pleasure, at different periods of his life.

It seems abundantly evident, that all mankind are more or less pleased with the great, the new, and the beautiful, as perceived, as conceived, or as imagined. We may affirm in general, that all men have some degree of taste for pleasures, through the mediums of sublimity, novelty and beauty. But it is as evident, that they preponderate variously in different men and women. One is supremely pleased with sublimity and grandeur, lofty towers and splendid temples, the vastness of the ocean and magnificence of the

heavens feast their taste. Of another it may be emphatically said, new things delight: And that like the Athenians, he is ever in quest of some new thing.—One is supremely pleased with novelty in one kind of object, another with novelty in another kind of object, and a third, with newness in every case unaccompanied with pain. Again, Some people are ravished with beauty, are supremely pleased with beautiful objects, irrespective of other considerations, whilst some others are equally pleased with the conjunctions of novelty and beauty, and a third class with the union of beauty and magnificence.—On the contrary, deformed objects are disgusting, and novelty but augments the disgust, and the trifling objects are contemned.—As is our relish to these enjoyments, so will be our aptitude to being impassioned: And as our emotions are, so also are our preferences.

Of more particular mediums of pleasure adapted to the mental taste of mankind, we first notice those of appetite.

Appetites are distinguished by the following marks, (1.) Every appetite is accompanied with an uneasy sensation proper to it, which is strong or weak in proportion to the desire accompanying it. (2.) Appetites are not constant, but periodical, being sated by the enjoyment of their objects for a time, and returning after certain periods.—The appetites serve valuable purposes, as without attention to them, life, health and strength, cannot subsist

subsist, or the species be continued. Every one knows the pains they occasion, and the pleasure in gratifying them; which when enjoyed with innocence, amply compensates any previous painful sensation. We find by experience and observation, that these enjoyments may be over-rated, or under-rated, and the appetites be inordinate or disorderly, as either excessive or defective. There are bodily diseases which occasion loss of appetite, and there are people too abstemious; whilst others are the devoted servants, and flaming votaries of Bacchus and Venus.—The objects of the pleasures and pains of appetite operate in conception as good or evil, and whether the appetite is reasonable or unreasonable, in degree or quality, or both, so is also the apprehended and operative good and evil which is essential to affection, and consequently to preference.

In the second place we will notice enjoyments and sufferings immediately in consequence of the bodily senses, and as related to mental taste. A great number of our sensations, through the medium of the senses, we may call indifferent, as not being either pleasing, or painful. Thus to a good ear every human voice is distinguishable from all others, by the accompanying sensation; yet the far greater part of voices, are neither particularly pleasant, nor disagreeable. The same may be said of other sounds, and with no less truth, of tastes, smells, touches, and colours; to which we may

add, that familiar objects seldom raise any conscious emotion, or sensation pleasant or painful.— Yet the senses, every one knows, are sources of pleasure and enjoyment, pain and suffering: Hence pleasing sights, pleasing sounds, pleasing effluvia, pleasing tastes, and pleasing feelings, suit our mental taste, and are more or less valued by mankind: The eye, we say, is never satisfied with seeing, or the ear with hearing. From mental taste in respect of sensible objects arise sensitive good and evil, corresponding with which will be the affection, and in consequence, the preference of objects conceived in this respect as good, better, or best.

Next we will notice the pleasures and pains of imagination. Imaginations, seem the result of the operation of mind on its conceptions received by sensation and reflection: for though the mind as imagining, has been complimented with creating; yet it can only variegate in conception the subjects originally received by these mediums.— The objects of appetite are frequently heightened by imagination in its anticipated state, and ideas received of sensible objects make new impressions on us, or in a different way affect our thinking and thoughts; after they have been modified by this operation of mind. The sense of seeing is the most fruitful source of the images of fancy, and here the mind is remarkably pleased with the great, the new, and the beautiful, and displeased with

with their reverse. The mean, common, or ugly, are nauseated.—Pleasing sounds, consonance, and harmony are diversified by imagining, and delight in conception, those who have a ear to music : and, Who is quite deaf to all its charms? Jarring sounds are discordant even as imagined. Thus this expression of the poet : “ Grates harsh thunder.”

—Imagination has also to do with the conceptions conveyed by the sense of smelling : but in far less degree : But hence probably arises the skill of the perfumer, and also the descriptions of the poet, when he pleases us with the breath of his odoriferous sweets.—Imagination also seems in still smaller degrees employed on conceptions received from the bodily taste and touch. Perhaps the improvement of cookery, owes its origin to an aptitude of imagining luxurious tastes of combinations of what simply is agreeable or disagreeable : and the heightened descriptions of poetry, are no doubt the sport of fancy on the conceptions connected with enjoying the other sex.—Imagination however, is not confined to mere objects of sense. Writers of novels and poems must fancy and diversify numerous modifications of thinking, to support their tempers and characters.

We may observe, that imagination is stronger in some persons than in others, and in some, respecting these objects, and in others, those ; yet in all variations there arises a good, which, operating in idea, is efficient to affection in suitable circumstances.

stances. Imaginations alone, with relative capacity in their subject, and suitable circumstances, often excite all the determinate passions : which is experimented by those who attend the exhibition of plays ; and it is well known, that shame flushes in the face sometimes merely by force of imagination in an hour of retirement.

In the fourth place, we may remark the pleasures of science, or rational speculation, intellectual pleasures, or pleasures of understanding. These objects of pleasure meet the mental taste of some people more eminently ; and hence many passions and preferences seem to take their rise. Thus the love of learning, and love of study, with the preference of both, to savage rusticity and dissipation ; one science all will allow is more pleasing or painful than another, and to one than to another. From this source, in conjunction with the pleasure of reception from human testimony or history, arts arise. And it seems evident, that all mankind have in some degree a taste for arts, but in general each for some particular art : which if useful, it is wise for every individual to cultivate, pursue and exercise : But if pernicious, it manifesteth a disordered taste, that needs correction. But whether the taste in this respect is sound or unsound, it more or less affects the passions, and in consequence the preference.

Next we may glance at the pleasures of self-approbation, and pains of self-disapprobation, for
consonant

consonant with the pleasure of self-approbation, is the mental taste of the more valuable part of mankind. Although I hold it absurdity to ascribe power to man, and the height of arrogance for a man to claim it; yet, by the principle of association, we ascribe ability, capacity, action, and operation, to ourselves and fellow-men, that is to say, they are predicable of us. We may say, I think without inconsistency, my ability, my capacity, I act and I operate. Self-approbation respects our actions and operations, both thinking under its various modifications, and motions of our bodies under their modifications. But our actions whether of body or of mind, are either wise, right, and our duty; or they are not. Actions judged right, wise, and our duty, if performed, we approve ourselves in that respect, which self-approbation is accompanied not only with the pleasures of innocence, but the pleasure connected with right, wise, and dutifully acting. On the contrary, actions judged neither right, wise, nor duty, if performed, we disapprove ourselves for: which disapprobation is accompanied with, perhaps, both pain and shame.

Those who are hardened through the deceitfulness of sin, whose moral sense is as it were seared with a caustic, or obliterated, are, perhaps, strangers to a taste for, or any enjoyment of these pleasures. But where there is a mental taste for those pleasures, the passions will be proportionably

ably excited as occasions arise, and in consequence also preference.

Another remarkable class of pleasures adapted to a relative mental taste in mankind, we may call the pleasures of public approbation, or of popular applause. Probably this species of mental taste is never absent from any person who lives in society, the man alone excepted who is heated with irritative passions, or sunk in the horrors of despair. Every one feels pleasure in the consciousness of being well with the society or club to which he belongs, or in the company he keeps. He who affirms that he cares not at all for the approbation or disapprobation of others, is ever suspected of hypocrisy, since such a being, in fact, must either be deranged, or a monster.—Passions are occasionally excited through our attachment to these pleasures, and these passions are frequently essentials of our preference.

The pleasures of religion are the last I shall mention. All mankind seem to have some degree of taste or relish for something which they account religion, at least in some part of their lives. God having forced the idea of himself as existing, from every quarter, on every man, it is the highest exploit of vice to root up the taste for religious pleasures from its most indefatigable adherents. In the most contemptible of our species, the wish seems rather to render the deity subservient to their views and base ends, than that he
had

had no being: Hence they profanely swear by his holy name, and imprecate his vengeance respecting those who offend them. The searchers after wisdom, who are favored with, believe and love the revealed truths of God's word of divine testimony, more eminently partake a truly evangelical, and soul-ennobling taste for the pleasures of religion, which are the most refined, suited to the true dignity of human nature, and can never be repented of. This excellent taste will conduce to pure emotions, and pure emotions are essential to the preferences which are the fruit of divine goodness, and which glorify God.

Thus we have glanced at some of the most remarkable classes of pleasures and the internal taste on which their existence is dependent. The variety which composes the mental taste of men, will not account for the diversity and anomalies of preferences among men in similar circumstances, if we do not reflect that it exists in different men, and perhaps in the same man, the whole of his life considered, in all the degrees of proportion and variations, which permutation can suggest. According as this, or that, or another, of the foregoing constituents preponderates, so is the prevailing taste, frame, temper, or spirit of any man at an assigned time. Generally one does prevail at a time, and prove an important bias to the mind; according to the Poet—

—One

—One master passion, * in the breast,
Like Aaron's serpent, swallows up the rest.

We need not wonder at this, when we reflect on the contractedness of human understanding, and that but one thought can occupy one instant of time.

As is the prevailing taste at the time, so will be the passions, similar circumstances admitted.

Passions are defined commotions of both soul and body, occasioned by the mind's perception or conception of some object of a particular nature. When the passion principally consists in commotion of mind, it is denominated cool, a cool affection, emotion, or passion: But when the passion chiefly consists in commotion of the animal part, it may be denominated sanguine, a sanguine affection, emotion, or passion. The former seems superior in nature to the latter, but the superior *strength* of affection, and not its precedency in nature, affects the preference, that is, in all cases of combined or of conflicting emotion. Sometimes the cool passion is superior in strength to a sanguine passion also present; thus when the path of virtue is preferred to that of sensuality, a temptation being present. At other times the

* *The word passion is here taken in a different sense from that in which I have used it, or purpose hereafter to use it, for it expresses the prevailing taste respecting the objects which influence the passions.*

sanguine

saugine passion may carry all before it, and triumph over every cool opposing passion.

In our enquiry then for the reason of the differences of human preferences, in similar circumstances, we have observed, that difference in understanding is attended with a proportionate difference of preference—that difference in the existing passion is attended with a proportionate difference of preference—and that difference in the mental taste is attended with different passions in kind and degree. I think we rationally conceive these points, laws of operation and influence established by the deity, and may here rest, in respect to further enquiry, consistently with the design of this essay. But if philosophers will push their enterprizes further, they may without loss of labour, enquire more particularly for the sources of erroneous judging, and of the diversity of mental taste. Difference of constitution, and of time of life, operations of custom, fancy, casual associations, and resolutions, would go far as objects of attention towards such investigations.

SECTION III.

Of Preference in particular, or considered as a Species.

THE objects of preference in general, are so extensive as the archetypes of our ideas, nor are they

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circumscribed here, but are so extensive as our conceptions, for there is no object of conception but at some time and in some respect may be preferred, or its negation. For example, we may prefer light to darkness, sweet to bitter, flying to walking, roundness to squareness, virtue to vice. We may prefer an angel to a man, a man to a beast, a beast to a tree, and a tree to a clod of earth. I may prefer my house to my neighbour's, my occupation, or trade, to some others, one person to another, one tree to another, and one picture to others. .Of the creatures of fancy we may prefer a sphinx to a mermaid, and a griffin to a centaur. We may prefer quails from heaven to other food, living for ever to dying, being handsome to being deformed or ugly. I may prefer sitting to its forbearance, or may prefer forbearance to lifting my arm. I may prefer going to a place of worship next Sunday to staying from it, attending diligently and devotionally in the service to inattention. I may prefer a cessation of running by standing still, to a cessation of it by walking.

Respecting these examples we may observe, that the perception of suitable objects has active property, which meeting a related passive property in suitable circumstances, excitation exists, and consequent impassioned thinking. Next we rationally judge impassioned thinking to have active property, which meeting a related passive property in suitable circumstances, inducement exists,

exists, and consequent preference. In other words, the perception of suitable objects excites passion, and the force thus generated of some passion or passions, is the moving principle, and in conjunction with its operation, is the efficient part of the cause of preference. I think we shall always find this the case, if we reflect on what passes in our minds when we prefer. We prefer one stately edifice to another, because we more admire it. We prefer one friend to another, because we more love him. We prefer one vice to another, because we less hate it. We prefer riches to its negation, because we more desire it. We prefer going next summer to Brighthelmstone, because we anticipate the pleasure or benefit. We prefer continuing action, to the forbearing it, because we desire to attain the end of our exertion. And we prefer this snuff-box to that, because it most pleases us. All these instances are examples of the different kinds of preferences hereafter to be distinguished.

Preference; approbation and disapprobation, preferring, approving, and disapproving, liking and disliking, convey the same conception of our modified thought, or thinking, with but a shade of difference, otherwise than as an *act*, or expression of *acting*. The term preference, necessarily refers us to two or more determinate objects, respecting which it is employed: But approving and approbation, strongly refer to the object

preferred, whilst they have but a vague indeterminate respect to the object or objects it is preferred to: Yet these expressions, as well as the other, fully suppose the object preferred to not-being, or its negation, and also to its contrast and opposites. Disapprobation and disapproving on the other hand, strongly refer to the object which the thing preferred is preferred to, whilst they have but a vague indeterminate respect to the object preferred. Similar remarks are applicable to liking and disliking. We are now led to a distribution of preferences according to their objects and circumstances.

Preference as a genus, seems truly divisible, according to its objects, into *preference* as a *species*, and *inclination*.

Preference concerning things in their own nature, absolute or relative, abstract or concrete, retains its name; and even respecting suffering when uninfluenced by the passion we call desire: it also retains the name preference, and the general action of our minds is still called preferring. Or, preference of things when the preference is influenced by the primary passions, admiration or contempt, love or hatred, still retains the name of preference.

But when the preference relates to actions or operations, it takes the name *inclination*, or *disposition*, *disinclination* or *indisposition*. And also when it respects suffering, or sustaining the operation

tion of an agent deprecated by us, or enjoying or sustaining the operation of an agent desired by us. Inclinations of mind are preferences which relate to events, or changes of things, and which are under the influence of the secondary passions, desire, or aversion, accompanied or unaccompanied with hope or fear, joy or sorrow.

Our grand division then, of the general conception of preference, is into preference still retaining the name, and preference under the name inclination. The first, when its objects are *things*, enjoyments, and sufferings under a limitation, and the preference influenced by admiration or contempt, love or hatred, as its motive. But the latter when its objects are *events*, dependent and independent on our actions or forbearance, and influenced by the passions of desire or aversion as a motive. When the object of preference is a *mere thing* it is *preference*: but when its object is an *event*, past, present, or to come, it is an *inclination*.

The objects of preference, still so called, are things. Things have either a real, or merely imaginary existence. It will be proper here to distinguish and notice some of them.

First, Pleasure and pain. Pleasure and pain express simple conceptions, which we gain by reflection on the sensations of our own minds, and the existence of them in others, made evident to us by voluntary or involuntary signs. These con-

sidered as abstract detached conceptions, or apart from their causes, kinds, and all circumstances, demand a primary attention; because all respect to them cannot be excluded from any other objects of preference. I need tell no person who understands the terms, that we always prefer pleasure to pain.

The laws of operation and influence respecting our sensations of pleasure and pain, seem reducible to these.

We prefer a lesser degree of pain to a greater.

We prefer the mere negation of pain to the smallest degree of it.

We prefer the smallest degree of pleasure, or enjoyment, to its mere negation.

We prefer a greater degree of pleasure, to a lesser degree of it.

Supposing the degree invariable, in that case, the idea of its duration operates in a similar way on the preference. Thus,

We prefer a short duration of pain, to a longer duration.

We prefer an immediate exemption from pain, to the shortest duration of it.

We prefer the most transient pleasure to none at all.

And we prefer a longer duration of pleasure, to a shorter.

Pleasure, the greatest in degree, and longest in duration, composes our conception of happiness.

—Pain,

—Pain, the greatest in degree, and longest in duration, exhibits our idea of misery.

The highest and most lasting pleasure which we conceive ourselves capable of, or can be made capable to enjoy, we call happiness. This in our conception, when retired from the world, in an hour of calm reflection, is ever preferred to every other object possible to be compared and contrasted with it. I think every man may be intuitively certain, that whenever he thinks of this object in these circumstances in relation to himself, in contrast with any other object capable of comparison, he uniformly prefers it, he cannot but prefer it.—Again, the most pungent and lasting pain we are capable of, or may be made capable of suffering, we call misery. Every object which is capable of comparison and contrast with misery, is necessarily preferred to it. Of this also, I think every reflecting man is certain: And with demonstrative certainty may conclude, that thus it must be with every other being capable of understanding and affection.

Degree and continuance, are two conceptions which materially affect our preferences of pleasure or pain. Suppose magnitude to express the degree, and the determinate portions of duration to express the continuance; it will be evident, that in pleasure or in pain, there may be different proportions of both. A pint of pleasure, if I may use such expression, may be enjoyed one hour, or
a pint

a pint of pain suffered one hour. Now if half a pint of pleasure is enjoyed two hours, or half a pint of pain is suffered two hours, then in the nature of things there seems no ground for a preference of the two former to the two latter, or the two latter to the two former. But suppose what frequently happens, that an ounce of pain endured one minute, would prevent an hour's suffering in the same degree, then certainly the nature of things considered, the preference ought to be given to the minute's suffering. Is not this sentiment strikingly apparent in the care and caution which distinguishes the man of prudence in his secular affairs? Human intelligence, amidst the prejudices of judging and erroneous reasonings of our disordered state, seems the only native guard from mistake, when we weigh the magnitudes of pains against their durations, or their durations against their magnitudes: And also, in our approximating the value of varying degrees of pleasure in magnitude and duration.

Here it may be noticed, that in respect of the passions, the abatement of pain operates as a good, and the abatement of pleasure, as an evil; for every degree of pleasure is accompanied with desire of its continuance, and every degree of pain with desire of its removal; in all instances where the circumstances do not render the desire inconsistent.

Secondly,

Secondly, Good and evil demand our attention, as things concerning which our preference is daily exercised. "That we call *good*, which is apt to cause or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us : or else to procure, or preserve us the possession of any good or absence of any evil. We name that *evil*, which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any pleasure in us ; or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good." Happiness and misery, are rightly conceived consequents of antecedents, or effects of causes. That which has an actual tendency to produce our happiness, or with which our happiness is necessarily connected ; or else which has a tendency to prevent or diminish our misery, is in the nature of things good, we call it good. That also which has a tendency to procure, or preserve the possession of any other good, or the absence of any evil, we also denominate good.

We are certain, if we reflect on our thoughts in calm retirement, that relative to ourselves, abstracted from all circumstances, we always prefer the least good to its negation, and a greater good to a lesser. In other words, we always prefer the highest good to its inferior, negative and contrary. On the other hand, we prefer a lesser evil to a greater, and also what is indifferent, to the smallest evil. Here also in respect to duration, when we conceive the good or evil the same in magnitude, we prefer evil for a short duration to
evil

evil for a long duration. We prefer the meer absence of evil, to its existence, for the smallest portion of time. We prefer the most transitory enjoyment of good to its negation. And we prefer a longer duration of good to a shorter. All these I account laws of operation and influence respecting preferring; to which we may add, that good of a certain magnitude to be enjoyed immediately, is preferred to good of the same magnitude, to be enjoyed at a remote period: And the enjoyment of good an hour hence, is preferred to that enjoyment of good a month hence; because any degree of good is preferred to indifference, and an hour's indifference to a month's suspension from good in prospect. Respecting evil at a distance, the preference is reversed, a longer respite from suffering is preferred to a shorter.

Here also, as respecting pleasure and pain, we are liable to innumerable mistakes respecting the balance in our apprehension of magnitude, with the duration of good and evil: And also respecting the magnitude of good or evil, with the distance of the period of enjoying the one or suffering the other. From these mistakes in judging, our passions and preferences are often inconsistent with what the nature of things and sound wisdom require.

Thirdly, Things good and evil considered absolutely, may be objects of preference. As we thus prefer good in abstract, so all other things which become

become objects of preference must be apprehended good or evil, according to the apprehension and taste of the mind. Things are conceived good and evil in the absolute, or else good and evil in relation to other objects. The goodness of objects considered absolutely, consists in their degree of value, excellence, and perfection, in their own nature : and according to the degree of perfection so is the degree of goodness.

Things, as considered absolutely good, are conceived irrespectively of their relation to any other thing, consequently cannot consistently be judged evil in relation to any other being or beings : and things as considered absolutely evil, cannot consistently be judged relatively good. I may also remark, that a thing cannot be absolutely good and relatively evil ; or absolutely evil and relatively good. The person who represents any object as absolutely good, and at the same time as relatively evil, destroys the essence of good and evil ; and the propositions, things absolutely good, and things absolutely evil, in his use of them, involve the absurdity of good and not good, evil and not evil ; This, I think, must be fully evident to every man of thought, who admits the definition of good and evil.

Of beings considered absolutely good in their own nature, irrespectively of other beings, God is the first and chiefest Being. There is no being comparable to the Lord, who is an infinitely perfect

fect being. In this sense there is none good but one, that is God.

Of beings considered in their absolute nature as good, we may, for example, prefer a vegetable to a clod of earth.—We may prefer an animal to a vegetable—a man to a mere animal—an angel to a man—and God to an angel.—We usually prefer garden-mould to rubbish—herbs to flowers—and an oak to an elm;—and frequently prefer one plant or tree to another of the same kind.—We may prefer a horse to a dog, and one horse to another.—Of our own species we may prefer John to James, Mary to Sarah.—Of angels, may prefer seraphims to cherubims, Gabriel to Michael. And if it were proper to give the appellation of gods to those things, which by nature are no gods, we may prefer the One Supreme to every local deity.

Objects considered absolutely in their own nature, seem to be preferred chiefly under the passions of admiration or contempt. St. Peters at Rome may be preferred to St. Pauls at London, or St. Pauls to St. Peters, under the inducement of admiration. And a structure appropriated to the use of a dog-kennel, irrespective of its incumbents, may be preferred to a house lately attached to, and the habitation of a snail, under the inducement of contempt, or because less contemned.

Perhaps beings in the absolute are preferred, merely through the force of imagination, as being
great

great, new, or beautiful : for the mind as imagining, feels pleasure in the great, new, and beautiful, but is pained in contemplating the diminutive, or abject, and deformed. Great and small here respects all comparatives, and is not confined to mere bulk and pomposity : for under the idea of greatness, consisting, for instance, in curiousness, a watch may be preferred to a clock, although much smaller : and some animalcules to a bear, as a greater curiosity. And thus a wise man prefers a poor virtuous neighbour to the richest, and most dignified, yet vicious courtier, as apprehending him the greatest character on the whole.—Some objects are preferred to others for their greater novelty, and other objects to others, for their greater beauty.

A thing may be good when its goodness is not perceived ; and a thing may be evil when its evil is not apprehended. Plants, whose qualities are unknown to me, may yet be good, and their goodness evident to some other person, whether for food, physic, or delectability. Other plants may be in their nature baneful, though inevident to me.

Although goodness in one object relative to another object cannot exist, unless that other object has capacity to be benefited by it, yet it does not follow that it must, if an intelligent being, have mental taste adapted to pleasurable enjoyment of the goodness.

Goodness, however, if unperceived, or not re-

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lated to mental taste, cannot affect the passions, and consequently cannot affect the preference, or be an object directly preferred.

Fourthly, Things also in relation to other beings are preferred every day. Relations are almost infinitely numerous, for what conceptions of actual existence cannot in some respect or other be compared, and some agreement be found between them? Thus the idea of God as a Sovereign, has relation to subjects or servants: Parents have relation to children, and children to parents; Husband to wife, and wife to husband, have mutual relation; Uncles and aunts are related to nephews and nieces, and cousin to cousin: As sustaining either of these relations, one object may be preferred to another.

Objects in their relations, seem chiefly preferred under the influence of the passions, love and hatred.

Logicians and orators enumerate various respects, in which beings may be related, such as genus, species, antecedents, consequents, adjuncts, conjugates, cause, effect, contraries, opposites, similitude, dissimilitude, &c. both in the nature of things actually existing, and according to our conception of them. Now beings under some, any, or all of these considerations, may be objects of preference. Concerning these relatives as well as the former absolute conceptions, the present preference is always of the greatest apparent good,

or

or of the least apparent evil. Or in other words, the preference is always of what appears most pleasing or agreeable, or of what appears least disagreeable and displeasing, circumstances considered, and taken into the account.

The graces and virtues as related to happiness here, and to eternal glory, may be preferred among themselves.

One code of laws may be preferred to another, as more conducive to civil happiness.

One profession or employment may be preferred to another, as a means of obtaining the necessities of life.

And one amusement is preferred to another, as a means of recruiting tired nature.

It is proper to remark, that what is preferred, considered abstractly, is sometimes rejected when considered in its relation to circumstances ; and that what is rejected when abstractly considered, may be preferred as considered in the concrete. Thus, according to their abstract nature, peace is preferred to war ; but when considered relatively or in relation to circumstances, war may be sometimes preferred to peace. Taking away the life of a man, considered abstractly, is an evil ; but relatively in regard to a constitutional law is a good, and may consequently in some instances be preferred. Amputation of a leg or an arm is, in the abstract, an evil, but in relation to preservation of life is frequently a good, and influences the

preference. Sorrow, in the abstract, we consider an evil, but in various relations to be good: Godly sorrow is conducive to our moral and spiritual attainments; a good man prefers its occasional existence in himself and his friends. A lie is acknowledged in the abstract to be evil; but some suppose that taken in relation to some circumstances it is good, or at least indifferent, an innocent lie, and consequently prefer it.

Fifthly, Things or events which, according to the nature of things, or present course of nature, are considered impossible, may yet be preferred, and that in respect to other impossibles, and also in respect to things possible. For instance, I may prefer flying in the air as a bird, to swimming in the ocean like a fish, as a mode of travelling. I may prefer flying to walking, as a mean of conveyance. I may prefer flying a mile in five minutes to flying a mile an hour. A good man prefers rectitude in temper and conduct to his present miscarriages, and to his present attainments, or to those of his neighbours. A wicked man prefers dethroning the Deity, to forsaking his abominations in temper and conduct; yet prefers heaven as a place of happiness, to continuing in the present state, and also being removed to hell. I may prefer continuing my present mode of existence for ever, to living only to the age of seventy years, or even to the age of Methuselah. And thus a cripple prefers an animal-leg to his wooden

wooden or artificial one. And thus I prefer superior talents for writing my essay to those I actually exercise.

Sixthly, Things and events unforeseen and unexpected by us, yet really existing, or which have really existed, may be preferred by us to other things unforeseen and unexpected, and also to things foreseen and expected. Here will be included enjoyments and sufferings, under the restriction before mentioned of not being the objects of desire.

Things which take place totally unforeseen and unexpected, could not previously be objects of desire, however good or agreeable they may appear when perceived. Adam, as existing, might prefer his creation, but could not desire it before its existence, and consequently before his creation. We, as brought into being under the laws of generation, may prefer our existence, and prefer the means and Spirit of God which made us, yet could not desire them before our existence. I may prefer my being the son of my supposed, and respected father, to that of being the son of John or Thomas, or any other man:—May prefer my coming into the world at the particular period when my birth happened, to an existence at a period three thousand years ago, and to an existence at a period three hundred years to come:—May prefer the particular circumstances or adjuncts of my birth, and bringing up, to those of a noble-

man's family, or to those of a pauper. May prefer my birth in my own country and own town, to being born in another country or another town. May prefer my sex, my body, my intellect, to some, or any other.—And may prefer my existence as a man, to existence as a bird, a beast, or a fish. Now in all these cases every body must allow, that the nature of things renders it impossible I should prefer under the influence of desire. Desire always respects future apprehended good: Nor can the events be the objects of previous desire and preference, since this is to suppose we desired and preferred before we existed.

Events also which exist in providence, unforeseen, unexpected, and unconceived, may be objects of preference. Thus our many escapes from imminent dangers by mediums previously inconceivable to us: and interpositions by unexpected friends, in circumstances of embarrassment, may be objects of preference. Unexpected friendship or unimagined love from another, when it becomes evident, may also be objects of preference or approbation.

Thus also the undesired operations of the truth and Spirit of God in conversion, may be truly preferred, and approved, when the party apprehends himself the subject of them.

But though it may be said with consistency, that we prefer some objects or events, which
exist

exist without our previous concern, yet we should not express ourselves with precision if we should say, that we prefer their negation or the existence of their contraries. Thus the expression would be too general, and consequently want precision, should I say, that I prefer John and Joan for my parents, to those who are really so. Or, that I prefer being loved by a person who does not love me. In all cases of this nature, the preference is not preference as a species, but preference generally considered; and to be specific the word *wish* is proper to be substituted in place of preference. Thus I wish I had never existed—I wish I were annihilated—I wish John or Thomas had been my father instead of Caleb—And I wish the disaffected person did love me; however impious or foolish, are proper expressions. This remark occasions our anticipation of the nature of a wish, which we are soon to contemplate and examine.

Without pretending to have given a complete enumeration of the kinds of which the objects of preference, specifically considered may be, I think the foregoing specimen may suffice respecting such a distribution.

We observed that preference generally considered, varied even in similar circumstances, in different men, and respecting the same man at different times. We may now add, that consequently

quently preference, as meaning a species, is also various.

The prejudices of men vary, and hence their preferences vary. Thus one man prefers a person born rich, another prefers him who from poverty rose to wealth by what is called his own merit; all other considerations being alike. One prefers the manufactures of his own country on that account, whilst another prefers foreign manufactures, because they are foreign.

The same objects presented to one person, do not raise always the same emotion as when presented to another, and our own experience proves, that we ourselves are not alike impressed or affected by the same objects presented at different times. We look for an inward capacity, and are led to what we call taste, gust, relish, or temper of mind, so called from its analogy to animal taste and palate. Our mental taste, as well as apprehension varying, our operative conception of good varies, and consequently our passions; and hence our preferences, specially considered, vary also.— Thus among students, some have peculiar taste for languages, and some for history and antiquities: others for science and philosophy: another class for mechanics: and another for the works of imagination, perhaps poetry, sculpture, or painting.— Thus also, in common life we say, That one has a taste for religion, another for philosophy, and a third for music. That one has a
taste

taste for keeping birds, another pigeons, and another for butterflies : Hence the denominations of bird-fanciers, columbarians, and the curious in insects.

All these have a sensation, a something in conception, which, whether they will call their happiness, or not, is that satisfaction which suits their temper, and thus influences their ideas of the goodness of objects, and ultimately all degrees of their preferences.

And in respect to the same person, how different is the operative idea of good and happiness: which, we may experiment in ourselves and observe in others ? Sometimes perhaps our preference sublimated by a devout aspiration, rests on nothing short of eternal glory : At other times it rises no higher than the gratification of a favourite dog, or an admired walking-stick : according to the extension of the present view of the mind.

Happiness in conception, or operative happiness in the mind, seems no more than satisfaction present, or satisfaction in prospect. It is consequently, in finite minds, in ever varying circumstances, itself an ever varying thing, yet, uniform in this, that it is the possession, enjoyment, and continuance of what the person, according to his present taste, is absorbed in, as his highest good in present view.

We may also remark, that sometimes the mental taste is what we will venture to call cloyed,
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and thus the mind is rendered insensible, callous, or stupid to the objects of a former passion and preference. In such cases, habit may stay a little, and influence a preference, but she soon becomes coy and withdraws.

SECTION IV.

Of Inclination of Mind.

INCLINATION, which is the other kind of preference, according to our division of preference under its general idea, may be thus described. An inclination of mind is a preference, under the influence of the secondary passions, desire or aversion, accompanied with hope or fear, joy or sorrow; and which respects events and changes of things as its object.

Inclinations of mind, differ from preferences, specially considered, in various respects: for the objects of preferences are things; but the objects of inclinations are events. The motives of the former are primary passions, such as admiration and love; but the motives of the latter, are the secondary passions, desire and aversion. Also, the conceptions of possible and impossible, freedom or liberty, constraint and restraint, are inapplicable

plicable to special preferences, but are applicable to inclinations.

As every preference supposes some object unpreferred, so every inclination supposes a disinclination, or an object disinclined to, either on thought or implied ; for the inclination is to this in preference to that, or at least, irrespective of that. Thus when we prefer an event to its negation, for instance, We may be inclined to live, but disinclined to die. Thus also, when the events are under the same genus. If we are inclined to travel to the south, we are certainly disinclined to travel to the north, or indeed in any other diverse direction. If we are inclined to ride, we must be disinclined to walk, or to sail. And supposing our mind in suspense respecting walking, riding, or sailing, yet if we incline to travel, we must disincline to staying at home.

Inclination, or bent of mind, when without intermission, fixed, habitual, and continued, takes the name bias or propensity.

As the passions are excited by perception of good or agreeableness, in relation to present satisfaction, and accord to the conception of near and remote, present or absent good : So desire, which is the immediate motive of inclination, may have for its object good or agreeableness present, or good and agreeableness absent. Hence arises this evident proposition, The inclination of man, in all cases, either arises *from* satisfaction, or *for* satisfaction.

satisfaction. In the former case, it is affected by the pleasure of desire; in the latter, by its uneasiness. Were power, which some absurdly ascribe to man, adequate to every inclination, good, agreeableness, and satisfaction, would be ever present, and man could only incline and act like the divine being, from satisfaction.

The term motive, is with superior propriety, applied to the passion and its operation, which are essential to an inclination of mind. It signifies a mover, or the efficient part of the cause of inclination, and why an inclination is to this, rather than that, or to that, rather than this. An actual inclination is dependent on actual ability, and actual operation. If there are things called causes, which at an assigned time, and in an assigned respect, were without influence and efficiency: And if there are things called inclination, which at an assigned time does not exist: neither one nor the other has any thing to do with the subject before us.

Some have talked of the invincibility of motives, and have even contended for and against the idea. To say that motives are invincible, is to say what no man in his senses ever doubted, who understood the terms, for invincibility goes so fully into the essence of motive, as cogitation into the essence of a man. To say that motives are not invincible, is to say, in its meaning, that motives are invincible and not invincible at the same time and in the same respect.—If any
should

should affirm to me, that a motive is not invincible, I should probably reply, My friend, if your words have any consistency, their meaning is, that something you have accounted a motive was not invincible, and therefore actually proved in the event no motive or mover at all. A motive is certainly a mover. If then something a person calls a motive does not actually move, I beg leave to affirm, that it was no actual motive, but merely an arbitrary name, or nominal mover.

Again, I have heard of weighing motives, and of a contention whether the heaviest, all circumstances taken into the account, does, or does not, determine the mind in every case. This seems as preposterous, and the contention as ridiculous as the former. I shall not attempt a minute refutation of the numerous subtelties advanced on these subjects, being convinced, that a word fitly spoken is of far greater utility to the wise, than volumes of nice confutation. Truth is oftener so near at hand as to be overlooked, than so remote, as to need elaborate disputation for seizing her. Indeed I have no wish to irritate philosophers, who have hitherto thought differently from myself: but am willing their obscurities, subtelties, and inconsistencies should quietly die, and be decently interred by their friends.—One motive can never be weighed against another, in point of *prevalence* or *efficiency*: for that, be what it will, which was insufficient to a determination, or which, in other

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words,

words, did not prevail, was no motive, it did not move in that respect: And again, whatsoever is more than required to a determination, that excess, surplussage or redundance, is no motive, or part of a motive. To illustrate, Suppose I start the thought of walking abroad immediately, but my desire and its operation, called inducing, is inadequate to a determination or inclination to do it: In this case, my desire and its operation are no motive. Suppose again the same matter presented to me, and that there exists desire, so far from inadequate, that I am ready to burst with desire, which is frequently seen in children, the excess of desire is no motive or part of a motive, since it does not affect the said, or any other inclination of mind. I do not see that the similitude of a balance, or pair of scales, can be applied to motives with any peculiar advantage, since I know but of two cases in which it can be introduced without absurdity. The one is when the motive of one man in point of excellence is supposed to be weighed against the motive of another man, who has the same inclination. Suppose two men are equally inclined to put a man to death, the one perhaps an assassin, from the motive desire armed with malice aforethought. The other perhaps a magistrate, his motive, love of mankind and consequent desire. Now these motives may be referred to a standard of excellence, in which case undoubtedly the latter would preponderate. The other

other case in which the similitude may be consistently used, is respecting the motives of a similar inclination, in the same man, at different times. Thus at a certain past time, I inclined to strike a person, and perhaps this instant incline to give a similar blow; yet, perhaps my motive was partly enmity in the former case, but in the latter, parental love.—The doctrine of motives will be more particularly considered in another part of the Disquisition.

Inclinations of mind seem to be of four kinds, which, consistent with common sense and also with common language, (which I would always follow as far as I can with propriety) we will call Wish—Purpose—Volition—and Choice.

In attending the various species of inclinations of mind, we shall have frequent occasion to use the word *dominion*, since the substitution of this term will enable us to refrain using the word *power* with ambiguity. Nothing is more common than talking of my power, your power, within my power, the sphere of my power, the limits of your power, the power of this thing, and within the power of that thing: now in such cases, I substitute, and I think with much greater precision and propriety, the word *dominion*. I say, my dominion, your dominion, or the dominion of this or of that thing: within my dominion, your dominion, or its dominion: I have dominion, the

sphere* of my dominion, and limits of my dominion.

Respecting inanimates and vegetables, we use dominion and subjection to express the relation of one thing to another in any case of actual operation and influence; and judge that where there is no actual operation and influence there is no related dominion and subjection: But respecting intelligent beings, we do not confine them to actual operation and influence, but extend them to express the *possibility* of operation and influence. Dominion of an intelligent being consists in ability and opportunity for operating on, and influencing a subject at its pleasure. And subjection of an intelligent being consists in liableness to be influenced by some other intelligent being.

Dominion is attributed to one being, subjection to another, in the same respect. Power cannot be truly ascribed to a finite being, although either dominion or subjection may: for the object to which we ascribe dominion is without capacity in the same respect: and the object to which we attribute subjection is without ability relative to, or in the same respect. Consequently as neither of the objects possesses ability, capacity and opportunity in the same respect, which are co-essential to power, power cannot rationally be attributed to any finite object, that is to say, with philosophic precision.

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We proceed to attend the kinds of inclinations, and first to that we denominate Wish.

SECTION V.

Of Wish.

ALL the other kinds of Inclinations, seem to involve a wish: but *mere wish*, or wish as distinguished from them is the subject of this section.

A wish is an inclination of mind, respecting an event which is considered impossible, uncertain, or dubious, and independent on the agency of the person who wishes it. A wish may extend to a series of events, as well as a single event. A wish is an inclination of mind towards an event, the existence of which is independent, more or less, on our agency. Or it may be described, a preference of an event, which the mind is certain or doubtful cannot be produced merely as a consequent of its exertion.

Thus an adventurer in the last lottery, wishes his ticket had been drawn a prize, and a large one. He also, whenever he starts the thought, wishes that his ticket now in the wheel, may be drawn a prize, and the largest in the scheme. In these instances, the mind prefers and is inclined to an

event which was or is previously uncertain in its apprehension.

It was remarked concerning preferences and preferring in general, that they were not always present with us, but that thoughts and thinking occasionally take those modifications and names: so it may also be remarked here, that wishing is not an uninterrupted, unremitted, incessant employ: but owes its existence to occasions, which are circumstances arising in life, or else mere conceptions of our minds. Any kind of suffering is generally an occasion of various wishes: so also is the excitation of any kind of passion. Admiration or contempt, love or hatred, are essential to desire and aversion, and desire or aversion is essential to wish. Under sufferings, sorrow is usually joined with desire, and under the influence of this emotion, we wish the removal of its occasion. Under enjoyment, joy is usually joined with desire, and under the operation of this emotion, we wish its occasion to continue. When pride affects desire, we wish to appear to advantage, or wish others to view us as we view ourselves. When emulation affects desire, we wish to equal or excel the object we emulate. Desire, existing with envy, we may wish an opportunity to sink the character, or tarnish the merit of our rival:—With malice, may wish an opportunity of revenge:—And with the private passions, in respect to our professional abilities and exertions, we wish

to be acceptable in the circle of our acquaintance.

Human wishes are numerous beyond conception. Parents wish the child unborn may be perfect in shape and proportion, and that in due time it may put forth all the blossoms of intellect. Good parents wish their instruction may be useful to their children, and wish their children may take good courses.—The lover wishes a return of love from the beloved. The parties who join in marriage, frequently wish happiness, and redoubled happiness, may attend the connection.—Consistent legislators among men, wish the laws to be obeyed. Consistent lawyers wish to gain the cause of their client; and consistent orators of every class wish their orations may please and persuade.—The merchant embarked on the ocean, wishes his ship may surmount the waves; wishes propitious gales; wishes to arrive safe at the appointed haven; and, wishes a good sale of his wares. The mechanic wishes to finish the piece of work he undertakes. And the shop-keeper, who buys commodities, wishes to sell them with profit and to receive his money.—A christian preacher wishes every hearer may come to the knowledge of the truth and be saved. Every man who believes the existence of a heaven and hell, wishes, whenever he thinks on the subject, to enjoy the former, and to be exempted from the latter. A good christian wishes perfection of holiness as well as of happiness,

piness, an increase of grace and perseverance to the conclusion of life.—To which, I add, that my present wish is, that this essay may communicate much instruction to those readers who have not previously studied these branches of philosophy.

The events which are objects of wish, may be impossible, improbable, or uncertain.

As impossibility arises from various considerations, so events may be impossible in different respects.—*First*, Events may be impossible by their time being past. Thus, I may wish I had existed one thousand years ago—may wish that I had better employed my youth—may wish that I had chosen a different trade—may wish I had not been forgetful of my interest yesterday—may wish that I had not fallen into sin by a temptation this morning.—*Secondly*, Some events in conception, are impossible through the essential identity and diversity of persons. Thus, you may wish that you were the man or woman whose ticket you find is drawn a prize of twenty thousand pounds. Thus also a man under sentence of death, may wish to exchange identity with any person he happens to think on.—*Thirdly*, They are impossible according to the present nature of sensible objects, under the laws of motion. A farmer may wish every shrub on his estate was an oak, and every sheep a cow. A nobleman in an urgent case, might wish his carriage to run a mile a minute—Or a sea officer, that he could sail in a perfectly

perfectly direct line from London to America—
Or I may wish to walk from Hyde-Park to St.
Paul's cathedral in a perfectly straight line.—
Fourthly, Impossible through the nature or cir-
cumstances of our minds. Thus we may wish to
attain all the advantages derivable from the study
of mathematics and logic, without that study—
may wish to master a language without learning
it—and may wish to retain any mental improve-
ment without exercise or practice.—One may wish
to be the subject of a christian temper without
perception or approbation of the gospel—another
may wish to perform every work truly virtuous,
and praise worthy, without humility, and other
internal essentials—and a third may wish to share
the christian conqueror's crown, without the
christian conqueror's combats, or even engaging
in the christian warfare.

Events improbable or unlikely may be objects
of wish. Thus, a trader may wish to double his
capital in a year—a pregnant wife may wish for
two children at a birth—and a general with ten
thousand men may wish to defeat another with
twenty thousand.

Events merely uncertain may be objects of
wish. Thus, we may wish to win on an even
wager, such as that decided by the toss of a piece
of coin—May wish for prosperity in a course of
honest industry—may wish to live till our children
are settled in the world.—May wish relief in af-
fliction,

flition, from taking a medicine prescribed, or from taking the country air, or from having recourse to bathing.

Wishes, notwithstanding they are bounded inclinations, yet may be as strong or ardent as any other species of inclinations: There may be sanguine wishes and reverie volitions.

Wishes are according as the apprehension of the mind is, respecting the nature of their objects, and the impossibility, improbability, and uncertainty of the event: When we wish for what is really good in the nature of things, it is a good wish. But we may wish for that which the moment it is gratified fills with confusion and disgust.—A person may wish to enjoy the company of a deceased friend, according to apprehension, and may be to-morrow gratified with his company, the information that he was dead proving to be false. A person may wish an acquisition of one thousand pounds, and immediately find that sum was yesterday put in the funds for his use, by a person from whom, perhaps, he had not the least expectation.

Wishes are also as the motive is, the passion and its operation called inducing, which is essential to the wish, is the immediate motive: but any consideration or argument or the final end and their operation called exciting, which excited that passion is the mediate or remote motive. Love to God, love to men, love of truth, love of moral,

moral, and love of evangelical excellence joining desire, are classes of immediate motives truly good. But hatred and enmity against God, and all other objects, so far as they fail of gratifying one's wishes, are very bad motives, and where they are prevalent, the party is denominated a wicked person. The multiplying such vicious or inordinate wishes, is very pernicious to those who indulge it. The poet says, *Wishing, of all employments, is the worst.*

Wishing seems the employ of some much more than of others, perhaps they abound more eminently in people quick of thought, and of warm imagination; yet the wishes of every one are vastly numerous.

Liberty or freedom may be applied to the modified thoughts we call wishes, that is, to the agent in respect of wishing. And this liberty must be liberty limited only by the boundaries of our conceptions of events, and of our affections respecting them; for whatever event can be the object of conception, and can excite emotion, may be some time or other the object of wish, and of thinking under the modification which takes the name wishing.

Wishes are direct or indirect, that is, affect their object directly or indirectly. Thus, by wishing for a whole in a direct respect, we necessarily wish in an indirect respect for all the parts. By directly wishing for a house, we indirectly wish

wish for a roof and walls, and the materials of which they are constructed. By directly wishing to live, we indirectly wish some ills, for ills are not excluded the composition of human life.—Every thing necessarily connected with what is directly wished is also indirectly wished. I directly wish to purchase something, and indirectly wish to part with my money. I directly wish an abscess opened, and indirectly wish for an attending smart. I directly wish mutual love to continue between me and my friends, and indirectly wish some anxieties or jealousy which may attend it. I directly wish to be possessed of a horse, and indirectly wish possession of its faults.—In all cases of a wish actually existing, we rationally consider the opposite, negation, and contrary of its object, to be indirectly wished not to exist.

Wishes cannot, by any immediate operation, produce the desired event, because there can be no action where the event is apprehended impossible, and when apprehended improbable or uncertain, our agency respecting the event, if it exists at all, is voluntary. Volition and not wish is essential to it; Wishing may, notwithstanding, materially affect other modifications of thinking. The most valuable operation of wishes is in way of remote motive to valuable purposes and pursuits: And those wishes have the happiest tendency, which, unchained from terrestrial things, are raised in devout aspirations to the all-balancing,
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all regulating, all surmounting objects of a future and invisible scene, life and immortality brought to light by the gospel. Ardent wishes for sublunary good and enjoyments, or of impossible, improbable, or uncertain events, without success, are very pernicious to mind and body; they prey on the nerves, and debilitate the constitution, and frequently derange the intellect.

These observations lead us to the next species of inclination. Let me just remark, that the most noble and interesting exercise of human wishes, is in addresses to the deity; especially considering, that if we receive the bible as a supernatural revelation from God, we have the fullest evidence, that God hath connected the enjoyment of many blessings and benefits with the prayer of faith and resignation.

SECTION VI.

Of Purpose.

WHEN the mind prefers any proposed action to its forbearance, or proposed forbearance to a continuation of action, both which are supposed within its dominion, and of a nature to be produced by its operation, without the intervention of any medium, only, at some future period

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of time, thinking takes the name of designing, purposing, and intending: and a single thought is called a design, purpose, or intention. If thinking thus modified is attended with ardour, we call it resolving, and a single thought, or abstract conception of it, we call a resolution.—The common expression respecting its object, is, I design, intend, purpose, or resolve doing, or not doing it—to do or not to do it. I conceive, that the word *purpose* is used in common speech with less ambiguity than design, or even than intention, therefore shall more commonly use it in the following part of my essay.

A purpose in its most strict meaning, is an inclination of mind to do, or forbear doing, something in futurity; which it either primarily or habitually supposes within its dominion to effect. If the purpose is ardent, or in some degree sanguine, we call it a resolve or resolution.

Doing, or forbearing to do, acting or refraining, seem the proper objects of purpose, when accompanied with the conceptions of liberty to act or forbear as the mind shall direct. I think purpose is applied with strict precision only to these objects.

But if we reflect how things are connected and related, and on their mutual dependence and operation, I think we may, with consistency, apply *purpose* also to *being*, *enjoying*, and *suffering*; notwithstanding the purpose respecting these objects,
must

must strictly refer to refraining resistance on the one hand, and to the use of means on the other: For future being, enjoying, and suffering, are frequently inclined to without reflection on the doing or forbearing essential thereunto.

A purpose of being must strictly refer to forbearing the means, supposed within our dominion of shortening our present mode of existence, and to using the means of its continuation, such as food, medicine, &c. It is then, an inclination of mind to future being, supposed within our dominion.

By reflection on the action of our minds, when under the operation of apparent good, we gain a conception of the sensation of enjoying and pleasure. Enjoying is the name we apply to thinking under that modification, and pleasure is the expression of enjoyment, that is enjoying in the abstract. So that pleasure is the result of the operation of apprehended good on the mind. A purpose of enjoyment must strictly refer to forbearing to resist the operation of the object enjoyable, and to actions, or a course of actions essentially connected with the existence of enjoyment; so that a purpose of pleasure is an inclination of mind to future enjoyment, apprehended within the dominion of the mind.

By reflection also on the operation of our minds, when, under the operation of apparent evil, we gain a conception of the sensations suf-

fering and pain. Suffering is the name we apply to thinking, under this modification: Pain expresses suffering in the abstract. The result of the operation of apprehended evil on our minds is pain. A purpose of suffering must strictly refer to forbearing to resist, and thereby permit the suffering; or to acting, or a course thereof, essential to the cause of suffering. Purpose here is inclination to refuse, or else to acquiesce in the action necessary. Thus, on the advice of a physician, I purpose purgation to-morrow; but the purpose more directly goes to forbearing to refuse the physic, and to the act of taking it. It may be remarked, that the purpose of enjoyment or of suffering is frequently very sanguine, and anticipation swells the imagination many degrees beyond the degree of enjoyment or suffering when it arrives. Such purposes are more strictly called resolutions.

If any one would rather wish to throw enjoyment and suffering, under what has been called the philosophical idea of passion or reception of the operation of the agent, as applied to material beings, I shall not dispute the congruity, only be it remembered, that the term passion must be extended to include all agreeable as well as disagreeable impressions or sensations; and also cases wherein there is no impression on the patient from the operation of the agent. To be tickled is an instance of the first, to be beaten is an instance

stance of the second, and to be loved without knowing it, is an instance of the last. It will be readily seen the author does not prefer this way of thinking and of expression.

Purpose, according with the foregoing account of it, is an inclination of mind to be, to do, or forbear doing, to enjoy or refuse enjoying, to suffer, or avoid suffering, something in futurity, or at a future time, which the mind, either primarily or habitually supposes within its dominion.

But if we reflect on what we have every day an opportunity of observing, we shall find that mankind have not circumscribed the extension of purpose by the limits of even this last definition. For *every thing*, or rather every *change*, in things supposed within the dominion and liberty of an inclined mind, mediately or immediately to concur unto, may be objects of purpose, and are said to be purposed or not purposed.

These changes may be distinguished into two classes. First, those which respect matter: Secondly, those which respect mind.

Adopting this latitude of purpose in respect of its objects; it seems eligible immediately to set on foot an enquiry, concerning what events the inclined mind can concur towards, or the extension of its dominion.

Respecting matter, I think the intelligent agree that it is not within the dominion of man to concur, or be necessary unto, the creation or unto

the annihilation of a single particle thereof. It seems also agreed, that mere concurrence in respect of altering the modification of material substances, either mediately or immediately, is the sole province of men. Every one also who reflects must be sensible that human dominion is under restrictions, that though generally speaking, men can sail in the trackless ocean, (by the Montgolfier discovery) can be conveyed through the air, can approximate the dimensions of the earth and planets, and compute the distance of a star: yet they are limited respecting the subjects of their operation, and are also unable to effect any change in matter absolutely agreeable to their own notion of perfection.

Dominion of mind respecting matter, is however vastly extensive. Let it be remembered, that we attribute dominion to the mind, not only in respect to whatever it actively concurs to the production of, in fact, but also in respect to whatsoever it would actively concur to the production of, supposing it were inclined.

It would be wrong to estimate the extent of human ability by the effects it has actually concurred to produce, for every man has liberty to do many things which he does not, and to refrain doing many things which he does. The effects of power and operation to which human ability concurs, are either immediate, or they are more remote. The immediate effects of power, and consequent

consequent operations, seem reducible to two heads, namely, giving certain motions to our own bodies, and giving certain directions to our own thoughts : Whatever human ability can concur to do beyond these, must be done by one of these mediums, or by both. We can directly concur to giving motion to no particle in the universe, but by concurring to move our own body or some part thereof as an instrument : Nor can we concur to the giving a turn, or new modification to the thought of another person, but by thought and motion in ourselves.

The dominion of mind in a mediate way is very extensive. Examples occur every day in the common affairs of life. Popularly speaking, we add quantity to quantity of the same kind of matter, and obtain an aggregate of a larger bulk than either separately :—We subtract or divide by the fingers with or without the medium of a knife or other sharp instrument, one part of matter from another :—By the hands only, or else by means of some implement or utensil, we mould and fashion various subjects, mix and apply them to various designs—and in other cases unmix and separate into classes, complex or compounded bodies.—Now, if we reflect, what doth the chymist, the apothecary, and the mechanic do more, the perfection of art excepted ? The art of chymistry consists in separating, refining, corroborating, sublimating, combining, &c. The art of the apothecary

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thecary in compounding and preparing medicines, which he considers conducive to restoring, establishing, or improving health, and felicitating life. And does not the art of the greatest adept in mechanics, terminate in uniting, separating, shaping, polishing, and applying materials, according to his idea or design? Respecting all these works, when in prospect, we are said to purpose them, or resolve to attempt them. All these the mind concurs to by the executive parts of the body, with or without the intervention of tools or implements. The inclined mind cannot immediately send away the head-ache, the fever as burning, or palsy as shaking—cannot immediately produce appetite, or produce a change in the body respecting stature, strength, or beauty: yet it can, most frequently, stretch out the arm, move forward the leg, dart the eye on any object, or forbear all these. We daily eat, drink, speak, or keep silence, as the inclined mind concurs.

Secondly, The dominion of the inclined mind over the modifications of itself and its thoughts. Here also, we may remark, that we cannot create mind, or give existence to thinking, and that, granting the immortality of the soul, we cannot destroy mind, or its essential action, in any direct or indirect way.

Mr. LOCKE has expressed himself on this subject beautifully and justly. “The dominion of man in this little world of his own understanding,

is much the same as in the great world of visible things; wherein his dominion, however managed by art and skill, reaches no further than to compound and divide the materials that are made to his hand, but can do nothing towards making the least particle of matter, or destroying one atom that is already in being." The same inability will every one find in himself, to fashion in his understanding any simple idea not dependent for existence on the organs, abilities, or capacities, which God has given him.

Mental events or changes of mind, we may concur to the production of immediately or mediately, that is to say, some may be immediately affected by the inclined mind, and some only mediately.

There are many changes in the modifications of thinking totally uninfluenced by the inclination of mind. Thus when affected with bodily pain, or under the intrusions of evil. But all changes more or less dependent on the mind in a state of inclination are rationally considered in the same proportion under the dominion of the mind, yet, the mind uninclined is totally without concurrence to power in respect of purpose, and cannot be said to purpose any change or mental event under its dominion.

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or what is generally apprehended to be within the dominion of an inclined mind.

First, As to our ideas in general, that is to say, sensations, perceptions, conceptions, and remembrances.

We have a property to enjoy, suffer, or perceive the operation and influence of external things through the medium of the senses, and so far as surrounding circumstances, and the nature of the senses admit.

Our ability, when inclined, may be extended to distinguishing simple, complex, compound and collective ideas : Also, to framing compound ideas of simple or complex, and collective of any sort or kind of ideas. Liberty in these respects limited only by our nature and circumstances.

By reflection, we can obtain conceptions of the action of our minds under all the modifications of which we are conscious.

We can by abstraction form universals so extensively as our conceptions.

We can lay up conceptions as in a store-house, and call them to view at pleasure, according to the strength of inclination and extent of our memory, which varies in different persons, and in the same persons in youth and age.

All these by immediate and direct effort in suitable circumstances, and all these were once primarily, and afterwards more or less habitually conceived

conceived to be within the dominion of an inclined mind.

We can retain the presence of ideas in our minds, and can by some mediums sometimes send away present thoughts—such as changing place, company, train of thought, talking, reading, action, drinking, &c. We can by no immediate or direct effort send away the present object of thought, for such endeavour would be effectual to the retaining it. But a man of sound mind and good nerves, according to his progress in practical logic, can master his thoughts, following new ones, the former retire from conception. Where the imagination is more or less disordered, this is more or less impracticable, and also in cases where the passions are violent, arising from pain or other occasions.

We can, by having recourse to some mediums, even change the swiftness, or slowness of the succession of our thoughts. Such as opiates, and exhilaratives, drinking, and other gratifications of natural or acquired appetites, or non-gratification of the same.

We can help our property of perceiving, and of consequence improve our perceptions, by studying logic.

We may increase our ideas by reading, hearing, study, and other means.

We can, by repeating the act of thinking on an assigned idea, concur to generating a habit of thinking

thinking on it, and also to improvement of our memory. And we can do the same respecting a train, or arrangement of thoughts on any subject.

* The ability of the inclined mind, respecting the imagery of its own thoughts, is generally indirect and mediate, but not always, for if we make experiments and reflect, probably we shall find, that we have direct and immediate ability respecting our ideas, so far as we have respecting external objects, and no further. Imagine a tree standing in the ground, we can directly and immediately imagine it growing, increasing size, annually dressed in verdure, blooming and bearing fruit. But let us try to imagine the same tree to lie on the ground. We cannot bring ourselves to this imagination, without recurring to some medium. Let us advert to the intermediate idea of some hands and instruments felling it : some high wind or lightning levelling it, or its decaying and at last falling by age, and the difficulty is removed. If I imagine a crack in the glass of my watch rising from the edge, I can conceive it turned to the nine, the twelve, or to any other part of the dial ; but find I cannot conceive of that glass without the crack, and why but because no person, to my knowledge, hath discovered a method of repairing a crack in glass ? Let us recur to the idea of a watchmaker's shop, the broken glass forced out, and another substituted, I then freely
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conceive of a whole glass to my watch, though I cannot imagine the same identical glass. And thus in all imaginations, we find that where apparent impossibilities arise, some intermediate idea must be attended before the mind can pass from an object in one state to that object in another.—Good old Jacob could not admit the idea, that his son Joseph lived, since his death had appeared to him so evident, and his living again impossible, until he heard the history, and saw the waggons which Joseph had sent. Then he could admit and entertain the idea that Joseph lived, and exclaims, It is enough! Joseph is still alive, I will go and see him before I die.—Martha could not admit the idea that her brother Lazarus, now foetid in the grave, should presently arise, until our Lord's discourse made an easy transition to the idea, and his eventual ability, to that of a living instead of a dead brother.—Thus also the writer of a novel who is well and practically versed in mental operations, having raised difficulties, ever takes care to remove them by what is possible and which appears more or less probable, otherwise the pleasing likeness to history would disappear, or be lost, and the piece would degenerate into a disgusting romance.

The present conception, we daily experience, does not perpetually occupy the mind. If we enquire what circumstances attend its change, experience furnishes an answer. A conception pre-

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sent in the mind retires to give place to another, which, in a meditation, or train of thinking, is generally a kindred one ; or else, it sinks, and is absorbed in stupidity or thoughtlessness, similar to what we experience when approaching to a state of sleep.

Secondly, The dominion of the inclined mind in respect to *judgment*. The ability of judging may be improved by the study of logic, and by the attainment of extended knowledge : but we cannot directly and immediately produce or effect that improvement, even with the most sanguine inclination to it. The use of means seems in this case the utmost effort of man in a direct way ; since it is not within our dominion to judge unlimitedly, as we are inclined in all cases. The thought we call a judgment is carried necessarily by the evidence, real or seeming, which appears to us at the time.

Thirdly, The dominion of the inclined mind in respect to its *reasonings*. The ability of reasoning also may be improved by the study of logic, and repeated exercise, which study and attempts are more or less within the dominion of the man who is inclined to them : But no man can, by any direct effort, produce an ability to reason on subjects.—We cannot draw an inference from any premises diverse from what is apparently the true one. We can directly seek new arguments

arguments, but cannot directly resist those which are of greatest weight in point of effect.

Fourthly, In regard to our *knowledge*. Knowledge is the mind's acquaintance with objects. The mind however inclined cannot directly and immediately produce knowledge or destroy it. The inclined mind may pursue knowledge in the use of means; may endeavour to obtain it with diligence, and may resolve to persevere in attachment to understanding; but cannot create, produce, or effect knowledge. God giveth knowledge, but admits, requires, induces, and requites our endeavours to seek and obtain it, in subordination and consonance to the properties and circumstances of things.

Scientific knowledge cannot be immediately attained by a direct effort, yet we can concur to its acquirement in ourselves and in others. Neither can we, by an immediate effort, become ignorant of any species of this kind of knowledge, but we can keep out of the way of even knowing that there is such or such a proposition: And we can refrain re-attendance to that proof, so that if we have received it, our future knowledge of the point will be but as retained in memory or habitual; consequently will be decaying and tending to extinction.

Thus also believing: We cannot directly and immediately produce knowledge founded on testimony; but we can take measures for hearing

or reading the report, can examine the character and other circumstances of the testator and witnesses from whence evidence may arise, and may repeat these attentions, and thus keep up a more vivid faith.—Respecting unbelief, we cannot directly and immediately produce it in ourselves or in others : but we can concur to it by keeping out of the way of the report ; By refusing to survey the proof ; By attending other objects, so that the proof is heard or read with little or no attention.—Having this sort of knowledge, we may concur to losing it by non-attendance to the report, non-attention to its evidence : this knowledge then, like the former, gradually declines, being merely dependent on habit and memory, notwithstanding respecting some objects it cannot be totally extinguished during our natural lives.

But let us enquire a little into the nature and extent of the dominion of an inclined mind, over its own determinations.

Fifthly, Dominion of the mind over determinations must respect future determinations. I think the conviction that the inclined mind has some degree of dominion over future inclination, exists in our species very early in life. Can a child purpose to do the most trifling action an hour hence, without an actual conviction that its present purpose can affect its inclination at the expiration of the hour ? If a man promises me a sum of money—if sincere, can he do it without conviction,

conviction, that his inclination to-morrow to perform, is, in some degree, under the dominion of himself as at present inclined? And what sort of confidence can I have in his promise, if I conceive that his future determination will be in no degree subjected to his present? The question then is, what ability does the inclined mind possess, tending, suitable circumstances admitted, to cause future inclinations or determinations to be this or that? Now I conceive that no degree of such ability can exist otherwise than as a property of a present wish, purpose, or resolution. The strength of the inclined mind, or of present wish, purpose, or resolution, in regard of affecting a future determination, seems entirely to depend either in continuing to view, or reviewing the same objects in futurity, and as we view them now; or else, as operating by virtue of habit.—Memory seems essentially requisite to the former case, and reiterated thinking on the same object to the latter. In many cases we are influenced in this latter way by a former purpose, when we have entirely forgotten the original circumstances, which concurred to the existence of that purpose. This is exemplified in habits attained at school, or under instruction, and will be easily admitted by whoever reflects that habits of thinking may be generated under any modifications whatsoever. By frequent attempts the facility is attained of keeping our thoughts or a thought in view: and a pur-

pose, a resolution, or thinking, under the modification of resolution may become so habitual, as to determine other purposes and volitions unreflected on, and consequently without a new excitement of emotion; But the deficiency of actual emotion with our purposing, occasions a gradual decay of the habit, and also an easy relinquishment of the resolution on the presence of some future opposing objects: However, in all similar cases, unless future circumstances, when they arrive, have superior motive property, we shall determine with proportionate coolness according to our habitual purpose or resolution.

The man who acts most universally under the influence of resolutions wisely made, and continued purpose, has greatly the advantage to other men. Such an attainment seems partly owing to natural and partly to acquired ability, and seems to consist in quickness of perception, accuracy of apprehension, constant attendance of the cool passions and memory.

These two, namely, a reiterated view, or else habit, being the only ways through which as mediums, the inclined mind has dominion over future determinations, or inclinations of mind: This ability will be found to differ in different persons, according to their constitution of body and mind, according to their use of means tending to renew the decaying strength of the original
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nal purpose, or to improve it, and according to the different circumstances of the parties.

Respecting the difference of constitutions. Do we not observe around us some fickle and changeable, unstable as water, respecting the affairs of common life, and religion, through an overbalance of fancy and imagination? We observe some others stable, steady, settled, whose property of understanding seems proof against every wild imagination. Their calm resolves seem calculated for enduring to eternity.—Respecting the use of means, we may remark, that as all resolutions, whatever their strength, have a tendency to become obliterated, the wise God hath poured on us instructions accompanied with sanctions, communicated in such way as tends to excite, stir up, and renew our resolutions, and to sustain and strengthen our purposes. Thus the works of nature, schoolmasters, books, orators, suggestions from angels, and sometimes immediate suggestions from the Spirit of God, are instruments and mediums conducive to these ends. By observation and report, we find that some diligently use means, whilst others are negligent in that respect. Some read, hear, meditate, study, and if religious, pray, whilst some others totally neglect these mediums, each of which retains, even in its own nature, a tendency derived from the Deity, to preserve, improve, and strengthen several important purposes, and when accompanied

nied with the co-operation of unknown parts of causes, elevate humanity and are crowned with efficiency.—Respecting the difference of circumstances, be it remembered, that it is impossible the identically same circumstances should ever surround even two persons only. The same time and place conjoined, can never happen, and apart from these, it is almost infinitely unlikely, that the remaining circumstances should in any two cases be the same.

Thus I have taken a glance of human dominion, or the dominion of the inclined mind, respecting various objects ; to which I beg leave to add, that I consider as a first principle this proposition. *We have some degree of dominion over our actions both of body and of mind.* I think no extraneous argument can essentially add to its evidence. This conviction is implied in all deliberation, for no man in his wits, deliberates whether he shall do what he apprehends not to be under his dominion. The same conviction is implied in every purpose or resolution formed in consequence of deliberation. A man may as well form a resolution to pull the moon out of her orbit, as to do the most insignificant action, which he apprehends not to be within his dominion. The same thing may be said of every promise, or contract, wherein a man plights his faith ; for he is not an honest man, who promises what he does not apprehend he has dominion for performing.

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The dominion of men, differs respecting its objects. This arises from difference of abilities, or from difference of circumstances. One has ability for painting, another for forging. The former may have dominion respecting painting a picture, which the other has not. The latter may have dominion for making a horse-shoe, which the other has not.—Remove these artizans to a situation in which the former shall have no colours or implements; and the other, no iron, no anvil, no hammer; and where they shall have no opportunity of procuring these essentials to their respective professions; and dominion in either respect no longer exists.

The influence of purpose within its sphere, seems to be in proportion to the quickness of recollection, and to the strength of the purpose or resolution of the agent, and also, to the absence of objects, which tend to divert from the purpose. Numerous purposes, perhaps by far the greater part, never become influential respecting their object. Defect of memory is probably the greatest occasion of this, for thousands are started and no more thought of or recognized. A fickle temper also is another source. Numerous purposes are started in one minute, rejected the next; soon as born, they die.

The more material purposes and resolutions, are generally followed with consideration, which, the very nature of a purpose always gives more or less.

less opportunity for; since it always respects events conceived as more or less remote in futurity. According to the virtues or vices of the party so is this space improved or prostituted. The thief, the adulterer, and murderer, may abuse and prostitute it to more fully securing the success of their abominable intentions and resolutions: but the virtuous examine them by the maxims of wisdom, for a practical purpose.

Liberty or freedom, is applicable to purpose, that is, to the agent respecting purposes and purposing. Liberty here is that species of opportunity, which respects our acting or refraining, according as we are inclined. By liberty, respecting purposes, I understand opportunity for purposing. Liberty in respect of purposing, is as extensive as apprehended dominion for doing or refraining when the time shall arrive. Every man who purposes, apprehends he shall have dominion for executing. Taking the objects of purpose in greater latitude, the boundaries of liberty for purposing, seem to be either apprehended dominion or apprehended subjection. If a man does not apprehend he shall have dominion, that is ability and opportunity for paying twenty pounds tomorrow, he does not, he cannot, purpose it: And if a man does not apprehend he shall have capacity and opportunity for being carried abroad tomorrow, he cannot intend it. Liberty is also limited to events considered probable at least, admitting

admitting our inclination: and to events conceived of under the influence of desire or aversion: for where there is apparent improbability, or no desire, or aversion, there can be no purpose or resolution.

Necessity, respecting existence, is fully applicable to purpose. Human purposes, are, in my judgment, undoubtedly necessary, are founded in the nature of things previous to their existence; are certainly foreknown to God, and when existing, correspond with the approbation, or non-prevention of the Deity.

Should any demand a proof that human purposes are necessary, I would reply, All human purposes are actual existences; all actual existences must have a cause; power, or its absence, is essential to every cause; and power is direct, and its absence, indirect necessity.

This fact, the necessity of purposes, known and acknowledged, cannot affect a single purpose. If any one thinks otherwise, let him admit what I call a fact, at least, in way of supposition, and try the experiment respecting some of even the most common concerns of life. Does he purpose to dine to-day? Let him then suppose that this purpose is necessary—that it was previously founded in the nature of things, and was certainly known to the Deity previous to its existence. What will be the influence or effect? Why really nothing at all: for appetite and suitable circumstances

stances can determine his purpose with, or without reflection on the said fact, or on those involved in it.—Again, Let him suppose it certain to God, though uncertain to himself, whether he shall purpose to-morrow morning to ride abroad in the day. Could this affect his morning purpose respecting his riding abroad or forbearing it? Certainly in no way, for his ability, desire, and circumstances will determine him, whether he believes the divine prescience or not.—Was he himself previously certain whether he should purpose it or not; the case, I grant, would materially differ. Or indeed if he had apprehended knowledge of what the Deity knew respecting this event; this apprehension might affect his purpose. Suppose a fortune-teller, or astrologer, should venture to predict that this gentleman should be inclined to ride abroad to-morrow, this might operate to corroborating the motive to his purposing it, or the reverse, according as he is ill or well affected towards such pretenders.—Again, Suppose he should be persuaded that God had somehow revealed to him that he should in the morning purpose staying at home all the day. How would this operate? If well affected towards the Deity, it might have a motive influence on the mind to purpose agreeably with this persuasion. If, on the contrary, he is at enmity with God, he may be influenced to purpose the contrary, through this bad temper. But would this

not reward, but prodigality ; and to inflict suffering in such circumstances is not punishment but cruelty.

Apprehended liberty: I express myself thus, because apprehension may differ from real fact, yet the passions and other dependent modifications of thinking, are ever correspondent with apprehension. To allude to another instance of Mr. LOCKE—Suppose a man be carried whilst fast asleep into a room where there is a person he longs to see and converse with; and be there locked fast in and thus deprived of opportunity to get out; he awakes, and unconscious of his confinement, is glad to find himself in so desirable company, which he stays willingly in. He is the subject of true volition respecting forbearing to go. But alter the case, and suppose him to perceive his confinement, he still is glad to stay in his friend's company; yet his inclination can no longer be volition, but merely wish, since he has no apprehended liberty.—I have heard of a gentlewoman, who, whilst sleeping under the influence of an opiate, suffered the amputation of a leg. On awaking, being unconscious of what had passed, she complained of a violent pain in her great toe, (which, I am told, is no uncommon sensation in her circumstances) now in this situation, the complaint was voluntary, or an act dependent on volition, and if she attempted to move her foot to ease her pain, the

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thought, or inclination was a volition, notwithstanding the attempt immediately convinced her that her apprehension of liberty to move her foot, or not move it, was an apprehension not agreeing with fact, she not having her foot to move.—The apprehension of liberty, like the apprehension of dominion, may be primary or habitual.

Some philosophers have ascribed a somewhat they call liberty and freedom to volition, which they do not conceive to be a species of opportunity, but strangely define to be, a power over the determinations of a person's own will : and add, that in some actions a man had power to will what he did, and power not to will it.

To say nothing of the absurdity of ascribing power to a finite being, I admit that a person may use a word in what sense he pleases, may undoubtedly call liberty power, or power liberty, provided he endeavours to be understood : But I think every one reprehensible who propagates inconsistency and absurdity. If I am not mistaken, these gentlemen intend, by their expressions to show us, that in their opinion the said liberty of volition does not consist with subjection to necessity, *i. e.* power or its absence respecting existence, the existence of the present volition as being of this action and not of its forbearance, or of that forbearance, and not the action respected. I have taken much pains to get at their meaning both by
reading

reading and conversation. I long supposed they meant that some determinations exist independent on God. But in reply, they tell me that this liberty consists in power to determine, and that this power is given to us by God, and that consequently we are dependent for it. I am still puzzled for *their* meaning, who do not conceive it a kind of independence on the Deity, which some have conceded to me. I doubt there is reason to resolve it into crude conceptions, retained as a feeble support to a tottering system.

Permit me to remark, that the notion which common sense frames of liberty as a species of opportunity, or in this case, of the suitable circumstances requisite to volition; is still determinate, notwithstanding the attempts of these philosophers to confound and obscure it. Perhaps the candid and more intelligent pursuers of truth, who set up a different notion of liberty, will grant the following to be consistent with their meaning. GOD hath given to mankind THAT, call it liberty, call it power, call it what you will, which is a ground for the determination of a man to be this and not that, that and not this, in some cases independent on the properties and circumstances of things, and independent on the Deity. If so, this sentiment will be combated in another place.

Secondly, Emotion. Emotion is the other essential to the existence of volition. The ex-

istence of the passion desire, a cool or more sanguine desire is indispensable from volition.

The desire which is always requisite to volition is usually attended with a preponderation of hope or of fear. A partial respect to this circumstance perhaps induced some to suppose, that it is uneasiness, the uneasiness of desire, which always determines the will or volition. Where fear respecting some object or end prevails, accompanying the desire, no doubt there is present uneasiness : But I think every one finds in his own experience, that sometimes his desire hath been not only free from uneasiness, but positively accompanied with a hope that hath supported cheerfulness and tranquillity. Indeed, a course of desires within the limits of our apprehended dominion, seems essential to health of body and mind, content and happiness. Every one, I think hath experimented in himself a stupidity or insensibility in consequence of an extinction or stagnation of desires. This state of mind is at times visible to others, who sometimes express themselves, you look as if you had neither won nor lost, nor saved your own. I think every man at times experiences an absolute stagnation of desires, and that not merely when the mind is tired and jaded out by exercise and exertion ;—I am also inclined to think that no one wishes a more frequent return of such experience ; but in general, the man who is under the sole influence of the things of time and sense, has

has usually a fool's paradise on the one hand, and an imaginary hell on the other, if I may use such expressions, influencing his desires and consequent inclinations, through the differing apparent goodness and evil of objects in relation to his sensations. The man who is influenced by the operation of the world to come, is generally allured on the one hand by hope, and alarmed on the other hand by fear, which generally keep up a round of desires; yet, he is not a stranger to a failure herein, and sometimes sinking to stupidity; experiencing this frame, he seems to himself as if there was no heaven to win or lose, no hell to suffer or avoid; but this frame is his great infelicity, and he would, perhaps, prefer desires combined with the uneasiness of fear, to this absence of desires.

People who account ease, contentment and peace, their chief objects of satisfaction, are mostly determined in wish, purpose, and will, according to the greatest uneasiness present: But people who reckon pleasure, vivid pleasure their satisfying object, seem mostly influenced to determination by the greatest good in conception, which is pursued by them, not because they feel present, or fear future uneasiness, but because they anticipate and always rejoice in prospect of some future gratification. Hence the motive emotion to wish, purpose and volition of the former class, is for the most part inclusive of fear, hatred, &c. but, of the latter, love, hope, and joy.—Though both sets of

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passions meet in desires; yet we sometimes enjoy and sometimes suffer desire, according to their attendants. There are through this conjunction of emotions, both uneasy desires and pleasurable desires. This I think is evident to those, who make reflections on their own desires, in health and sickness, and observations on the emotions of their neighbours.

If we look around us, we find that some of mankind are by natural constitution subject to a prevalence of sorrow, are of a sorrowful spirit, others are by natural constitution prevalently disposed to mirth and joy. If the former are prosperous, they are in danger of a stagnation of desires, melancholy and hypochondriac diseases: If the latter are prosperous in their pursuits, they are in danger of forming unreasonable projects, and following extravagant desires, and the frenzy of inordinate mirth. Cheerfulness which seems the desirable medium in the present state, seems to consist in a regular course of animated desires of objects within ones dominion and subjection, to possess and enjoy. May we not conclude, that the fearful are most and oftenest influenced in volition, by the greatest evil apprehended, as occasioning desire, and that the cheerful are most and oftenest affected in volition, by the greatest good in prospect, as animating desire? Or, since pain is the object of aversion and pleasure, that of desire, shall we say, that the emotion of the former

is mostly aversion, but that of the latter, chiefly desire?

Joy and rejoicing also sometimes accompany desire in volitions, and that in so great degree as nature can support without being oppressed, which I think evident from general experience as well as my own. In other cases, gratitude may seem to swallow up or absorb the desire: but is not thanksgiving and other expressions of gratitude voluntary? Are not thanks and praises inseparable from desire to thank and praise? The native effusion of the fine temper gratitude, instead of being influenced by uneasiness, is the consequent of delight and satisfaction.

I account it a fact, that every one's experience, if he reflects, will support, that we ever act for satisfaction, or from satisfaction, that is, being unsatisfied, we direct our action to the attainment of satisfaction in the way that most pleaseth us; and having attained and enjoying satisfaction, which is sometimes the case in so great degree as nature can support without pain, we act under its influence, in voluntary thinking, or voluntary moving.

The mind is satisfied only with the enjoyment of apprehended good. Happiness merely in conception, though admitted in degree what no mortal ever enjoyed, if even conceived as essential to the satisfaction we have in eye or hand is uninfluential. Desire is indispensibly
essential

essential to the motive of a volition, respecting the attainment of satisfaction in eye, and is accompanied with hope or fear, joy or sorrow. Desire is also essential to the motive of a volition respecting the manifestation of satisfaction in hand or enjoyed, but here hope and fear are included, joy and rejoicing are its native attendants.

When the emotion which attends volition is violent, natural action, whether of mind or body can never be quick enough to keep pace with the impetuosity of the mind, this is experimented in anger, and in violent love, combined with desire.

So much for the emotion which essentially goes to the existence of volition, we now proceed to the doctrine of motives, which seems to claim more particular attention than it has yet had in this essay.

What determines the will? Is a question which has been thought of some importance, and deservedly, since all voluntary actions and forbearances depend on the volition, and that on its cause. Shall we render this question thus, what moveth the mind to direct its general ability to this and not to that? Such a rendering I can by no means admit, since it leads to the supposition of one directing property to direct another directing property also in the mind, and consequently that admitting one to influence another, we may admit another to influence the former, another that, and so on *ad infinitum*, which ultimately

mately sinks us in absurdity. Mr. Locke seemed aware of this, yet too much gave it into similar language. Mr. Edwards, however, has set the matter of self-determination in such a light, as that its absurdity, in my opinion, must glare on the intelligent reader. Not to be tedious, the meaning of what determines the will, I will suppose is,

What is the cause or reason, that a volition is of forbearance, and not of action; of acting and not of forbearing, in this and that instance? This manner of expression, will probably be admitted. Perhaps, the direct, immediate, and most strict answer to the question is,—The operation and influence we call inducement is the immediate reason. Now inducement may attend emotions or passions of every kind. We may be induced to act or forbear, from fear of offending—hope of honour—expectation of advantage—delight, or at least, amusement in the action proposed—a junction of each—or some emotion parts of motives, unnamed; when any thing is proposed to be immediately done or forborn, we are always determined as some inducement affects our minds.

But we enquire more particularly for the mental cause of a volition being of this object and not of that. I take leave to affirm, that in all cases operation and influence are essential to the philosophical notion of cause, although they may not to the common or vulgar conception, which sometimes

times goes no further than to the person or thing to which ability is ascribed. Thus man has been called a cause, and an efficient cause, without sense or reason. Every change, and volition is one, or must be considered in its origin as one, requires active property, or ability, passive property related, or capacity, and suitable circumstances to the existence of operation and influence respecting the change. Consequently these with their subjects conjoined are the cause or ground of efficiency.—If we enquire then for the cause of a particular volition, we shall find ability in a conception, relative capacity in the general action of our minds, that is thinking, and in suitable circumstances, with the addition of operation and influence, make up our complex notion of the cause sought for.

The efficient part of the cause of a determination, I call the motive or mover. By motive then I mean the efficient part of the cause of a volition, consequently also of its being of *this* and not of that; for every existence must have its modes. I do not say that it is merely the efficient part of the cause of a determination, generally considered; but that it is also of that determination being of this or that object, whether an act or its forbearance, for there can be no actual existence abstracted from its essentials, and properties. A motive is the efficient part of the cause by which we are determined to this, rather than to that, or
by

by which at different periods we are moved to both. The subjective part of the cause or basis of determination is cogitation or thinking. The final part is the end of the volition which is usually diverse from the action, or forbearance which is its object.

I affirmed in the former disquisition, that a cause co-exists with its effect: I may add, did not exist before its effect, and cannot exist after its efficiency is past. That although the effect exists in order of time with its cause, yet as an event it may continue after its cause is no more: but is no longer rightly conceived an effect, than its cause exists. Whatsoever owes its existence to a cause, was in respect of its origin an effect. A motive then as the efficient part of the cause of a determination co-exists with the determination, did not exist in order of time before its concurrence to efficiency, and does not exist when the determination is past.

As the efficient part of a cause, whether material or mental, consists in actual ability and actual operation, so I conceive the efficient part of the cause of volition in any instance in fact or actual existence, to consist in ability of the excited passion or impassioned thought, and consequent inducing to which it concurs. The ability of the excited emotion and consequent inducing compose the motive or efficient part of the cause, both of the existence of volition, and of its being of
this

this and not of that. The existing cool, or sanguine passion, and the attendant operation called inducing, compose the primary or immediate motive.

As to the process of the cause of our willing and volition, that is thinking under the modification we call willing, and thoughts under the modifications we call volitions: Reflections alone can assist us. Reflecting on what we are conscious of, we discover that conceptions of objects exist in our minds, comparing them in relation to good we are incited to judge this object of conception, good, and that better, this bad, and that worse. If these objects are conceived more or less remote, desire or aversion, or perhaps both, is excited respecting these objects, and if circumstances are suitable the operation we call inducing, and consequent volition exists. I start the idea of immediately putting my finger into the flame of the candle, and its forbearance in circumstances which give opportunity for either: but desire to forbear pain operates to my willing to refrain and forbear that action. Or rather aversion to pain thus operates. When conceived good influences, the emotion is desire: but when evil conceived chiefly influences, the emotion is aversion. Thus a criminal voluntarily walks to execution through aversion to being dragged thither, and not from any desire to any part of the dreadful business. In other cases both desire
and

this argue that the necessity or the previous certainty affected his said purpose? By no means. It would fully argue his being mistaken concerning a revelation from God, but no further, since he must admit God might be previously acquainted with the baseness of his temper, and his consequent purpose: Indeed a God without prescience, unlimited prescience, is no God. The conception is an absurdity. Neither of the last cases can touch the original assertion, that the necessity of purpose, known and acknowledged, cannot affect a single purpose.

Purposes and resolutions are *direct* or *indirect*. By directly intending a whole, we indirectly intend all the parts. By directly purposing an antecedent, we indirectly purpose its known consequent: And by directly purposing a consequent, we indirectly purpose its known antecedent. In a word, by directly purposing an action or its forbearance, whatsoever is necessarily connected with what is directly purposed or resolved on, if known, is indirectly purposed, also.

Events, indefinite as to time, as to place, as to manner, may yet be purposed. Thus I may purpose taking an excursion in the country, without respect to time, place, or manner of travelling. May purpose going next May without respect to the place or manner:—May purpose going to Margate, without respect to the time, or whether by water, or land:—May purpose exercising on

U horseback,

horseback, without respect to time, or place. But let it be remembered, that the time, place, or manner, not reflected on, or indeterminately regarded, are yet, indirectly purposed.

Human purposes, that is, thoughts under the modification which occasions their taking the name purposes, intentions, designs, or resolutions, are innumerable. The more important of them, as more eminently influential in life, are those which regard entering on, and persevering in, a civil calling—moral conversation—and true piety.

First, A civil calling. The acquirement of abilities for filling a lawful sphere in life, for the mutual benefit of society and the individual, whether the business be principally of the head, or of the hand, requires a most steady purpose and fixed resolution, otherwise, the difficulties will not be surmounted, or habits established, and the party at last will not attain a higher epithet, than a dunce, or bungler, in his profession.

Secondly, A moral conversation; without this, how shall a man be acceptable, or even safely retained in society. But to attain habits of temperance, prudence, justice, moderation, and benevolence, a fixed resolution is essentially requisite for breaking off pernicious attachments, lopping off the wild excursions of depraved fancy, and cultivating the seeds of a virtuous education. —This is best effected where there is.

Thirdly,

Thirdly, A steady purpose and fixed resolution to be religious. The difficulty attending this path, all will admit, whilst the sojourner only, is fully convinced, that godliness with contentment is great gain.

Probably the most valuable and most general purpose of governing influence of the greatest importance, is a fixed purpose and growing resolution to examine our inclinations universally, by the best rules and maxims of wisdom we have at hand, and with an eye steadily fixed on evidence, to establish or rescind our dependent purposes accordingly. This resolution should never be impeded in any instance, as periods arrive, from ripening into volition, and becoming a real ability to forsake the foolish and live, and to go in the way of understanding: Whilst its happy possessor is secure of the approbation of God, of angels, and of the pious and virtuous in all generations.—St. Paul uses this phrase, “He that standeth stedfast in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath so decreed in his heart.” 1 Cor. vii. 37. Now what does all this import, but resolution which governs volitions? I conceive ability in the resolution, capacity in the volitions, and an occasion or opportunity:—It seems to imply, that some other men are not in this state, have not dominion over their own will, that is, have not a governing purpose in the respect assigned.

Purposes of governing influence, are generally affected by the prevailing taste, and such is the depraved state of humanity, that the purposes of most men seem affected by prevalent sensuality, or pride, and oftentimes by both in the same person. Happy, superlatively happy, the pious few, who raised in a good degree from the ignorance which is at the root of pride, are frequently indulging reflections on their universal, entire, and unlimited dependence on God, respecting the existence, properties, and efficiency of valuable purposes. Ignorance is the parent of self-sufficient purposes and proud resolutions, as inconsistent with our mutual dependence as they are atheistical: But knowledge of our mutual dependence on each other, and primarily and ultimately, dependence on God, generates humility, the immediate parent of pious intentions and godly resolutions, which persevered in, ennoble humanity, and glorify God: Divine strength being made perfect in our weakness, and divine sufficiency in creature insufficiency.

SECTION VII.

Of Will, or Volition.

THINKING, when the mind endeavours to begin, or continue any proposed action, or its forbearance, supposed within its dominion, and of a nature, without the intervention of any medium, to be produced by its influence, takes the name *will* or *volition*.

That particular thought, whereby the mind knowingly exerts that dominion, it either primarily or habitually supposes itself to have over any part of the man, in concurring to the existence or continuation of a proposed action or its forbearance, takes the name *will* or *a volition*.

This simple modified act of mind, by other arrangements of its circumstances, may be further defined.

Volition or will, is that inclination which immediately follows a conscious want of some supposed attainable good, and which immediately precedes, endeavour to attain the said good.

Volition or will, is that thought by which the mind knowingly exerciseth that dominion, it primarily or habitually supposeth itself to have, over some other property of its subject.—The

following seems the most logical definition, as the next or nearest genus is used.

Volition is that inclination in which the mind knowingly exerts that dominion it apprehendeth itself to have, over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, some immediate action. The ability in the mind to order, or as it were, to command the doing or refraining any particular action is what I call *the will*, conceived in abstract.

It is impossible by discourse, to lead a man into a conception of volition, unless he has reflected, or will reflect, on his own cogitation or thinking, when merely by a thought, he gives existence to motion of his body, or pursues a train of thinking by inclination; or, on the other hand, opposes such motion or thoughts, when proposed in idea to the mind. Every reflecting man has abundant opportunity for observing that he has ability sometimes joined with suitable circumstances, to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of his mind and motions of his body, barely by a thought, or inclination of mind.—That I be not too tedious, I shall only add, That this inclination of mind, which co-exists with apprehended liberty thus to order the consideration of an idea, or the forbearing to consider it: to effect the motion of any part of the body, or its cessation, if in motion, in any particular instance, is that which I call will or volition. *Thinking*, thus circumstanced,

ced, or under this modification, takes the name *willing*.

A volition agrees with a wish and a purpose, in that it is an inclination of mind : But disagrees with wish, in that its object is immediate acting or refraining what is conceived possible ; whereas, the object of wish is an impossible, improbable, or uncertain event, past, present, or to come. And volition differs from purpose in that its objects are always immediate, and either action or refraining ; whereas, the object of purpose is always future, and may be not only action or refraining, but enjoyment or suffering, and also changes in things.

If the foregoing descriptions of volition are just, it is fully evident, that understanding and emotion are essentially requisite to the existence of volition. Let us attend them in their order.

First, Understanding. That species of understanding which we call apprehension, is chiefly concerned here, as respecting inclination under other modifications. This apprehension is respecting the object of volition—the nature of the acting or forbearing proposed—the dominion of the mind—and its present liberty.

1. In regard of the apprehended or conceived object, whether it is immediate action or immediate cessation, we may remark, that, without apprehension of it, we could never be voluntary agents ; but if actors at all, should merely act as vegetables

vegetables and inanimates do, according to the laws of motion, or to the laws of mind unknown to us. This is evident to every one.

2. Something of the nature of the proposed acting, or forbearing, in absolute, or in respect of its relations and consequences, must also be apprehended; for without this there can be no emotion, and a mind without emotion, would be a mind without volition, or indeed any kind of inclination or preference. Apprehension of the connection or repugnance, agreement or disagreement which there is between our thoughts, seems essential to a voluntary agent, and to the existence of volition. I think all will admit the indispensibility of some understanding, or perception of the nature of the action, or of the forbearance, proposed.

3. Apprehended dominion of mind. Dominion of mind was considered in the last section. I here add, that dominion is implied in every act of volition. "Volition, it is plain, says Mr. LOCKE, is an act of the mind knowingly exerting that dominion which it takes itself to have over any part of the man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action," Every volition, therefore, implies a conviction of dominion in respect of the action willed, to be done or forborn. A man may be inclined to make a visit to the moon, or to the planet Jupiter; but nothing except insanity could make him will to do

do so. And if even insanity produced this consequent, it must be by previously making him think it within his dominion.

As this act of mind always implies a belief of some degree of dominion predicable of ourselves; so also in some common and familiar cases it implies a belief with regard to others. When we impute to a man any action or omission, as a ground of apprehension or of blame, we must believe he had dominion for doing otherwise had he been inclined. The same is implied in all advice, exhortation, command, and rebuke, and in every case in which we rely upon his fidelity, in performing any engagement, or executing any trust.

Dominion we have supposed to consist in ability conjoined with suitable circumstances. That we have some degree of dominion over our actions both of body and mind, I have thought and still think, to be a self-evident truth, and as perceived by me, necessary knowledge in my mind.

All dominion must be derived from the fountain of dominion, and of every good gift Upon his good pleasure its continuance depends, and it is always subject to his immediate and mediate control. Consequently our dominion in every case is a subjected dominion: And if we reflect, that without external created objects there could be no sensation, without sensation no human conscious existence, we justly add, Our dominion

minion is subjected to surrounding creatures, whilst it is primarily and ultimately subjected to God.

Human dominion may be extended or abridged by a variation of ability. Thus in case of loss of strength or its increase; loss of habit or its attainment for exercising a particular art. Human dominion may also be extended or abridged by the circumstances changing. A man conceived himself to have ability and opportunity to walk abroad agreeable to an appointment: but his dominion in that respect is abridged by an officer, who claps a lock and bar on his door, or a fetter on his leg; and his dominion is extended when they are taken off.

This apprehension of dominion, as I before hinted, may be either primary or habitual. Through the frequent occurrence of some actions and some refrainings, we are habituated to conceive that we have dominion for them, and consequently, sometimes concur to their existence without reflection on the dominion. Thus we stretch forth our hands, move our feet, our fingers, or tongue at pleasure. This is, perhaps, the case respecting the greater number of our volitions: The action or forbearance is willed without reflection on our consciousness of dominion for acting or forbearing, as the mind directs.—By a *primary* apprehension of dominion, I respect that dominion which the party has just discovered a possession

possession of, either by a previous experiment, or else by present reasoning on the nature of the act or forbearance. Thus by experiments, having just attained the direction in which a diamond will cut glass, you primarily apprehend you can again concur to it on your inclination. Thus by an experiment finding I can lift a burden, I primarily apprehend that I have ability to lift it again in similar circumstances : Or knowing my ability to lift one hundred weight accommodated to one's hands, and being assured that the said burden does not exceed a hundred weight, I also primarily conclude that I have dominion in respect of lifting it. Thus also a young musician discovers, by an experiment, that his ear is adequate to tuning a piano forte : and consequently primarily apprehends he has ability to do it again. But he habitually apprehends he has dominion for playing a tune which he has practised.

4. Apprehended liberty is essential to volition. Dominion apprehended is not all that is further requisite to volition, for there must also be apprehended liberty. Where there is dominion in respect of an action or a forbearance, there may not be liberty. A paralytic may have dominion for lying still, but has no volition to forbear rising, because he does not apprehend himself to have liberty for both rising and refraining. Another person by a convulsive operation may move his limbs ; he has dominion in that respect, but
has

has not liberty to move them and refrain it ; and therefore his motion cannot be voluntary.

Liberty consists in opportunity for acting, and for forbearing to act, on our inclination : But not always in opportunity for both an action and its contrary, as our inclination shall be. He that is, as Mr. LOCKE instances, close prisoner in a room twenty feet square, being at the north side of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet southward, because he can walk or refrain it : But is not, at the same time, at liberty to do the contrary, that is to walk twenty feet northward.

Constraint and restraint are opposed to liberty or freedom. Restraint in relation to action, and constraint in relation to forbearance. We do not conceive the man to be at liberty who strikes himself or his friend by a convulsive motion of his arm, but pity him as acting by constraint. We do not conceive a military man to be at liberty, who does not go to visit a dying friend, whilst he himself is under confinement in a castle, but pity him as forbearing by restraint.

Within the confines of liberty is the whole sphere of suasive government. Here legislation and magistracy may be exercised for the good and advancement of limited rational beings, but cannot pass these bounds. For to give laws where there is no opportunity of obedience and disobedience as inclined, is madness ; to communicate good as an enforcement to such laws, is
not

and aversion may exist and influence the same breast at the same time. Under the influence of desire to rise and aversion to lying a-bed, I may will to rise.

The immediate efficient part of the cause of volition, is emotion and its operation. But there is also an efficient part of the cause of the existing passion: This I conceive to be the ability of some object as conceived, and its attendant operation which we call exciting. A suitable object conceived and consequent exciting, compose a remote motive to volition. Here something suitable is perceived in the proposed action or forbearance, or else in one or more of its *ends*. When tired on a journey on foot, the idea arises in the mind of forbearing another step. Properties and suitable circumstances concurring, we are influenced to desire forbearance of walking, and in the next step to will it. Here the cause gives birth to volition, by the nature of the object of volition, namely, *forbearing to walk further*, operating by idea. Again, we are determined to a *disagreeable* action, sometimes, because the hope of reward sweetens or at least softens labour, that is the end an expected reward exciteth desire, which with its operation determines the volition to an action, that, apart from its connection, and in itself is disagreeable. Thus most men pursue their civil calling, chiefly under the operation of the end, expected advantage.—The *final end*, as concurring to passion, and with its operation com-

posing a remote motive to volition, is a distinct conception, and its object may be a distinct thing, from the *end* of the *tendency* of a volition; yea, sometimes, these ends may run counter to each other. Thus in war between two nations, the money distributed in a country to raise insurrections, tends to enrich that people, which was never the end of its enemies, in that voluntary distribution.

But there is also an efficient part of the cause of the said conception of a suitable object. This I view as ability in perception, and its attendant operation, which we call inciting. This understanding part of the process, I call the most remote motive of the determination.

To illustrate, we will take the case of Lot when he went to dwell in Sodom, Gen. xiii. The immediate motive I collect to have been desire of preventing strife in future with Abram's household, through want of room for their respective flocks, and also desire of equal or better accommodation to himself and his herdmen. This passion, with its inducement, was the immediate motive of his separating and journeying east.—The next remote motive seems to have been his persuasion or belief, that the plain of Jordan was well watered, this, with its attendant excitation, in respect of emotion, was a remote motive of his separating and dwelling in the cities of the plain.—Lastly, the most remote motive was the perception coexistent

istent with his lifting up his eyes, and beholding all the plain of Jordan, that it was well watered every where, even as the garden of the Lord. This perception, with its accompanying incitation in respect of the forefaid belief and persuation, were the most remote motive of Lot's volition of separating from Abram and journeying eastward; till a new motive was requisite for the volition of pitching his tent towards Sodom.

Further illustrations seem needless, as every one may make so many experiments as he pleases on facts, which occur every day. We perceive objects, are *incited* to judge this good, that better, this bad, that worse; and thus conceiving of them in suitable circumstances, desire is *excited*, and desire in suitable circumstances for volition with its *inducement*, is immediately essential to volition.

The immediate, remote, and most remote, motive, may, for facility of speech, be expressed by emotion, final end, and conception, using them as synecdoches. The emotion is the immediate ground of volition. The final end, the ground of emotion, and a complex conception, the ground for a final end. Though such expressions may be tolerated for convenience, yet, in meaning, understanding must not be divorced from its incitation, the final end from its excitation, or the passion from its inducement: since ability and operation, compose our philosophical notion of the

efficient part of a cause. Philosophical disquisitions, require determinate expressions: but perhaps it is eligible, for facility of speech, in common conversation, to call the most obvious passion, which attended a volition, the motive. Thus if I were asked from what motive, the hog butcher in Gravel-Lane killed his wife? I should reply, Jealousy.

If the desire requisite to volition is pleasurable, through anticipation of any enjoyment, we sometimes call the operation and influence of it as generally conceived, attraction. When the desire is painful through the forebodings of unavoidable pain, or when aversion is the emotion, its operation and influence may be called deprecation, what is most deprecated is never the object of volition, but on the contrary, that which is least. In both these cases the terms obligation and inducement, are also applicable. We are obliged or induced to sing, are obliged or induced to sigh and complain.

Be it noticed, that what I have said of motive is most properly applicable to the motives of valuable determinations. I have not forgotten that in our disquisition on power, we conceived power to be essentially related to excellence, and that consequently there is a large class of antecedents, commonly called negative causes, which involve ability, capacity, and circumstances attended with actual operation and influence, yet which as no
including

including power, do not come up to our notion of a proper cause. As we have no particular name to this large species of antecedents, I have, in this Disquisition, without distinction involved them, for sake of facility to myself and readers, under the general term cause. I do not think, however, that we strictly and properly conceive a cause to involve baneful incitation, excitation, or inducement; nor consequently, that we conceive strictly and properly of motive as the efficient part of the cause of a bad determination, notwithstanding motive expresses in every case active property and operation. People seem aware of the difference of motive respecting a good and bad determination, since they exchange the word induce for seduce, respecting a bad determination. Thus in common talk we say, He induced me, she induced him, I induced him: Promises induced me, my love induced me, hope of success induced him: But when the object to which the party is inclined is evil or noxious, the word inducement is exchanged for seducement, and we confess, He seduced me, she seduced him, I seduced them, fair promises seduced me, gold seduced him.

The doctrine of motives has been, in my opinion, treated very absurdly in the present age. Writers have confounded motives with reasons, or considerations, and represented them as similar to advice, exhortation, and counsel, which may

be complied with or resisted. Let us call over some of their assertions, concerning motives, with the addition of a thought or two respecting them, as we go on.

A philosopher has told us, that motives are *neither causes, nor agents*. I should wonder to find them causes, and should be equally surprised on discovering them to be agents. I know of no kind of action, but thinking and moving. The mind that thinks, is an agent or actor. The body that moves is an agent or actor. And a being may exist that both thinks and moves: Witness myself, But motives have neither the action of thought nor of motion, consequently are not agents or actors.

He tells us, That a motive *is not capable of acting, or of being acted upon, that we cannot, without absurdity, suppose a motive to act or to be acted upon*. I grant both these propositions true: but beg leave to assert, that a motive, even according to his notion of it, can both operate, and be operated on. I refer my cause to those who possess common sense, for a reply to these queries. Is not the general action of the mind, that is to say, its thinking, affected in its degree of intenseness and remissness by the operations of our emotions? or more strictly, their concurrence to operation? Does not love operate? Does not jealousy depend, for its existence, on the operation of love? is not the operation of either love or hatred, in
all

all cases essential to the existence of desire, and also of aversion? And on the other hand, is not love operated on, when by concupiscence it is entirely destroyed. Thus when Amnon who loved his half-sister Tamar, had ravished her, 2 Sam. xiii. it is said that Amnon hated her exceedingly, so that the hatred wherewith he hated her was greater than the love wherewith he had loved her.—I apprehend it holds universally, that all existences may operate, or more strictly, concur to operation, and may be operated on, whether we have strength of mind to get over the prejudice attending their division into subject and mode, or to trace, in any degree, the operation or not.

Again we are told, That a *motive is not a thing that exists, but a thing that is conceived, and that it is, what the schoolmen call an ens rationis*. But I pray now, Do not conceptions actually exist? Is not an object of conception essential to the existence of conception? Do not sensations actually exist? Do not judgments actually exist? Do not passions actually exist? What argument then is there in the said assertion.

Again he tells us, That innumerable cool and calm determinations exist without a motive. To support this assertion, he appeals to our consciousness, that every day we perform many trifling, but voluntary actions, without consciousness of a motive.—The division of volitions into primary and habitual, will fully account for this phenomenon :

menon : But whether it is accounted for, or not, unconsciousness of motive will never prove there is none respecting the most trifling actual volition.

The philosopher next tells us, there may be opposing motives. Concerning opposing motives, I find some affirm that when they are equal, there can be no volition : but that when they are unequal the strongest prevails, whilst others affirm, the mind can determine when motives are equal, yea and may determine on the side of the weakest motive.

The whole of this language will appear perfectly ridiculous, if we retain a consistent notion of motive. No one can use such language with any degree of consistency, but the man who considers motives to mean no more than reasons and counsellors, considerations and advisers. If any one chuses to abide by the notion, that motives are merely reasons or considerations : I will readily grant, that where there are apparently equal reasons for and against a proposition, there can be no incitation to assent : and that when they are unequal, incitation must exist, and a consequent judgment *pro* or *con* also. I grant also, that a man's volition may run counter to this judgment, may be of that for which there is the least reason, or not even the shadow of reason, and why, but, because existing emotion, which immediately influences the volition, goes on the
other

other side, and the said reasons have neither part nor lot in the volition, no, not even as remote motives. Thus in all cases of falling by temptation or seduction :—But what has all this to do with the efficient part of the cause, or motive according to my representation of it ? surely nothing at all. If a man contends that motives are arguments, or that arguments are motives, whether they have operation respecting a volition or not, he has still to conflict with the efficient part of the cause, why a volition is of this object and not of that, in any instance, although he has left it without a name. I call nothing a motive, that does not concur, actually concur to an actual wish, purpose, or volition. Motives are movers, that which does not move may be called a mover, if any one chuses it ; but it can be but a nominal mover, a phrase tending only to jargon and nonsense.

Impassioned thinking or an impassioned thought with inducing, I judge to be the efficient part of the cause of a volition and to be its immediate motive : And nothing is more evident than that where the volition does not exist, there can be no immediate motive existing ; and that where an immediate motive does not exist, there can be no remote motive existing.

Perhaps there may be instances of contrary passions existing in the same breast, almost at the same instant, or a conflict of passions : but I beg
leave

leave to affirm, that they cannot efficiently respect the same object: hence one only of them can be a motive to one volition. Desire and aversion, desire, and its negation, or aversion, and its negation respecting the same object cannot exist at the same time, and in the same respect.—The conceived objects which immediately concurred to the excited passion, I have called a remote motive, but, no opposing motive of this class can possibly exist; for that could be no motive which was not attended with excitation. And two opposing objects adapted to raising passions, can never actually exist any more than opposing passions at the same identical time and in the same respect.—The perception of the mind which is attended with incitation, I called the most remote motive of a volition, but this most remote motive cannot consist with opposing perceptions: For incitation, can accompany but one of them at the same time and in the same respect.

I add by way of corollary, that the whole business of weighing motives, or treating them as weights applied to a balance, can have no place in sound philosophy, there being no analogy between them.

The gentlemen who have treated the doctrine of motives so confusedly, seem to owe their absurd notion of motive to their more absurd notion, that the mind is a cause, and what they call the efficient cause of its volitions. I trust no
thinking

thinking person who has read the former disquisitions, will attempt to defend that sentiment. I humbly conceive the mind, in conjunction with the essential action of the mind, its thinking, to be the subject part of the cause of volition, and indeed of every other modification of thinking and of its thoughts.—I think their laboured metaphysical discussion of motive deserves no further attention.

If any should object and assert, that if my representation of mental causes be just, the consequence is, men are mere machines, To this I reply, that having never been able to perceive a consistency in applying such an assertion to the mind, all machines being composed of matter and under the laws of motion, if the objector thinks it deducible from the *reality* of mental causes, he must bear with me till I hear something rational advanced against that reality. Indeed I know not that any will oppose that quaint saying, to my representation of motive and mental causes in these disquisitions.

Respecting the necessity of volitions, a word or two. I hope the disquisition on power, and the foregoing part of the delineation of the process of preference and inclination, are sufficient to evince the necessity of human volitions in a direct way: I shall here only attend the absurdity of the contrary supposition.

Those who admit that independence on other
creatures

creatures, and of the Deity, in respect of their volitions being this and not that, that and not this, is what they call liberty, or who account that their volitions were not necessary, methinks cannot move a step without absurdity. To make this glare on the intelligent reader, let us advert to the divine prescience. The man who admits or asserts the unlimited prescience of the Deity, yet asserts this independence of his own will, asserts in plain English, that he has dominion for making God a blunderer in his knowledge. In proof we recur to a familiar instance. Suppose one of these gentlemen to tell me, that it is known to God whether he shall to-morrow morning incline to rise before nine or forbear it: but that his own will is independent, or that his mind is independent in that respect, that he has liberty and dominion to will to rise at one time, or to lie till another. In my opinion if he means any thing diverse from my notion of dominion and liberty, he must mean that he has dominion, not only for concurring with, but for going against the knowledge of God, and rendering what was knowledge, a mistake or blunder, which is absurdity.

To make this more striking, we may consider this foreknowledge an actual existence in the Deity. We will suppose that he knows this day, what will be your volition or my volition to-morrow, this knowledge is now actually existing in
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the Deity, whilst this is fully admitted, the gentleman as fully asserts that to-morrow morning life and health continued, we shall have independence or dominion in respect of which our volition shall be of, and thus by just inference, as fully asserts independence or dominion adequate to willing the object which the Deity knows we shall, or its negation, or its contrary, that is to say, adequate to willing the object, the Deity knew we should not will, as well as to willing that which he knew we should actually will.

Again to recur to the former case, Suppose that God knows he will have volition to rise at some point of time previous to nine. The man consistent with his hypothesis to-morrow morning (for we now suppose that period is arrived) still asserts the independence of his mind in regard of the volition of rising or forbearing it: but by asserting liberty, according to his sense of it, to incline to its forbearance, he asserts independence adequate to frustrating what was yesterday known by the Deity.—If he says, No, God could not be mistaken, he must have a knowledge of the free actions of men, however incomprehensible to me, he must have known what I should, and now do actually incline to. I would reply, Why my friend, then of consequence your present volition is necessary, is necessarily what it is, must be what it is, could not be otherwise than what it is; for God cannot alter his yesterday's knowledge

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ledge

ledge actually existing. The necessity of the event is all I contend for.——Is it not fully evident, that this person, denying necessity, holds there is a connection, an indissoluble connection, between the event of yesterday and the event of this morning. And yet affirms, that the event of this morning is without necessity, and independent on God, and creatures, being only dependent on himself, in this respect detached from all other beings? Is not this to all intents and purposes making a connection necessary and unnecessary, and the event necessary and unnecessary, at the same time, and in the same respect?

If we advert to other perfections of the Deity, a kindred absurdity attends the notion, that human volitions are of this object and not of that, in part, or in whole, independent on the Deity.——Some of that opinion, have admitted to me, That God is omnipotent and infinitely wise, yet have also admitted that God wills what has not existed, does not, and will not exist, and not only what has not existed, does not, and will not exist: but what he at the time of willing absolutely knew had not existed, did not, and would not exist. And asserted it to be in their opinion consistent with his infinite power and wisdom.

Consistent with this opinion, asserted that God willed Adam should stand and not fall, not only before and at his creation; but also at the very moment when he ate the forbidden fruit. That
he

he willed it not only previous to his fall, and at his fall; but also whilst he with *absolute certainty* knew that Adam would fall, and also whilst under the full eye of God, he did actually take of the fruit and was eating it.

Admitted that Christ according to the scriptures, was delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God: yet asserted, that God willed that Judas should not betray our Lord, not only previous to, but at the moment when he betrayed innocent blood, and also that he willed it whilst he absolutely knew that Judas would betray him, yea, and whilst he knew that he was actually committing his aggravated crime. Where will not an intemperate zeal for a system carry a man! especially when supported by some superstition.

With equal consistency they might assert, and I suppose would assert, that God willed the foreigners, who lately murdered their fellow traveller and benefactor, should not have killed him, and *that* not only previous to the horrid deed: but also with full and certain knowledge, that they were actually doing it. O what a being do they make of the omnipotent and infinitely wise God!

Should any reader reply to this effect, By will of God, as used in these instances, "I mean, that will of precept, or command, in which, God has prescribed to us what we ought to do, and

" which has rather our duty than our actions for
 " its proper object. I would say, that by it God
 " wills formally and immediately, not our doing
 " what he commands, (for then our obedience must
 " follow necessarily and infallibly,) but our being
 " obliged to do it. And thus it is, his will always
 " obtains effect: for whatsoever God has com-
 " manded, it is our duty to perform, whether we
 " actually perform it or not." Should such reply
 be made, I grant the expression may be tolerated and
 that the sentiment involves no contradiction.

Thus these philosophers fall into the absurdity
 of making God to will in a thousand instances,
 what he at the instant knew it was impossible
 should take place, with an impossibility arising
 from his present evident knowledge that the event
 will turn contrary.

Suffer a remark or two, before I proceed to the
 kinds of volition.—Thinking in general, is not
 voluntary action, because we cannot refrain think-
 ing if we please: but thinking under this or that
 modification, and of this or that object, frequently
 is voluntarily because within our dominion, or the
 dominion of the inclined mind.—A man is not at
 liberty to refrain the action of soul, we denominate
 thinking, nor is he always at liberty to think on
 what objects, or under what modification of
 thought he is inclined. Assent of the mind is a
 thought, under a different modification from pre-
 ference,

ference, yet assent may exist with preference or without it. A wicked man may prefer a connection between indulging his lust and happiness, to a connection between its mortification and happiness, but his assent to the latter is irresistible.

—Wish cannot affect assent on full evidence: yet on doubtful evidence a wish may bias either way; a cheerful mind assents strongest to the favourable side; but a gloomy melancholy temper assents strongest to the unfavourable side, foreboding evil.—Often times volition coexists with assent, many of our assents are voluntary. Assenting is many times the immediate consequent of willing. Thus a miser assents to the safety of his gold. In all cases where the mind voluntarily surveys evidence of what is desired, the assent also is voluntary as being the immediate consequent of what is directly willed. Primary, and oftener habitual volitions are essential to the actual existence of assent in many particular instances. Thus the comparing ideas or objects in relation to a third to draw an inference is generally habitually voluntary.

Volitions may be distinguished according to their immediate motive into *cool* or *sanguine*, and *primary* or *habitual*.

(1.) Volitions are cool or sanguine. Desire and aversion are the passions one of which is ever essential to volition—Desire respecting what is willed, and aversion respecting what is nilled

or rejected. Now when warm passions actually existing, concur to the motive, the *volition* is *sanguine*. But if we determine when we are unconscious of the immediate motive : Conceptions being understood by the mind, yet attended with no sensible commotion : It is a *cool volition*, or what some have called a *velleity*.

(2.) Volitions are primary or habitual. When the mind contemplating proposed objects as related to pleasure and pain, becomes the subject of desire, which desire concurs to will, the volition is *primary* or *original*. But when by a repetition of like objects and circumstances producing a repetition of like volitions, a greater or lesser degree of habit is formed of determining in such cases, when the remote motive is not reflected on, and we are unconscious of the immediate motive ; these volitions are *habitual*. This seems the fact more or less in every series of voluntary forbearances or actions. Many volitions in a series are usually habitual, by virtue of repeated volitions on the original motive. And many actions and restraints in a series may be habitual, which series was begun by primary or habitual volition.

Volitions, according to their remote motives, may be distinguished into *own will* and *another's will* : *Self will* and *self denials* ; *compulsive* and *restraitive* ; *spontaneous* and *reluctant*.

(1.) Own will, and another's will. (These names sound oddly, but are agreeable to popular language.)

language.) When the preference of no other person recollected is a partial cause of our determination, such volition is called our own, and we say *my will*. But when the manifested preference or approbation of another chiefly concurs to volition, and when if the said preference of that other had not influenced us, we should not have willed the action or forbearance we actually did, but the negation thereof, we call that volition, not ours but that other persons—That other's will. Thus a servant says, I did not my own will, but my master's.—It has been said, If I had my will, he would have been forbidden the house: but this expression wants precision, as *wish* should be substituted instead of *will*.

(2.) Self will and self denial. When a man, through an error of judgment, or violence of passion, suffers not the opinion of others to have due motive influence on his determinations, he is said to be *self willed*, refractory, unsubmitive, unresigned, and this may respect either an instance or a general character. But when our preference clashes with the preference of a superior, and our volition is influenced by the manifested preference of that superior, the state of mind or volition is *self denial*. This division differs from the former only as having respect to virtue and vice, which the former has not.

(3.) Volitions are compulsive and restraintive. When by the apprehended superior ability and advantages

advantages of another agent, we are induced voluntarily to do what otherwise we should not have been willing to do, the volition is *compulsive*. When by the superior ability and advantages of an agent, we are induced voluntarily to refrain doing, what otherwise we should have been willing to do, the volition is *restraintive*.

(4.) Volitions are spontaneous and reluctant. When the action or forbearance proposed is of a nature tending to excite the passion which is the immediate requisite to the volition, the volition is *spontaneous* or *hearty*. Thus to sing, to dance, or on the other hand, to rest or repose. When the action in its own nature is undesirable and disagreeable, and the mind is determined through the medium of a diverse final end or other consideration, which raises the motive passion, then the volition is reluctant—The man acts or refrains without his heart. Thus a man bridles his tongue, or forbears to reply under provocations, through the fear of God, or desire to perform self-denial. And thus a good father corrects his son, through desire of his profit, however trying to his parental feelings.—We are sometimes said to do a thing against our will; but this is an indefensible mode of expression for doing it reluctantly through the influence of persons or things, or both on our motives.—I will add a familiar instance of spontaneity and reluctance. A grocer and tea-dealer refuses to serve you with sugar, unless

unless you likewise buy your tea of him—His sugar you approve as being of a superior quality, but do not like his tea,—having weighed the matter, that is, compared the objects in reference to the notion of good, your approbation of his sugar preponderates, and you voluntarily take of him both sugar and tea. You buy them both voluntarily, but the sugar spontaneously, and tea reluctantly.—Thus also we spontaneously take food, but reluctantly take physic.—To give an historical case, we may advert to the reluctance of Lot, when he left Sodom, previous to its destruction, Gen. 19. His volition was reluctant, but that of the angels spontaneous.

Volitions, according to their nature, are distinguished into *direct* and *indirect*, *effective* and *admissive*.

(1.) *Direct* and *indirect*. Where the forbearance or action is supposed the immediate object of the volition, the volition is *direct*; thus, to stretch forth the hand or forbear it.

The known consequences of a volition are of two kinds: *first*, such as coincide with, or which are the end of our volition: or *secondly*, such as make no part of our end. Now the former of these are virtually and directly willed in the volition of action or forbearance. But the latter class although virtually willed yet are indirectly willed by the volition of acting or refraining.

Thus,

Thus, by willing to paint, I indirectly will the necessary imperfection of my picture.

An indirect volition respects the undesired forbearances, actions, or events, which are consequents, and perceived to depend on the immediate act or forbearance. It goes to every thing diverse from our end, which is a known consequent in the nature of things, of our immediate acting or forbearing, whether that knowledge is, respecting its evidence, possible, probable or certain. All these are indirectly willed in the direct volition.—Thus our Lord indirectly made himself of no reputation, by directly taking human nature and submitting to the sorrows of the present state. But the following steps of a journey, and the following notes of a tune are directly willed as approved dependent consequents of our direct volition to walk and sing.—Again, if I voluntarily risk a guinea on the toss of a halfpenny, or throw of a die, and it falls to my disadvantage, though I prefer the contrary, yet I have not willed the contrary, but have indirectly willed what hath come to pass, in willing to risk my guinea on a toss, or throw, which might be, and in fact was to my disadvantage, the antecedent of the consequent loss of a guinea.

I think indirect volition is rightly restrained to those consequences only which are thought of at the time. The man who voluntarily hired a servant that eventually killed his son, did not by that
volition

volition indirectly will that murder: because he had no foreknowledge, or even conception of that event. The event was never thought of, and consequently there could not exist a thought of it under the modification which occasions it to be called will: and what never existed, could not be a direct or indirect volition. Yet I think that knowledge on the mere evidence of possibility is sufficient to support indirect volition;—that thus the people of England indirectly will the various acts passed by their Representatives in Parliament—That the members in the minority indirectly will every act of the House; and that the absent members indirectly will whatever is done by the House, in their voluntary absence. The direct volition, of which the first is the consequent, is the voluntary appointment of their Representatives in Parliament. The direct volition on which the second depends, is that of carrying all questions by the majority. And the direct of the latter, is that of absenting themselves.

The dependent enjoyment or suffering is indirectly willed, when we voluntarily act or forbear, as is requisite to its existence.

Volition cannot directly affect the passions whether to excite or calm them. They are not indeed the objects of volition, for the most sanguine inclination of any kind cannot directly affect them. Every one may make experiments for his satisfaction.—Many people cannot debate
a point

a point with a neighbour dispassionately, however ardent their inclination to preserve their temper. Others, perhaps, find it as difficult to excite the needful passions for a chiding. A friend to whom I am under obligations, may, by his obstinacy, grate my common sense, and occasion a complex passion. This may prevail to breaking my rest in the night, however strong my inclination to the contrary: and when I come to talk over the point with him, may prevail to affecting even the tone of my voice, whilst I would give almost any thing valuable to be able to speak of it calm and unruffled. In this case, as respecting the perfection of wisdom, though we would give all the substance of our house, we cannot attain it.—It is however worthy of notice, that when we are the subjects of a sanguine passion. we may concur to calming it, by turning a philosophical attention to it. Whilst we make it a subject of our reflection it subsides or retires.—Some have thought we might act in a similar way, and with equal effect respecting our bodily pains: but my experiments do not confirm the supposition.

Notwithstanding the passions are frequently consequents of our voluntary actions and forbearances, and as all expected consequents of volition are willed, so in all such cases the actually existing passions are objects of indirect volition.

Some consequents of volition both of action and forbearing are agreeable, and some are disagreeable.

agreeable. The agreeable are frequently the end of the volition of acting or refraining on which they depend : but a disagreeable consequent, unless disguised, can never be the end of the volition of which it is the result.—Thus, by voluntarily taking a wife, we indirectly will a new source of care :—By purchasing a horse, we indirectly will possession of all its faults :—By voluntarily making a mathematical instrument, we indirectly will the existence of its imperfection :—By voluntarily playing on a musical instrument, we indirectly will every defect in our performance :—And by voluntarily employing our eyes we sometimes indirectly will the sight of some unpleasing objects. But neither a new source of cares, the faults of a horse, or faults of a machine, defect of performance, or an unpleasing sight, could be the end of my volition.

Here permit me to remark, although the subject will come before us more directly in the application, that, direct and indirect volition is rationally attributed to the Supreme Being. All good actions of a creature, whether a man, or an angel, are with propriety resolved ultimately into the agency of God. But an evil action, whether of depraved men or degenerated spirits, cannot be traced back beyond some sinner, since he was the first who determined on that action, he only directly willed it, God never did ; The merely indirect volition of the Deity does not make it his

act, but is merely the necessary result of his infinite knowledge, and does not touch the moral agency of the creature, or affect his own suasive government.

Lastly, Volitions are effective and admissive. Where some immediate effect or effects are necessarily connected with my determination to act or refrain, the volition may be called effective. But when the effective determination of another agent is perceived to be necessarily connected with my volition of forbearing or acting in a certain respect, my volition is admissive. In other words, when our end necessarily requires active property or ability, to be voluntarily exerted by us to effect its accomplishment, the volition is called an effective or efficacious volition or will. But when we voluntarily refrain from exercising ability, we have to hinder by acting or forbearing the effect of what we foresee tending to its production, we are said, not only indirectly, but admissively or permissively to will the existence of such event or effect.—Thus the volition of an architect, who builds an edifice, and of a man who lies in bed to cure a cold, is *effective*. But the volition of withdrawing the hand from the cork hole of a cask in consequence of which the liquor runs out, as also, the volition of the unfaithful servant, who refrains resistance in consequence of which the house is plundered, is *admissive*.

Thus

Thus far in this disquisition, methinks, I have gone on experiments and followed the actual nature of things confirmed by experience: for I persuade myself, that the most unlearned husbandman, of good parts, if he reflects on what passes in his mind, can notice that he perceives two *objects* either merely in conception, or in sensible existence. He next views them in the respect of *apprehension*: Next under the modification of thinking we call *comparing*, and this in relation to good or pleasure. Here he reflects that a *judgment* is formed: this judgment is immediately attended with *affection* or *passion*; and in conclusion, he finds that thinking of them in contrast is now *prefering* one to the other. If the ideas were of action and forbearance, or of any event, then the passion was desire or aversion or both, that is, desire respecting the preferred object and aversion respecting the rejected, the preference was *inclination of mind*. If the inclination was to some thing uncertain or impossible, we denominate it *wish*: If to something in future to be done or forborn, enjoyed or suffered, it is *purpose*: but if the inclination was to something presently to be done or forborn, apprehended within the dominion of the inclined mind it is *volition*, and may manifest itself to others by signs of some sort.— Though the determinate notion of power may run through the whole series, yet the ploughman and the greatest philosopher are equally without a di-

rect conception of it, or of the operation of modified thought to produce another modification of thinking. Nevertheless all the operations of the soul, depend one upon another, and a train of thinking is aptly illustrated by a clue or chain.

SECTION VIII.

Of Choice.

CHOICE option, election, and selection, seem nearly synonymous words. Choice is, in my judgment a complex inclination of mind; which I know not how better to describe concisely, than by saying, choice is voluntary preference, and that chusing is voluntarily preferring. The best account I can give of this complex inclination take as follows.

The preference that we call choice essentially requires an antecedent volition, I said essentially because the *end* of the volition of chusing is the standard to which the objects are refered, in order to the minds neglecting one and embracing another, in which choice principally consists. Suitable subjects for choice being at hand, the question arises shall I chuse or shall I forbear? Perhaps I am indisposed to lay myself under obligation to a donor, and so voluntarily forbear to chuse. Perhaps I am disposed to suspend my chusing to some future opportunity, and so voluntarily forbear chusing at present

present. In short, if I have no desired *end* in prospect I shall not be induced to chuse: But if I have a desired end in prospect I shall be induced to chuse. Now the question arises which of the objects presented for choice will best accomplish my end? The process for answering that question joined with the resulting preference, is what we strictly call chusing.

The objects presented for simple volition are acting and forbearing, but the objects of choice must always be a contrast of the same genus or species, that is, considered of the same genus or species, in respect of the end of our present volition to chuse.

Wherever there is chusing, two objects, at least, of the same genus, must be presented to the mind, whether objects of special preference, or of inclination of mind. Agreeable with common language there must be two or more objects to make choice; for these objects thus presented for the mind to chuse, are frequently called choice.—Thus we say here is choice of fowls, choice of fish, choice of meat, choice of cloth, of ribbons, of rings, &c.—Where there is but one object presented for our approbation, we sometimes call it, by a proverb, Hobson's choice, or no choice at all. But it is choice as an act of mind, we are considering.

The objects of chusing are as extensive as those of preferring in general, for they may be things persons, enjoyments, sufferings, events, actions,

or forbearances, times and places. The final preference, wish, purpose, or volition in conjunction with the antecedent voluntary examination is what we call choice. Choice essentially involves a special preference, a wish, a purpose, or a volition, according to the circumstances of the object, hence there arises so many kinds of choice, and chusing.

The particular ends of the volition of chusing would be impossible to enumerate. Perhaps the special ends may be reduced to relief, security enjoyment, and communication. Those respecting preference as a species all centre in the general end *possession*.

Relief regards all evils we suffer, whether sickness, lameness, jeopardy, anxiety, sorrow, &c. Under affliction we chuse this, that, or the other physician, this, that, or the other prescription, this, that, or the other counsellor. We may remark, that the end of chusing is still relief, although the objects of which we chuse are the most dreadful. It is some relief, respecting evil objects, to suffer the least, Thus David, 2 Sam. xxiv. 14. When the Lord by his prophet Gad gave him choice of three disagreeable objects, namely, seven years famine, three months flight before his enemies, or three days pestilence, chose pestilence, and said, let us now fall into the hands of the Lord, for his mercies are great.

A suffering

A suffering is chosen in relation to a greater under a disagreeable circumstance of distress. Imagine that a ship on the mighty waters takes fire, the flames get the ascendancy, all hope to extinguish them is gone. An opportunity presents itself to the seamen for chusing whether to die by drowning or burning; perhaps, some of the ship's company chuse death by water, whilst some others chuse death by fire. In either case it was a poor relief.

Security regards opposition and exposure to ill, whether from defect of natural things, inflictions from superiors or the vices of evil disposed men. A house or castle defends our persons and property from descending rain and snow, shelters us from the scorching heat in summer, and from the piercing blast in winter; and in some measures secures us from the depredation of the unprincipled and inordinate of our species. The laws of a country secure the rights of private property and social intercourse. We sometimes have opportunity for chusing a house, a harbour, a fortress, clothing, armour, a government, &c. in this respect.

Enjoyment. The objects of our enjoyment are as extensive as our delights, and afford us innumerable opportunities for chusing. Choice of countries, gardens, orchards, and vineyards, are frequently made for this end: more particularly,
for

for eating, may chuse meat, milk, or vegetables: Beef or mutton, fish or fowl; peas, beans, turnips, &c. and the individuals of every class. For drinking, may chuse wine, or shrub, beer or tea. This sort of wine and not that, of this bottle and not of that. On consideration, we may chuse marriage in preference to promiscuous amours with the other sex. John may chuse Mary, Martha, or Rachel, for a wife; and Mary may chuse James, Thomas, or William, for a husband: Their end in which choice may be augmenting their pleasures, and dividing their burdens. We make choice for friends, companions, and servants. We chuse a profession, and chuse a situation in which to exercise it.

For gratifying the eye, people of taste chuse pictures, statues, and attire. For gratifying the ear, we chuse our music, an organ, a band, or the melody of human voices. For recreation, one chuses hunting, another hawking, or both may be chosen by the same person at different times. The good man chuses the conduct of wisdom, and enjoyment of divine approbation, whilst the bad man chuses the conduct of folly, and inordinate gratifications. These are instances of choice for enjoyment, to which any person may add at pleasure.

Lastly, Communication. A man confined for life, without opportunity for communicating to any kindred being, would be excluded from
tasting

tasting the fine pleasures arising from the effusions of love, gratitude, and goodness. The man is a wretch, who, having ample possession, has not a passion for communicating. This seldom happens. We approve of having children, friends, pupils, or apprentices, to whom in our turn to communicate of knowledge, property, or happiness, and have opportunities of chusing in this respect.

All these ends of choice as before hinted, centre, or terminate in our idea of possession, their objects are chosen for possession, so far as respects special preference of object to object.— Possession is by donation, by purchase, by taking, or by generating. We receive the valuables given to us, and thus have possession of them, We buy the needful articles which are not given, which we cannot take without injustice, and which we do not manufacture. We take by our own effort knowledge, take inanimates, vegetables, and animals, from off common land. Stealing is illicit taking. We generate in respect of vegetables and animals, and manufacture other things, which may also be included in our present conception of generation.—By these considerations we are led forward from choice, respecting the former objects of special preference to choice respecting the objects of inclination, the first of which is wish.

Choice, as including a wish of this object and

not

not of that or the other, is sanguinely exercised and exhibited in children, who are frequently chusing out of uncertain events, and objects of perception impossible for them to possess, whether fossils, flowers, fruits, animals, planets, stars, &c. Among people of riper age, choice, respecting objects of wish, seldom goes beyond reverie. Thus young women sometimes amuse themselves in chusing for husbands among their acquaintances, or a number of young men they accidentally see. And these selections go no further than wish, since modesty restrains the sex from making profession of love. The apostle Paul made an essay of chusing, respecting wish, but was unable to make up his choice. Phil. i. 22, 23, 24.

Chusing as involving purpose occurs every day. We voluntarily compare, examine, and confer on contrasted objects, the result of which is a particular purpose.

Of objects to be given, young people have generally many opportunities of chusing for their acceptance, wherein the choice involves a purpose. Choice of apples, choice of oranges, are presented, and choice including a purpose to enjoy this, that, or the other, is made. Parents give children a trade, a lad that is to be put apprentice has opportunity for chusing whether he will be a smith, a carpenter, a taylor, a shoemaker, &c. The end of volition to chuse, and to which end the objects are referred, may be his particular taste—his fancy—

fancy—or his judgment in respect of profit: A purpose of this that or the other trade is the conclusion, and involved in the choice. Suppose a gentleman will give me a ride with him to-day to Windsor, to-morrow to Uxbridge, or the next day to Barnet, *which* I shall chuse: My choice would include a purpose. Again, Suppose I were a young man, and the same gentleman gave me choice of his daughters for a wife; I might chuse, and my choice would include a purpose of receiving the chosen object from his hand in marriage at the day appointed.

Opportunities for chusing including the purpose of buying, bartering, hiring, &c. frequently occur. We purpose to buy the superfine cloth rather than the second, of this colour and not of that, and of this piece and not of that, or in either instance the contrary: which purposes not exclusive of voluntarily comparing them in respect of our end in buying, is our choice. Purposing to make a tour abroad, you may have opportunity for land or water carriage. If you chuse water carriage, a new opportunity for chusing presents itself,—whether boat, hoy, sloop, &c. and your choice in both instances involves a purpose. If you purpose to journey on land in a wheel carriage, you may have choice of several kinds, and of several individual carriages of each kind, your fixing on one is your choice. —For the end of pleasing imagination we will to
chuse

chuse and actually chuse, now of pictures, then of statues, at one time of curious products of nature, and at another time of works of mechanism, and purchase according to our choice.

We take the air or bathe in the water at our choice, whether for health or pleasure, and this choice includes a purpose. For the end of gratifying appetite and sustaining our being, we will to chuse, and actually chuse of the various salubrious objects presented, and help ourselves to those which appear most apposite to the end or ends of our chusing. The prophet Elijah said to all the people, "How long halt ye between two opinions? If the Lord be God, follow him: but if Baal, then follow him." 1 Kings xviii. 21. Here is enjoined a volition of chusing, for the ends, deliverance and happiness of the people; and consequently chusing that object for worshipping which should be discovered by the process most commensurate to these ends.—Whatever objects of enjoyment we conceive ourselves at liberty to take by our effort, whether it be study, labour, action, rest, and which is in its nature needful, convenient, or luxurious, we may chuse concerning, in respect to a future time, and our choice includes a purpose. And here we may observe, that distance of time, and difficulty of obtaining give place to near and easy, for determining choice respecting attempts, essays, and endeavours, when their objects are similar.

A farmer

A farmer intending to breed cattle, chuses whether to breed kine, sheep, or horses, the consideration and consequent purpose is the choice; whether his end in chusing was a competency for honest livelihood, accumulation of wealth, or merely his pleasure. For the same end or ends we will to chuse, and chuse what species of goods we will manufacture of those which opportunity offers.

If the objects of choice, which includes purpose, were actions or forbearances at a future hour or a future minute to take existence, and the purpose continues until that time arrives, the inclination becomes volition.

As the objects of enjoyment and suffering are excluded from volition, at least in a direct way, volition being restrained to immediate act or forbearance: The circumstances for chusing where volition is included, are not so numerous or frequent as for purpose. Accept the following instances. At my door, purposing a walk, I chuse to turn to the right and not to the left, or to the contrary. Running, I purpose its cessation, and then chuse to slacken my pace to walking, rather than immediately standing still, hopping, or jumping. Determining to discharge a debt—opportunity for choice whether to deliver a bank-note or money for that purpose, may present itself—And again, whether this note or that, this money or that, shall be actually taken and delivered to my

A a

creditor.

creditor. Thus also I may chuse immediately to write my thoughts rather than speak them, when I have opportunity for both: which includes a volition of writing.

For writing I take up and write with this pen and not that, because I conceive it to be best. When engaged in speaking I frequently use this word and not that, this phrase and not that, according to my choice of rival expressions. An artist in painting, chuses the pencil for the next touch most adapted to his intention, and employs it in this or that part according to repeated choice. A mechanic at work takes up now this tool then that, chusing in reference to the end of his exertion. The musician chuses the finger he will move according to the end of his chusing, namely, conformity to the particular tune. At table, I chuse now to take up my bread, now meat, and now vegetables; as I have no respect to the future but entirely to the present time, the conclusion of my choice in either instance is volition.

Choice frequently respects two contraries, but is not confined to them since any objects differing from each other, within the extent of the primary preference or inclination, may be objects of choice: but there can be no chusing any more than preferring, where objects are conceived to be without difference: for in that case one is not admitted to come nearer the end of chusing than the other.

Of

Of sensible things we chuse some for their comparative largeness, others for their smallness—Some because thick, others because thin—Some for their roundness, others for their squareness—frequently for their colour, and frequently for a something we cannot describe, which pleaseth us. Flavor, fragrance, beauty and harmony, are frequently the ground of choice, and frequently a something which nobody else can fancy. Of intellectual beings, one is chosen for his memory, another for his imagination—one for his courage, another for delicate feelings—one for judgment, another for taste—and frequently for a similarity of mind to that of the chuser.

We have innumerable opportunities for chusing, and an unquenchable proneness and promptitude to chuse wherever we can discover the least difference in respect of apprehended goodness, balancing defect against defect, excellence against excellence, agreeableness against agreeableness.—Perhaps we seldom pay or give a shilling without some transient respect to which we take for the purpose, when we have several. A banker's clerk, I believe, seldom gives the amount of a check in hard cash, without more or less preference of guinea to guinea for that purpose; or without a dexterous selection of the imagined best, or a proportion of them, either for himself or the party.

1. Liberty, which is a species of opportunity is essential to chusing. Liberty is predicable of choice, as of the other species of inclinations, and also in a respect which the others do not admit. It consists in this, that choice gives opportunity for consideration, and opportunity for consideration is liberty in that respect. Choice differs from the other kinds of inclination in that it requires time, a longer or shorter time for making it up. Consideration more or less is essential to chusing. Consideration requires time, consequently choice requires time. When there is no time for chusing, there can be no choice. In chusing, the determination is always more or less suspended, and essentially involves opportunity for so doing. Volition must take place when proposed, either of acting or forbearing, but it is otherwise with choice and chusing.

The right improvement of this peculiar liberty is fair examination of the objects in respect of the end of our chusing. We frequently make blunders through being too hasty in making up our choice; and sometimes, on the other hand, lose our opportunity for chusing through undue procrastination; this is awful concerning the great concerns of our souls. Perhaps we resolve to chuse, but suspend it every time it is proposed for immediate engaging, and at last, death deprives of farther liberty in that respect. Then
“ though negligent mortals may wish, wish never
so

so sanguinely for a few hours, a few minutes, to be thrown back from the opening eternity, thousands of worlds cannot procure the grant."

Liberty for chusing, that is, liberty to chuse, is in some cases pleasing and in some cases painful. In trivial matters, liberty for chusing is a source of pleasure, and abridgment of that liberty gives pain; because in the former case fancy is gratified, but in the latter is mortified. Fancy is ever prompt for giving a decision to our choice wherever novelty, beauty, or magnificence is concerned. The student takes pleasure in varying the places of his books according to his start of fancy: and the good housewife finds an equal gratification in repeatedly arranging her china, glasses, &c. And either would feel pain in being abridged of their liberty of chusing in these respects. Opportunity for chusing in some cases is, on the other hand, tremendous: for even in the most important worldly concerns that can attend us we are liable to err. Frequently there is opportunity for chusing—but we discover our great defect of ability or defect of the related capacity of the subjects. Thus, whether to take this or that shop when obliged to remove; whether to take this or that road when we have reason to believe an armed banditti is in one of them; are serious concerns: our choice is frequently embarrassed; and at other times, wrong choices are made which involve us in difficulties and distress.

2. Motive is truly essential to chusing as to the other species of inclination. The volition to chuse is not without motive: The voluntary examination and comparison of the objects in respect of our end is not without motive: nor is the consequent determination, which completes the choice, without motive. That motive is essential to chusing is evident from this first principle of human knowledge, EVERY EXISTENCE, EVERY EVENT, AND EVERY TRUTH, MUST HAVE A SUFFICIENT REASON, joined with the consideration, that, motive is the efficient part of the cause of our chusing. Let us glance at some cases supposed and set up as arguments against this position.

1. It has been asserted, that two different means may be equally fit for the same end, consequently, that no motive can attend the choice of using one for that purpose in preference to the other.

Waving the dispute respecting the actual existence of two means equally adapted to an end, and concerning which there is actually no reason why one should be preferred to another: I reply, That when such cases are apprehended, either no essay of chusing is attempted, or if attempted, is rescinded, as the apprehension becomes confirmed or established. Immediately on the apprehended discovery that two means are equally fit for accomplishing our end, the means are rightly and necessarily conceived to be an aggregate quantity

quantity of the same kind ; of which a certain proportion is required to answer the purpose ; And the inclination can only be a preference, purpose, or volition of using the mean or not using it. In the case supposed, a sufficient reason is admitted operative to a resolution or volition to use the mean. The motive goes to the determination of using that part without respect to the part remaining, and not to chusing one before the other, because they were by the supposition perfectly similar or apprehended so, and there cannot be preference of one object to another whilst they are apprehended to be without difference. I may have occasion and intention to pay a guinea when I have several in my pocket, which I apprehend equally good and equally adapted to discharging the debt. I have in this case opportunity for choice, but there is no ground for chusing because all the objects are apprehended without difference in respect to my purpose. My intention ripens to a volition and payment is made without any choice of the particular guinea. I should wonder if there was a motive to chusing, between objects acknowledged not to differ, and concerning which actual chusing does not exist.

Here has been also introduced the case of an hungry ass placed between two bundles of hay, or two fields of grass equally inviting. Now I grant asses may be poor logicians, yet I am fully convinced there never existed an ass capable of judging

ing two bundles of hay to be equally inviting, who did not also conceive them as an aggregate of the same quality, and began to feed without any other species of inclination than a volition which respected eating or refraining. The ass then as more intelligent beings would do in kindred circumstances acted under the remote operation of hunger, and under the immediate operation of desire to eat. The two bundles perfectly alike, in all their parts also alike, in the conception of the beast, must strike a hungry ass as one quantity of food adapted to his desire.

I hope it is fully evident to the intelligent reader, that in these cases there is no chusing, and that consequently these instances are not in point as arguments to support the position, chusing may exist without motive.

2. A second argument set up against this principle is, "That there would be no reason but the will of God, why the material world was placed in one part of unlimited space, rather than another, or created at one point of unlimited duration rather than another: or why the planets should move from east to west, rather than in a contrary direction." Perhaps the objector would say, The former cases supposed a simple end of tendency, but these suppose a fair contrast of conduct—a place on the right hand and a place on the left hand—Motion to the right, and motion to the left, and certainly these afford opportunity for chusing.

But

But I would remind the objector that it is human chusing, and not divine chusing, we are here treating of. Human choice may aid our conceiving of divine choice, but I have no expectation that divine choice will aid us respecting human choice. I will therefore state a supposition, and make some experiments; if the objector should be satisfied, I will say, *well*.

Let us picture to ourselves a lone house, having no avenue to the premises, but a door in centre of the front: within a few yards of the premises, in centre of the back part, is a stile and path running direct into the country: a broad pavement equally good surrounds the premises.— Suppose the inhabitant is disposed to take a walk in the field behind his house. Volition of chusing may occur respecting whether passing his door, he shall turn to the right hand or to the left. He has full apprehension that the pavement which surrounds the house is equally good and dry, but perceives that one side is in the sun, and the other in the shade. If in the summer, probably his choice will be of the shady side, if in the winter, of the reverse. The same may be observed respecting the wind, and he may chuse that which shelters him from the wind, or that which exposes him to the breeze, as is most agreeable to his present taste. And if we suppose no wind stirring, and no sun shining, he yet may chuse, because some surrounding objects on one side more gratify

gratify his eye, than those on the other. But we will suppose that even all circumstances are apprehended perfectly alike, what is his conduct? Will he stand at the door till he finds a variation of circumstances? No, his inclination will be no longer a volition to chuse; he perceives there is no rational ground of chusing, and relinquishes the attempt; but his inclination will be a volition to follow accident in respect of his moving from the door in prosecution of his design to walk in the field. The attention of his mind cannot be fixed on both ways at once, any more than his eye. He takes his first step, according to the way which is the object of his more direct perception of mind at the instant he is putting forth his foot.—Again, to make another experiment, suppose the mother, from a back window, hears the cry of her child, in the said field, and perceives that the turkey has flown at it, and continues the attack. She runs to its immediate relief, and so far from chusing this way or the other for her flight, she does not reflect even on the circumstances which gave opportunity for chusing, but turns this way or the other as readily as she opened the door, or crept under the stile: and on her return, perhaps, if you ask her, has forgotten whether she ran by the right or else by the left side of the house; and if she does remember, it was through something which struck her attention on the way, and not the

the act of chusing. The reader may make further experiments at his pleasure.

Perhaps the objector may rejoin, I grant there is edification in attending such experiments as you have stated, but they do not fully touch my point, you have evaded a chief part of my argument—The infinitude of space and infinitude of duration have been overlooked, these, certainly, are of a nature to afford no ground or reason for this conduct, rather than that, and for that conduct rather than this, and yet in fact, this conduct existed, and not that.

The very stating such a rejoinder would be, in my judgment, a sufficient reply to itself, for chusing is eternally excluded between objects respecting which there is no ground or reason for preference; and so far as we can rationally exclude ground or reason for chusing from any case, we may so far exclude evidence of the existence of choice itself from that case. Whether there is, or is not, a difference in respect of any divine end, whether the material world is placed where it is, or in some other part of space: whether there is, or is not, a difference whether it be created at this or that point of infinite duration: whether there is, or is not, a difference whether the planets move as they do, or in a contrary direction; I judge to be absolutely out of the reach of human intelligence to determine.

If there is no difference in respect of accomplishing

plishing the divine end, the Deity conceived them in my apprehension no otherwise than as an aggregate, consequently no choice could exist, and the inclination must be a simple volition of one or neither. But if there is a difference, which I apprehend most probable, then there was choice, and the philosophers' appearance of argument is equally lost.

Philosophers having confounded volition and choice together seems the chief occasion of debates on this subject, I trust the distinguishing them in this essay will occasion many to receive conviction that there can be no chusing concerning objects in the respect in which they are apprehended similar: and that consequently the position Motive is essential to chusing stands invulnerable.

We may be subjects of the most sanguine passions, respecting the objects between which we find a total inadequacy to chuse: because, the most tremendous consequence may be suspended on our willing this or that. But the case will not be more favorable to the notion of choice without motive, if the objects, concerning which there is no difference in our apprehension of them, are attended with the most tremendous consequences. Conceive of a captive in presence of his conqueror,—suppose him to have presented before him two boxes of similar size, shape and material, in one of which is inclosed the word
life,

life written on a slip of paper, and in the other the word *death*.—He is informed of the contents, and that he is to lay his hand on one of these boxes, which he pleases, and according to the inclosed word so shall be his fate—he is allowed three minutes to deliberate, and an executioner stands ready with a drawn sword, to cleave him down when the three minutes are expired, if he shall refuse to touch either.—The frame and feelings of a man, thus circumstanced, can easier be conceived than expressed. He knows the boxes are connected with events, the one most desired the other most deprecated. He *wishes* for the former, and to avoid the latter. No apprehended difference in the exterior of the boxes, he has no ground for chusing one rather than the other. Certain death attends him if he refuses to meddle with either, he therefore *resolves* to take one, he relinquishes the attempt to chuse, and submits the decision to chance, or to divine providence, and has no objection to fix which it shall be, by the toss of a piece of coin. The minutes up, now comes *volition* ; he takes, voluntarily takes, perhaps, with trembling hand, according to lot or accident and uncertainty, just as happens, one of the boxes, which being opened discovers his destiny.—Here was, as in the former cases, popularly speaking, opportunity for choice, but no other essential to the cause of chusing, no ground for its existence. The distracting, almost insup-

portable jeopardy lies like a dead weight, and can influence no choice.

Perhaps some prejudiced opponent may be yet dissatisfied and affirm, that the mind can prefer, and actually has preferred one object to another between which, strictly speaking, or, in the judgment of the mind, there is no difference.

It has been replied to this position, and I think rightly, that if so, the preference must be an existence without a cause.

No, rejoins the opponent, the mind itself is the cause of the preference.

Against this position I beg leave to reply, that power, operation, influence, an operator, and a subject influenced, are essential to cause: that these cannot be attributed to any single object, therefore the mind which is a single object cannot be a cause.

Well, says the opponent, but by cause you do not mean what I do, I mean, by cause merely the subject that is efficient.

We admit your definition for sake of argument, and reply, preference is a modification of mind, the mind then in its production is the subject which is efficient, and the subject influenced: But can the mind be active and passive, be operator, and be influenced respecting the same identical preference at the same time, and in the same respect?

Perhaps some prejudiced person may reply,
that

that he still considers the mind to chuse of indifferent objects, that in such cases the mind makes one to become pleasing, or makes one more agreeable than the other, by operating on itself.

To this we reply, that granting for sake of argument that the mind can make itself pleased with objects it was not pleased with, or make objects agreeable or disagreeable to itself which were before indifferent, by operating on itself, we remind the objector, that the mind must voluntarily operate on itself, or involuntarily operate on itself: If it voluntarily operates on itself, we have then a volition as unaccountable as the choice in question; if it involuntarily operates on itself, then the objector subjects the choice in question to that fatality which he denies.

I conclude that so far from chusing without motive, the attempt to chuse is always rescinded when insurmountable difficulty arises. Thus, *first*, when we discover inadequate ability. If we apprehend that our ability is inadequate to chuse, we usually refer our choice to some other person. Thus David unto God, Psalm 47. 4. "He shall chuse our inheritance for us." And thus in sickness we usually refer it to the physician to chuse our medicine, and to chuse a regimen for us. *Secondly*, when we apprehend that the objects are without difference, and thus without a related capacity. When we cannot apprehend a difference between the objects presented, we either suspend

our chusing, in which case our inclination becomes a purpose to chuse ; or else we relinquish our volition of chusing and the inclination terminates in a simple volition.

When we refuse to chuse, we indirectly will the known consequences of that refusal, but do not chuse them. When we suspend our choice, we also indirectly will the known consequences of that suspension, but do not in any sense chuse them. So also when we make essay to chuse, but find there is no difference in the objects ; or else discover our inability to chuse, and for that reason refer our choice to some other person, that is, as we say, let another chuse for us ; there is an indirect volition of the consequences, but neither direct nor indirect choice.

3. Choice is direct or indirect. Direct or proper choice we have hitherto considered. Indirect choice is choice that does not accord with the end of our volition to chuse ; and its object is some known consequent of our direct choice. By chusing an object, we chuse all the known consequences of our choice. All the known consequences of our direct choice which are more or less repugnant to the end of our chusing, are objects of our indirect choice. Choice is indirect of the consequent events of our direct chusing, which consequences were previously known, but were not objects of our desire. Thus, on chusing to take rhubarb rather than manna, we indirectly chuse its gripping.

gripping. And if we chuse to take Glauber's salts, we indirectly chuse their brackish nauseous taste. And thus a female who perceives she is loved by Charles and William, but chuses to give her hand to William; indirectly chuses her trial respecting his peculiar temper; and also the painful disappointment of Charles.

On reviewing this section we collect, that if the representation be just, opportunity of chusing is first essential to chusing:—Next, there must be apprehension that it is probable, or at least possible, that the objects differ from each other in respect of our end of chusing before an essay will be made.—An essay or attempt to chuse is not chusing, the choice will not be completed, unless, in the third place, one object is apprehended to come nearer our end or ends of chusing than another.

We have now gone through what was first proposed relative to the doctrine of preference, and have seen the fertile stock of humanity supporting the numerous branches of preference: we saw these branches adorned with the more numerous leaves of ardent wishes: waiting a little we beheld the more beautiful blossoms of purposes and resolutions: and anon the ripe fruit of volition, either growing singly, or clustering into the duplicities of choice. But could not help remarking, how few of the blooming embryos of fair purposes and most promising resolutions, ever matured and ripened into volitions.

Having

Having gone through what was originally proposed, suffer me to wind up the disquisitions with a short section on *human endeavour*.

SECTION IX.

Of Endeavour.

CONTINUED inclination and efforts for attaining an *end*, we call endeavouring, and endeavour. In other words, when we attempt by a series of voluntary or habitual exertion to accomplish an end attended with difficulty, *Thinking* takes the name endeavouring, and we are said to endeavour, or to do our endeavour.

The *end* and *purpose* must not be confounded. The school-boy may fix for his end, writing as well as his master: but does not purpose it, unless he conceives it within his dominion—The end of the master may be excelling in penmanship, all who have gone before him; yea, may not rest in an end short of absolute and unlimited perfection: but his purpose in respect of writing, can never go beyond his apprehended dominion.

Endeavour always respects an end which is considered to be as yet unattained. To endeavour to attain what we are conscious that we possess is impossible.

impossible. We may also endeavour to retain what we are conscious we possess : but that retention is, in this case, the end we aim at or endeavour to attain. We may also endeavour to obtain what in fact we possess, when we are ignorant of that fact : but this is an erroneous procedure.

Endeavour consists, I think, in a series of wishes, purposes, and volitions, tending to the attainment of an end. According as the end operates to an interrupted or uninterrupted series of wishes, purposes, and volitions, so is the endeavour denominated constant, uniform, or, interrupted and ineffectual.

Endeavour is strictly applicable to immediate action, and not to forbearing or refraining : for though we say I endeavoured to keep silence ; to refrain speaking, or to hold my tongue, yet the meaning is, I made efforts to strengthen my *resolution* to keep silence, refrain speaking, or to hold my tongue.

Human endeavour in regard of concurrence to efficiency, is confined to changes in matter or mind, which are all resolvable into the modifications of matter and mind : But the consequences and end of human endeavour may go further than these limits, for divine approbation may be a consequent, and infinite perfection our end.

To endeavour, expresses the use of all the opportunities and abilities, that any intelligent and
active,

active, yet imperfect being, hath to act. Perhaps the highest instance of creature ability, universally in heaven and on earth, in all ages, is to endeavour, strive, and occupy what they have. And whatsoever, according to the nature of things, would not exist in consequence of its utmost endeavour at a given time, is justly deemed impossible to that creature.

Imitation is natural to man. Man also is a sociable being: Example greatly influences endeavour. Indeed the greater part of mankind seem more influenced by example, than by précept. But endeavour is not influenced merely by example, for who that has seen a groupe of basket-nymphs bearing their summer fruits to the London market, can help concluding, that, company also animates endeavour?

I here close the Disquisitions, and with them, the first part of my Essay. The intelligent reader perceives that the doctrine of Power and Human Preference as here stated, must more or less affect several of the popular notions of the leading articles of the Holy Scriptures. The attempt to point out some of these affections is reserved to a future opportunity, in the mean while, candid reader, farewell.

END OF THE FIRST PART.



